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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Survivorship in Joint Accounts
Today the proceeds of numerous joint bank accounts lie dormant
in banks due to the fact that the law regarding the right of survivorship
in joint bank accounts in North Carolina is marked with uncertainty.
Administrators and executors of the estates of deceased parties to these
accounts are uncertain whether to retain the funds for the estates or
whether to award them to the surviving parties to the accounts.1 In
a recent law review note the author discusses the problem of an attempted
transfer of the proceeds of a joint bank account to the survivor of the
parties to the account, but at the time of that writing there were no North
Carolina holdings regarding joint bank accounts executed with a con-
tract for the right of survivorship.2  The purpose of this note is to dis-
cuss the development of the law since the last writing on the subject
and to answer, in so far as possible, the questions raised in that note.
For the purposes of this note joint checking accounts and joint savings
accounts will be treated alike since by both devices it is possible to
create a joint tenancy in the account.
At common law the right of survivorship was an incident of joint
tenancy in real property, and under this rule, the surviving party would
be automatically entitled to the property on the death of the other party.
That rule has been destroyed in North Carolina by statute,8 but the
supreme court has pointed out that the statute does not prohibit joint
tenants from making contracts to provide for survivorship both as to
personalty and realty.4
The law is generally settled as to joint accounts which do not contain
a clause designating survivorship. When the sole owner of the fund
can be ascertained, he, or his estate, will be awarded the entire fund.5
But when the evidence does not establish sole ownership, a presump-
I Professor Fred B. McCall will deal with the problem from the administrator's
point of view in an article to be published in a later issue of this volume of the
LAW REVIEW.
'Note, 31 N. C. L. REv. 95 (1952).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1950).
' Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531 at 535, 21 S. E. 202 at 204 (1895). "The Act
of 1784 (code, section 1326) abolishes survivorship where the joint tenancy would
have otherwise been created by the law, but does not operate to prohibit persons
from entering into written contracts as to land, or verbal agreements as to per-
sonalty, such as to make the future rights of the parties depend upon the fact of
survivorship."
'Hall v. Hall, 235 N. C. 711, 71 S. E. 2d 471 (1952) ; Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226
N. C. 313, 38 S. E. 2d 222 (1946) ; Nannie v. Pollard, 205 N. C. 362, 171 S. E.
341 (1933).
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tion of co-ownership arises and distribution is made accordingly. The
normal effect of depositing money in the name of the owner and another
is to make that other person merely the owner's agent with power to
draw on the account and upon the death of the owner, the agency is re-
voked. Thus, the agent has no right to any part of the account after
the owner's death. 7 The courts of North Carolina hold that such a
deposit does not create a gift nor does it establish a trust, for the owner
does not make a valid delivery of the fund nor does he relinquish con-
trol over the fund.8
It is when the joint account contains a provision for survivorship
that the confusion in the law begins, and this is especially significant
in light of the fact that most, if not all, banks today have such a pro-
vision in their standard signature cards for accounts. Since the gift,
trust, and agency theories will not support the survivor in his claim for
the entire fund, he must resort to a contract with a survivorship clause
to maintain his claim for the whole amount.9 The contract theory orig-
inated with Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank.10 In that case
the depositor made an agreement with the bank that in the event of his
death, his wife was to receive the entire fund in the account. Both hus-
band and wife were named in the account and either was authorized
to withdraw any or all of the fund. In awarding the fund to the widow
the court stressed the fact that the agreement with the bank was a valid
contract between the bank and the depositor, and discounted the con-
tention that the issue was whether or not there was a valid gift.
In a leading case11 the agreement contained the usual statement that
the depositors were joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and not
tenants in common, with the further provision that upon the death of
either party, the fund would become the absolute property of the sur-
vivor. The court upheld this agreement and declared the survivor abso-
lute owner of the balance in the account, emphasizing the contract saying
that there was an agreement made by the bank with its depositors and
that the bank and the depositors were bound by the contract.
North Carolina first recognized the contract theory of survivorship
in Taylor v. Smith'2 in which two sisters who were joint owners of a
I Smith v. Smith, 190 N. C. 764, 130 S. E. 614 (1925) ; Turlington v. Lucas,
186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923). "Under the law of this jurisdiciton, nothing
else appearing, the money to the joint credit in the bank belonged equally to
plaintiff and defendant." Smith v. Smith, supra at 767, 130 S. E. at 615.
7 Hall v. Hall, 235 N. C. 711, 71 S. E. 2d 471 (1952) ; Nannie v. Pollard, 205
N. C. 362, 171 S. E. 341 (1933).
'Jones v. Fulbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229 (1929) ; Thomas v. Houston,
181 N. C. 91, 106 S. E. 466 (1921).
'Note, 31 N. C. L. Rs v. 95 (1952).
10222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371 (1915).
"Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N. W. 2d 870 (1951).
22 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).
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note made a verbal agreement that the survivor was to be the sole owner
of the note on the death of the other. The court said that the right to
the fund in case one survives the other was a valuable assignable in-
terest, and there was then a valid contract with the mutual rights of
survivorship being the consideration. The same result has been reached
as to stocks,' 3 and in a later case, Jones v. Waldroup,14 the court seems
to have gone a step further in applying the contract theory. In this case
the husband, Mr. R. M. Waldroup, had stock certificates which were
made out to himself alone. He subsequently executed a paper under
seal authorizing the issuing association to transfer the -certificates to the
names of "R. M. Waldroup or Mrs. Hattie L. Waldroup, either or the
survivor." There was evidence introduced to show that Mr. Waldroup
changed the names so that "if anything should happen the other would
cash in without the usual red tape." Witnesses said that Mr. Waldroup
told them he wanted the stock to go to the survivor. In commenting
on this the court said: "We construe the conveyance . . . as creating a
common ownership in the property which is its subject until one of them
should die, with the right of survivorship."'15 The court denied the
plaintiff's contention that the wife was merely an agent of her husband
saying that the husband's intent was clearly to provide for the right of
survivorship in his wife.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the
contract theory in joint tenancies in some instances, there is some ques-
tion as to how far the court will go in allowing persons to contract for
the right of survivorship. Will the court allow one party who has de-
posited money in an account in his own name create by contract the right
of survivorship in another person? Will the court allow a contractual
right of survivorship where one party deposits his own money in an
account in his own name and that of another? Finally, where the con-
tract is allowed, what form must it take?
North Carolina has recognized third party beneficiary contracts
in other areas of the law, but the same is not true with regard to
joint bank accounts. In Wescott v. First & Citizens National Bank
of Elizabeth City16 the court struck down an attempt to create the
right of survivorship in one not a party to the account. A soldier in
Italy had sent money to the bank with a letter stating: "I wish to
establish an account with your bank. . . In case I become deceased
"Fawcett v. Fawcett, 191 N. C. 679, 132 S. E. 796 (1926). Two brothers
owned stock in a bank and made an agreement that upon the death of either, the
stock was to go to the survivor at par. The court stated that the agreement "is
a contract made by each and both parties . . . to sell to the survivor.. .. " Id.
at 683, 132 S. E. at 799.
"217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. 2d 366 (1940).
'BId. at 188, 7 S. E. 2d at 371.1 f227 N. C. 39, 40 S. E. 2d 461 (1946).
19561
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
I would like to make an agreement with you so as to make my bene-
ficiary my grandfather . .. to receive the money ... ." It was also
stated that this was to be an "in trust for account," and the court denied
the grandfather's claim due to the failure of the trust. No mention was
made of an attempted contract for survivorship nor of a contract to
establish a trust though the bank had accepted the deposit along with
the letter containing the agreement. Thus, this might be considered
authority for the proposition that our court will not recognize a third
party beneficiary contract in regard to joint bank accounts where both
parties are not named in the account.
Where both parties are named in the account, but it is determined
that one party is the sole owner of the fund, North Carolina authority
is to the effect that the sole owner, or his estate, will be awarded the
fund though there be a clause providing for survivorship.17 Thus, there
is an apparent requirement that the parties must not only be named
in the account, but that they must also be joint owners of the fund.
In the latest case in North Carolina, Bowling v. Bowling,'8 there
were four funds in question. The first was a joint savings account
opened by Mrs. Bowling with funds she had withdrawn from an account
in her own name. Later funds from another joint account of Dr. and
Mrs. Bowling were added to the savings account. The source of all the
other deposits and withdrawals is not determinable from the record.
This account initiated by Mrs. Bowling was recorded in the following
name: "Mrs. Agnes P. Bowling and/or Dr. W. W. Bowling, 1017
Demerius Street." Through error there was no joint account card
executed, but the bank had recognized the account as joint with the
survivor having a right to withdraw the entire fund.
The second account was an optional savings account opened by a
cash deposit and execution of a written agreement with respect to such
account. The agreement was as follows: "It is understood and agreed
that the shares hereby subscribed for are issued by the association,
and all moneys paid or that may hereafter be paid thereon are held by
the association for our account, as joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship and not as tenants in common, and that said shares may be resold
subject to the by-laws of the association, by either before or after the
death of either, and either is authorized to pledge the same as collateral
security to a loan." Both Dr. and Mrs. Bowling signed the agreement.
Money deposits were made by Mrs. Bowling, but the source of all de-
posits is undetermined.
The third account was a savings share certificate account opened by
a deposit and the execution of a written agreement with the association
17 See note 5 supra.
18 243 N. C. 515, 91 S. E. 2d 176 (1955).
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which read as follows: "Membership of joint holders (with right of
survivorship) of a share account. The undersigned hereby apply for a
membership and for a JOINT share account in the FIRST FEDERAL
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION OF DURHAm and for the issuance of
evidence of membership in the approved form in the joint names of
the undersigned as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not
as tenants in common." There is no record of the source of the de-
posits in this account.
The fourth fund in question was One Hundred Twenty Five shares
of common stock of Life & Casualty Company of Tennessee and was
registered as follows: 'William W. Bowling and Mrs. Agnes Paulk
Bowling, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common." There is no record of who purchased or possessed
the stock. Thus, whether there was sole ownership or joint ownership
of the fund is undeterminable.
As to the first account, the lower court said: "... the facts are in-
sufficient to establish that either the estate of William W. Bowling,
deceased, or Agnes P. Bowling is the sole owner of the entire fund
in this account. A presumption of equal ownership by the co-depositors
of said funds applies to the account."u9 The account was awarded one-
half to Dr. Bowling's estate and one-half to Mrs. Bowling. For identical
reasons, the court reached the same result in regard to the fourth fund,
common stock of Life & Casualty Company of Tennessee.
As to the second and third accounts, the lower court awarded the
entire funds to Mrs. Bowling saying: "There was a valid written con-
tract covering this account which was executed by W. V. Bowling
and Agnes P. Bowling .... By the terms of said contract it was agreed
that the survivor . . . would be the sole owner of the funds on de-
posit .... ",20
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the lower court in es-
sentially the same language. As to the second and third accounts the
court made the following comment: ". . and since the parties having
contracted and agreed that the savings accounts described hereinabove
as the second and third items, respectively, were held by them as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common,
the right of survivorship existed .... ,,21
The court in refusing to award Mrs. Bowling the entire amount
in the first and fourth funds, has in effect, denied the validity of a sur-
vivorship clause which does no more than say that the fund is payable
to "either or the survivor." Though this clause was not present in the
"' Bowling v. Bowling, Record on appeal at page 19 (1955).20Id. at 20.
2 Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N. C. 515 at 520, 91 S. E. 2d 176 at 180 (1955).
1956]
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first account, the account was recognized by the bank as one with the
right of survivorship in it. The clause was expressed in the stock
certificate as quoted above. The court in failing to recognize the clause
standing alone has followed its decisions of the past.
2 2
In the Bowling case it was shown that the surviving wife had con-
tributed to the first account, but still the court ignored the survivorship
clause standing alone. Perhaps this was because she did not contest the
lower court's ruling giving her one-half the account, but it seems safe to
say that the court probably will continue to ignore such clauses which
might well be a result of banking practice rather than an honest attempt
by the depositors to contract for the right of survivorship. In the two
accounts which the court did award the widow in the Bowling case
there were express contracts executed with the opening of the accounts.
These agreements specifically and unequivocally designated the sur-
vivor as having sole rights to the funds. The language is that usually
seen in specific and detailed contracts. The court seems to require that
the parties spell out the meaning of the clause, "payable to either or the
survivor." Though this seems to be merely an academic distinction, the
detailed form leaves no room for doubt that the parties intended for the
survivor to take the balance of the account.
The two accounts which the court awarded the widow were composed
of deposits made by both parties to the account; there was no question
as to the parties being co-owners. Where sole ownership has been
established, the court has consistently given the remainder to that party,
or his estate, who was the sole owner of the fund in the account.23 Only
where there was joint ownership did the court allow a contract for sur-
vivorship in a joint account.24  Thus, we apparently have two pre-
requisites to the formation of a valid contract as to joint bank accounts.
The parties must be co-owners, and they must execute a contract spelling
out their intent to create a right of survivorship in the survivor. Any-
thing less has yet to succeed in securing that right in North Carolina.
The exact form which the contract must take is not specified in the
Bowling case or any other case, but in the opinion of the Attorney
General the following has been held to be sufficient under Taylor v.
Smith25 and Jones v. Waldrou p26 to vest title in the survivor of the
joint account:
21 Pope v. Burgess, 230 N. C. 323, 53 S. E. 2d 159 (1949); Buffaloe v. Barnes,
226 N. C. 313, 38 S. E. 2d 222 (1946). In Buffaloe v. Barnes supra, the court
said there was no agreement nor oral evidence of an agreement. Evidently the
court simply refuses to see an agreement in an account labled as a joint account
with the right of survivorship. Also in that case the stock was purchased with
the husband's money and undoubtedly this had a bearing on the court's decision
in that it spoke of the absence of any consideration flowing from the wife.
2 Cases cited note 5, supra.
2 Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).2 Ibid. " 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. 2d 366 (1940).
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"We , and , the undersigned, do hereby apply
for membership in the Federal Savings and Loan Association of
and for the issuance of evidence of membership in the
approved form in the joint names of the undersigned who have
and do hereby agree as between us that the same shall be held
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants
in common, regardless of who places the funds in said account.
And it is definitely understood between us that in the case of
death of either of us the survivor shall be the owner of this entire
account, both principal and dividend which may be due at the
time of the death of either of us. .... ,,2
It will be noticed that the Attorney General's opinion was careful
to state that the agreement was between the depositors; no mention was
made of the bank as a party to the agreement. This is interesting in
light of the fact that the court in the Bowling case did not mention
G. S. 53-146.28 Heretofore the statute served to protect the bank, but
in light of the contract theory, it does not seem unreasonable to ques-
tion its application where the court has found a valid contract. There
would be no problem where the^ bank paid the survivor, but if the
bank should pay the fund to the estate of the deceased, then there is
an apparent breach of the contract with the surviving depositor. Thus,
the question arises: is the bank protected by statute in an apparent
breach of contract? Of course, there is the contention that the contract
is between the depositors only and that the bank is not a party to such
contract, but this position is logically untenable. When one man makes
a deposit with the bank, the bank is bound to pay him, and only him,
the fund on deposit. It is elementary that if the bank allowed a with-
drawal by a stranger, it would be liable to the depositor for breach of its
contract in the amount paid out. The same result would obtain where
there are two depositors as well as where there is only one. When an
agreement is excecuted at the time of deposit, the deposit should be
construed in the light of that agreement. The bank is a party to the
deposit, accepting it on the terms of the agreement. Contract law
would not allow the bank to accept the deposit and yet assert that it
was not a party to the agreement which controls the deposit. It seems
to follow that when a valid agreement is found, the depositors and the
depositary are all bound by it. One writer29 in discussing such con-
" Opinion of Attorney General to Hon. W. E. Church, Clerk of Forsyth Su-
perior Court, dated 9 October 1945.
2 8 N. C. GEN. STAT. 53-146 (1950). The statute provides that when a deposit
is made in names of two persons payable to either, or payable to either or the
survivor, it is payable to either whether the other is living or not. Courts have
consistently held that the statute is for the protection of the bank only and is not
controlling as to ownership of the funds. 9 N. C. L. REv. 15 (1930).28Note, 38 HAmv. L. REv. 243.
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tracts says: ". . . B's interest is not one transferred from A ... but is a
legal interest directly created in B by the depositary's promise to pay
A or B, as joint obligees." It seems, the bank makes a direct promise
to B when both A and B sign the signature card. If B does not sign,
it still is the intention that the bank is obligated to pay B on A's death.
The making of the deposit is certainly sufficient consideration flowing
from both depositors for the obligation of the bank.
That the statute expressly protects the bank is not denied, but
neither is it denied that G. S. § 41-2 expressly abolishes the right of
survivorship in joint tenancies, and yet the Supreme Court has said
many times that the statute (41-2) does not prohibit the making of
contracts to provide for such a right.80 Thus, there would seem to be
nothing in G. S. § 53-146 to prohibit the banks from contracting away
the protection which the statute confers upon them in the same manner.
Further it does not seem a wrong to take away such protection where a
bank has voluntarily chosen to accept a deposit which carries with it the
obligation of the bank to pay the survivor and only the survivor. To
do otherwise would be a clear breach of contract. Yet, such a construc-
tion of the statute and court decisions affecting it would place banks in
the dubious position from which they were lifted with the initial passage
of the statute. Banks would act at their peril when determining the
validity of an agreement before paying the fund to anyone but the sur-
vivor.
The foregoing emphasizes the need for a standard form of contract
which will be universally recognized in North Carolina as valid for
creating the right of survivorship. A bill providing such a form was
presented to the North Carolina General Assembly in 1953 and 1955,81
and each time the bill was defeated for the reason that it might result in
defeating creditor's rights. The Legislature should recognize that court
decisions in time will effect the same result but amid much argument
and confusion. Creditors' rights in this instance will eventually yield to
those who form valid contracts with banks. There is no reason to make
it an uneasy process for the depositor and the bank when all that can be
gained is delay.
CALVIN W. BELL
'Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. 2d 366 (1940); Turlington v.
Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923) ; Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531, 21
S. E. 202 (1895).
"Address by William F. Womble, Thirty-seventh annual conference of the
association of superior court clerks of North Carolina, July 7, 1955.
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Conflict of Laws-Domicile Rule in Custody Proceedings
While the whole field of custody of the children seems to be con-
fused, that area of the problem which crosses into the domain of Con-
flict of Laws is an entangled mass of inconsistent awards, decrees, and
orders.1 This lack of uniformity has given rise to abuses of custody
orders which not only go unreproved, but far too often result in ad-
vantage to the recalcitrant. The most prevalent of such violations
are withholding of a child against the wishes of his custodian and ab-
ducting of a child from the custodian by a parent or relative. How and
why such conduct is resorted to and often rendered advantageous in
subsequent custody actions can best be understood by considering the
jurisdictional aspects of such actions.
This subject presented no problem to the early common law for in
that system a father had absolute authority over his family. In America,
however, the state stands in the relation of parens patriae to its children.
In this capacity the sovereign's right is superior to that of the child's
parents, and this authority has as its natural corollary a duty to attend
the welfare and best interests of its minors. An incident of this obliga-
tion is the determination of custody of those children whose parents are
separated, divorced, deceased, or who by some unsocial conduct have
lost the right to their child. While legislatures enact some child welfare
regulations, the individual nature of the responsibility renders the ulti-
mate resolution a matter for judicial discretion. Though broad range
is essential in the matter of deciding the specific issues, as in all judicious
actions some jurisdictional bounds must be defined.
A court determination of custody, being an adjucation of the do-
mestic status of the child is considered to be an in rem proceeding 2
Following the general rule of in rem proceedings as it is applied to
property and divorce actions, the res must be within the territorial do-
minion of the court for jurisdiction to attach. Thus, in divorce actions,
the res is said to be the marital status, and in most states one or both
of the parties to the suit must be domiciled in the forum in order to
bring the res into the state 3 In a custody action, the child is con-
sidered the res,4 but the action differs from other in rem proceedings in
that the foremost purpose must be the determination of what course is
1 See Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Cr I. L.
REV. 42, 59 (1940).
' Coble v. Coble, 229 N. C. 81, 84, 47 S. E. 2d 798, 800 (1948) (dictum);
Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 CORNLL L. Q. 1 (1921). But
see Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Coaflict of Laws, 8 U. CL. L. REv.
42, 56 (1940).
GOODRICH, CONmICT OF LAws § 132 (3d ed. 1949).
'Coble v. Coble, 229 N. C. 81, 84, 47 S. E. 2d 798, 800 (1948) (dictum).
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in the best interests of the child, and not the settlement of the rights
of two conflicting parties.5
Because custody actions adjudicate status, domicile of the child as
well as his presence within the geographic bounds of the court's author-
ity is essential to give jurisdiction in the majority of the states,0 and
this has generally been considered the rule in North Carolina. 7
The minor cannot have domicile apart from that of his parent,
guardian, or legal custodian. While living with his parents, the child's
domicile is that of his father. Following the common law rule of the
absolute authority of a father over his children, some states hold that
upon separation of the parents the child's domicile continues to be that
of his father until a custody award is made, even if the child lives with
his mother. Other states allowing a married woman living apart from
her husband separate domicile, and giving the parents equal rights to
the child, hold that upon separation of the parents, the child takes
the domicile of the parent with whom he lives.8
The domiciliary state is presumed to have the greatest interest in
the welfare of its citizens and therefore to give the utmost deliberation
to providing for its own incompetents. This forms a policy basis for the
rule requiring domicile as well as physical presence to give a court
jurisdiction in a custody case. Two well known authorities' set out dom-
icile as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. The Restatement ° supports
the view that the child's domiciliary state has greater power than other
states and thus may change a foreign custody award. But domicile
of the child in the jurisdiction of the forum is not requisite for every
purpose: "In any state into which the child comes, upon proof that
the custodian is unfit to have control of the child, the child may be
taken from him and given while in the state to another person.... This
action will be effective within the state. If the state is also the domicile
of the. child, the action will change the status and will therefore be
effective in every state."'1
Another leading authority12 has suggested that the welfare of the
I Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 42, 56 (1940).62 BEALE, CONFLICT or LAws § 144.3 (1935) ; 67 C. J. S., Parent and Child
8 13 (1950).
'Richter v. Harmon, 243 N. C. 373, 90 S. E. 2d 744 (1955) ; Hoskins v. Cur-
rin, 242 N. C. 432, 88 S. E. 2d 288 (1955) ; Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N. C. 218, 29
S. E. 2d 313 (1952) ; Allman v. Register, 233 N. C. 531, 64 S. E. 2d 861 (1951).
' GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 36-40 (3d ed. 1949).
' Ibid.; Beale, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 1 U. CHI. L.
REv. 13, 22 (1948), where this authority says: "Since custody of a child by one
parent carries with it domicile and domestic status, jurisdiction to give the child
to one parent or the other depends in principle on the domicile of the child."
±RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1934).
11 1d. § 148.
12 Stumberg, The Staris of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L.
REv. 42, 62 (1940).
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child being of foremost consideration, a legal technicality like domicile
should not be made the basis for jurisdiction. Because a minor cannot
establish domicile himself, it is felt that the rule fails if it is based on
a greater interest of the domiciliary court. Fear is expressed that a
child may suffer detriment at the hands of an undesirable custodian if
the court of the residence state cannot take jurisdiction.
While both domicile and physical presence of the child within the
state are required for jurisdiction in many states, a strong minority
group holds that physical presence alone is a valid basis for determina-
tion of custody.13 Justice Cardozo considered the latter the proper
rule and gave voice to this view in Finlay v. Finlay.14 Mere domicile of
a child not in the state at the time of the action has been held a sufficient
basis for custody action jurisdiction in one or two scattered cases,'15 but
does not appear to be the consistent standard in any state. There are
a few opinions which have intimated that the presence of both parents
within the state would be reason enough for a court to entertain a
custody action, and that neither the child's presence nor domicile would
be necessary. 16
The full faith and credit clause of the United States ConstitutionY
is generally considered to prevent judgments and orders of the courts
of the various states from overlapping,' 8 yet the United States Su-
preme Court has given almost no indication as to how this clause should
apply to custody cases. Halvey v. Halvey 9 was the last Supreme Court
opinion on custody, and there the court based its decision on the narrow
conflict of laws rule20 that a Florida judgment was only entitled to such
faith and credit by the New York court as Florida herself would
give her custody order.21 Many of the questionable areas were suggested
1 Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N. W. 2d 60 (1950); In re Bort, 25
Kan. 308 (1881) ; Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 Atl. 524 (1930).
"1240 N. Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925) : "The jurisdiction of a State to
regulate the custody of infants found within its territory does not depend upon the
domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the protection of the incompetent or
helpless."
"' Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P. 2d 739 (1948).1 Re Lee's Guardianship, 123 Cal. App. 2d 882, 267 P. 2d 847, 851 (1954)
(dictum).
17 U. S. CONsT., art. IV, § 1.
"
8Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1905).
19 330 U. S. 610 (1947).
"In Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 612 (1947) the court said that under
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.14 (1941) : ". .. decrees of Florida courts in divorce cases
fixing custody of children are ordinarily not res judicata either in Florida or else-
where, except as to the facts before the court at the time of the decree."
I In Halvey v. Halvey, supra note 20 at 614 the court cited Rav. STAT. § 905
(1875), 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (1950) which "declared that judgments shall have such
faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have
by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken."
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by this case, but the court merely noted these issues and declined to
consider them as essential to the determination of the case.
22
The essential modifiability of the custody award is often given by
the courts as the reason for not being bound to full faith.23 A judgment,
it is said, is not entitled to full faith and credit unless it is a final judg-
ment.24 An order is usually held to be binding and not subject to sub-
sequent adjudication when a "full-dress-hearing" has been entertained
in a court of competent jurisdiction and an award has been made on
the issues before the court.25 The best interests of a child, however,
require that the custody award be redetermined upon show of subse-
quent change in circumstances rendering the former custodian incom-
petent.26
"Change of conditions" is so broad a standard as to place almost
no restrictions upon the courts in treating foreign awards. Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court in the Hdvey case apparently did not
feel that even evidence of such change was required for a redetermina-
tion of another state's award. In that case the father took the child
from Florida to New York the day before the divorce decree and at-
tendant award of custody to the mother was handed down. The mother
promptly brought action in New York to recover the child. No finding
of change of circumstances by the New York court was held necessary
for it to make a different award of custody. Neither was the child's
domicile made an issue in this case. Perhaps, then, Mr., Justice Brewer 2 7
was right when he said the temporary nature of a custody decree pre-
vented it from being entitled to full faith and credit.
28
22 In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge suggests that once the child
returned to Florida, the disappointed mother would be able to secure another decree
nullifying that of the New York Court; that the father might then again abduct
the child and secure restoration of those rights in New York, setting up "an un-
seemly litigious competition between the states and their respective courts as well
as between parents. Sometime, somehow, there should be an end to litigation in
such matters." Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 620 (1947).
2 See Boone v. Boone, 150 F. 2d 153, 156 (D. C. Cir. 1945).
" Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1909); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183
(1900).
2 See Beale, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 1 U. CHI. L.
Rxv. 13, 24 (1930): "When custody is awarded one parent by a court having
jurisdiction, the right of this parent will be recognized by other states. The facts
upon which the award was based have become res judicata and cannot be re-
examined in the second state. But this estoppel extends only to conidtions which
existed at the time of the original decree; the second court may examine any facts
which have occurred since the original decree which throw light upon the fitness of
the parents to have custody of the child."
2 Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 441, 148 Alt. 524, 552 (1930).
2 Mr. Justice David Josiah Brewer of the Kansas Supreme Court, later of
United States Supreme Court.2 In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881). The subsequent post held by the Justice
has been considered by some authorities to have given this case more recognition
than it is due. See Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws,
8 U. CHr. L. Rxv. 42, 58 (1940).
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The fact that no uniform requirements exist to govern jurisdiction
of custody matters practically amounts to "open season" for "child
snatching." After an award of custody is made by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction in State A, the disappointed parent or relative may
without authority take the child from his custodian, carry him into State
B, and have the child's custody redetermined in the courts of State B.
20
Similarly, this lack of harmony also puts a parent's custodianship in
jeopardy if the child is allowed to visit the other parent or grandparents
in a state other than that which awarded the custody.30
Two recent North Carolina cases, Richter v. Harmons ' and Wed-
dington v. Weddington,3 2 bring these abuses sharply into focus. In the
Richter Case, upon a divorce decree of the Florida court, the custody
of a four year old girl was awarded to the child's mother. Sometime
later, the mother notified the child's father, who was then living in North
Carolina, that he could take the child for a visit to his home. In offering
to allow the child to make the visit, the mother stipulated that the child
was to be returned to her as soon as she could find employment and
become settled in the Washington-Baltimore area. Later, upon the
mother's demand, the father refused to relinquished the child. The
mother then came to North Carolina and brought a special action3 3 in
the superior court to enforce the Florida custody award. That court
held the foreign decree was entitled to full faith and credit, and ordered
the father to surrender the little girl to her mother.
Upon appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
sister state's award was not entitled to such credit, and that the superior
court should examine the circumstances of the case and determine into
whose custody she should be placed. Apparently, the basis for the
court's decision was the fact that the child's state of domicile which
follows that of her legal custodian, the mother, had ceased to be Florida
3 4
and had become Maryland.35 A point was made of the fact that a child
usually must be domiciled in North Carolina for the court to assume
jurisdiction in a custody proceeding.3 6 Yet this child had never been
2 Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N. W. 2d 60 (1950) ; Ex Parte Heilman,
176 Kan. 5, 269 P. 2d 459 (1954); Commonwealth v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super.
631, 98 A. 2d 437 (1953).
"Richer v. Harmon, 243 N. C. 373, 90 S. E. 2d 744 (1955); Goldsmith v.
Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S. W. 2d 165 (1943).31243 N. C. 373, 90 S. E. 2d 744 (1955).
S2243 N. C. 702, 92 S. E. 2d 71 (1956).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13 (1950).3 In re Alderman, 157 N. C. 507, 73 S. E. 126 (1911). This case has been
cited often as authority for the proposition that a prior court's custody award
has no binding force in a new state of domicile.
"0Cf. Lorenz v. Royer, 194 Ore. 355, 360, 241 P. 2d 142, 148 (1952); Re
Burns, 194 Wash. 293, 297, 77 P. 2d 1025, 1028 (1938).
"0 See Allman v. Register 233 N. C. 531, 533, 64 S. E. 2d 861, 862 (1951):
"The validity of the [prior foreign] judgment . . . depends on whether the children
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in her domiciliary state of Maryland and subject to the jurisdiction of its
courts, and in addition both parents were before the North Carolina
court; therefore, it was held proper that jurisdiction should be assumed
and a redetermination of custody made. Thus by refusing to comply
with the Florida court's order the father gained a redetermination of the
child's custody.37
The Weddington Case is the most recent North Carolina decision
involving "parental kidnapping." Here the superior court, in a habeas
corpus action38 brought upon separation, had awarded one of the two
children to each parent with stipulations for visitations at given intervals.
Later a divorce action was brought by the wife with no request for
determination of custody. Then she sent the child over whom she had
custody to visit the father. He did not return the child nor give any
notice of her whereabouts from June until September. The mother
located her child on a school yard in South Carolina and brought her
back to North Carolina. She then moved the superior court for a de-
determination of custody as part of the divorce action and the father was
served with notice of this motion. Three days later he bodily picked
the child up from her schoolroom and carried her back to South Caro-
lina.39
The superior court again awarded the child to the mother and
ordered that she be returned immediately under penalty of contempt
proceedings. Upon appeal, the supreme court held that the lower court
was without jurisdiction to determine custody as the child was not within
the jurisdiction of the court.40
If such noncompliance and attendant abuses are not rebuffed in the
subsequent custody actions, 4' is there not some legal recourse for this
unsocial conduct? Contempt proceedings are available,42 but if the
involved herein were domiciled in North Carolina at the time this proceeding was
instituted .... [U]nless the children were domiciled in this state at such time,
the court below was without jurisdiction to award their custody. .. "
" Would it not have been a more orderly procedure for the court to uphold
the lower court's order on domiciliary grounds, remanding the child to her
mother? The father then could have petitioned the Maryland Court for a re-
determination with the burden of proof of change of circumstances falling on him.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 17-39 (1953).
' Quaere what the South Carolina courts would have done if the action had
been brought by the mother in that forum?
"0 The habeas corpus award was said to become ineffective upon the instiga-
tion of divorce proceedings thus rendering the action brought not one of enforce-
ment of a previous custody order but an action for a new determination as part
of the divorce action.
4' See Commonwealth v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 645, 98 A. 2d 437, 443(1953): "The fact that the mother took the children from Florida without the
father's consent, and in violation of the decree of the Florida court is important
here only so far as it may have a bearing upon her fitness to be awarded their
custody."
4' State v. Keller, 36 N. M. 81, 8 P. 2d 786 (1932).
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abductor flees the state, as is most often the case, this action is of course
ineffective. Kidnaping statutes of some states have been construed
to allow a criminal action against the abducting parent or his agent.43
Apparently, however, North Carolina's kidnaping laws have closed the
door on this remedy.44  Even where this action is available, when
"border hopping" is practiced, difficulties of extradition proceedings
render the law virtually unenforceable, especially where escape is made
to a state not allowing such action. The federal statute on kidnaping45
expressly excludes abduction by a parent.
At least one court4 has awarded damages for mental disturbance
to the parent or guardian from whom a child was illegally taken in a
custody fight. Apparently, this action has not been often used, probably
because many jurisdictions still adhere to the common law notion that
a loss of services of a child must be proved before a parent is entitled to
damages for the abduction of his child.4 7
With such meager remedies available, in the interest of the welfare
of our children, the courts should refuse to entertain custody actions
when a child's presence within the state is a result of wrongful conduct
of one of the parties to the action.48 The jurisdictional requirement of
domicile of the child, in comparison with residence or presence alone,
substantially reduces the benefits which are available to the abductor
and withholder. The domicile rule is not suggested as a "cure-all" for
custody abuses, 49 but until the United States Supreme Court speaks, or
" Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 Pac. 1023 (1912) ; State v. Taylor, 125 Kan.
594, 264 Pac. 1090 (1928) ; Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 255 Mass. 144, 150 N.E.
882 (1926); 31 Am. JuR., Kidnapping § 6 (1940); 51 C. J. S., Kidnapping § 4
(1947).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-40 and 42 (1952) provide that no near blood relative
shall be indicted for abducting or conspiring to abduct a child.
1;62 STAT. 760 (1948), 18 U. S. C. § 1201 (1952), as amended, Pub. L. No.
983, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. S. (Aug. 6, 1956).
"Pickle v. Page, 252 N. Y. 474, 169 N. E. 650 (1930).
'
7 But see Howell v. Howell, 162 N. C. 283, 78 S. E. 22 (1913), where the
court held that in actions for abduction of infants no loss of service need be alleged
or proved.
" See Shippin v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10, 14, 196 S. W. 2d 425, 427 (1946) where
the court said to adjudge custody would put the "stamp of judicial approval upon
the wrongful taking." Re Burns, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P. 2d 1025 (1938) is an
example of a case where the court refused to take jurisdiction when the child
was wrongfully detained in the state. See Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195, 203 (1862) :
"Shall the courts of Georgia avail themselves of a tort to wrest from those of a
sister state a jurisdiction properly appertaining to them? We say not: rather
let the subject be remanded to them."
" See Ex Parte Heilman, 176 Kan. 5, 269 P. 2d 459 (1954), where custody
was awared the grandmother who abducted the child from California after the
California court had awarded custody to the mother. The court considered sub-
stantial changes (i.e., remarriage of the parents and subsequent reparting) before
disposing of the prior Kansas award. Here both states seemed to claim the child
as domiciliary. Cf. Evens v. Keller, 35 N. M. 659, 6 P. 2d 200 (1931). Neither
would the domicile rule effect the abuses of the Weddington Case.
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a conflict of laws rule evolves which shapes some jurisdictional contours
out of the custody tangle, retention of this rule appears to be the most
advisable course.
JOHN L. DAVIDSON
Constitutional Law-The Right to Government Employment for Those
Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Loyalty Oaths-Due Process
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City' again
brought before the United States Supreme Court one of the most con-
troversial issues that has confronted our courts in recent years-the
right to continued government employment for those persons who have
not been charged with or convicted of any crime,2 but whose government
service has been terminated3 because of security or loyalty reasons.
Specific examples have involved situations where: (a) the employee's
loyalty was questionable,4 (b) his status as a security risk made his
retention incompatible with the best interests of national security,5 (c)
1350 U. S. 551 (1956).
2"The charge of disloyalty or even of being a security risk has become in the
setting of today so serious that it is almost like a charge of a crime." Garrison,
Some Observations on the Loyalty-Security Program, 23 U. Cnr. L. REV. 1, 2
(1955).
'The cases before the Supreme Court on this point have challenged both state
and federal laws. Although the principles involved are similar, the federal and
state policies that have given rise to the cases have not been the same. The
federal government has established an elaborate and expensive system for in-
vestigating its employees, for conducting loyalty and security hearings and for
reviewing the results of these hearings. The states, if they have acted at all,
have tended to confine their loyalty measures to less expensive and more easily ad-
ministered programs. Generally, with reference to those categories listed in the
text, those cases under a, b, and d have concerned federal employees and those
under c and e have concerned state employees. Both the federal and state cases
should be considered in a discussion pointed primarily at either line of decisions.
'Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331 (1955) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U. S. 918,
(1951).
5 By virtue of Executive Order 10450 of April 27, 1953, the loyalty cases, which
were formerly categorized separately from the security risk cases, are merged with
and are known as security risks.
The criterion for dismissal as established under the first loyalty program was
"on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person in-
volved is disloyal." Executive Order 9835 of March 21, 1947. This criterion was
changed to "reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved." Execu-
tive Order 10241 of April 28, 1951. Executive Order 10450 of April 27, 1953, made
the criterion "whether the ... retention ... is clearly consistent with the interests
of national security." This order provides standards and procedures for the exer-
cise by agency heads of their power under the Summary Suspension Act, 64 STAT.
476, 1950, to summarily dismiss employees in the interests of national security and
establishes the criterion for dismissal as stated above. "There has thus been a
change from loyalty to security. At the present time, a person discharged as a
security risk may well be able to establish his unswerving loyalty. . . . Loyalty
cases as such no longer exist; a disloyal person is now dismissed as a security
risk." Sweeney, People, Government and Security: An Analysis of Three Books
and a Program. 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 79, 81 (1956).
Executive Order 10450 was held invalid to the extent that it authorizes an em-
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his failure to take a loyalty oath disqualified him for government service,0
(d) his past or present membership in or association with organizations
or persons whose activities or ideals are suspect endangered the na-
tional security,7 or (e) his exercise of the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination8 was made sufficient cause for dismissal.9 The Slo-
chower case involved this last point. Even before the Slochower case
the Supreme Court jealously guarded the privilege so as to prevent its
limitation or complete abolition (which has been suggested at times1 °)
by anything less than a Constitutional Amendment; and the Court will
ployee's dismissal "irrespective of the character of his job and its relationship to the
'national security."' The Court held that the Federal Summary Suspension Act
did not authorize the summary dismissal of a federal employee who occupied a
non-sensitive job even though he is charged with disloyalty. Cole v. Young,
351 U. S. 536 (1956). This case recognized and eliminated one of the most
serious objections to the program.
The practical effect of Executive Order 10450 seems to be diametrically op-
posed to the one desired. By placing the loyalty case in the same category as the
security risk the latter is tainted with the more serious stigma of disloyalty and
merely serves as a smoke screen for those who are suspected of actual dis-
loyalty. At the same time there is little actual benefit to the loyalty case since he is
still subject to the same public ostracism. See Garrison, supra note 2, at 2.
' Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951); Notes, 50 MIca.
L. REV. 467 (1952), 20 U. CiN. L. REV. 514 (1951).
' "In many instances, it is his associations or character faults which compel
the conclusion that his retention is not clearly consistent with national security."
Sweeney, supra note 5, at 81. Also, see Garrison, supra note 2, at 3.
' U. S. CoNsT. amend. V. See 8 WIGMoRE, EviDENcE, 3rd ed., §§ 2250, 2251
(1940) for a discussion of the history and policy of the privilege.
All states have included similar provisions in their constitution, except the states
of New Jersey and Iowa, and in those states it is held to be a part of the existing
law. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 91 (1908). Also, see Note, Self-
Incrinination-Historical Background of the Doctrine, 44 Ky. L. J. 124 (1955).
"As to the type of proceedings in which the privilege against self-incrimination
may be used, the court has said; 'the object was to insure that a person should not
be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime.' ... In a later
case, it said, 'the privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the pro-
ceedings in which the testimony is sought or is used. It applies alike to civil
and criminal proceedings wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal
responsibility him who gives it.'" Trimble, Self-Incrimination and Congressional
Investigations, 44 Ky. L. 1. 333, 335 (1956).
This note does not attempt to deal with the Fifth Amendment in all of its
many ramifications since it is not disputed that the privilege was properly invoked;
but, merely with those aspects surrounding Professor Slochower's summary dis-
missal as a result of his use of the privilege.
' For discussions of this problem see: STUDIES ON PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATIoN-A SYmPosiUm. Historical Background and Implicatiols of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, R. Moreland; Scientific Evidence in the Law,
J. R. Richardson; The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination--Policy Pro and Con,
C. L. Calk; The Investigating Power of Congress-Its Scope and Limitations,
J. R. Richardson; Self-Incrimination and Congressional Investigations, E. G.
Trimble. 44 Ky. L. J. 267 (1956). Also, see PROBLEMS OF THE FnrH AMEND-
MENT IN MODERN TIMEs-A SymPOSiUm. The Right to Silence, J. R. Connery;
The Fifth Amendment Today, E. N. Griswold; The Fifth Amendment in N'on-
Criminal Proceedings, C. C. Williams. 39 MARQ. L. REV. 179 (W 1955-56).
0 This is discussed in two recent articles. Inbau, Should We Abolish the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 2 U. CIN. L. REv. 28 (1955)
Calk, supra note 9, at 303.
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not permit any unfavorable inference to be drawn from the fact that
the privilege has been invoked in a federal proceeding." However out-
side the court, suspicions, questions, and imputations continue to rise and
surround those claiming the privilege.' 2 Frequently, it has resulted in
the loss of that person's job,' 3 which in turn has caused numerous appeals
to the courts as the employees attempt to retain their positions'4 or,
more important in many cases, remove that "badge of infamy"' 5 with
which they have been branded.
The Slochower case is typical of the situations encountered in these
cases. It raised the question of the constitutionality of a statute that
provided for the automatic dismissal of any city employee invoking
the privilege against self-incrimination in order to avoid answering a
question relating to his official conduct.16 The appellant was serving
as an associate professor at Brooklyn College, an institution operated
by the City of New York, when he was called to testify before a Con-
gressional investigating committee. 17 He invoked the Fifth Amend-
11 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) ; Ullman v. United States, 350
U. S. 422 (1956); See, Note, Constitutional Law--Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination--Iinnunity, 9 Sw. L. J. 474 (1955).
1 Elson, People, Government and Security; An Analysis of Three Books and
A Program, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 83, 85 (1956) ; Garrison, supra note 2, at 1.
1" Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Automatic and Permanent Dis-
missal of Public School Teachers for Invoking the Privilege Against Self-Incrinz-
ination, 54 Micia. L. REV. 126 (1955). For a presentation of the reasons favoring
dismissal see, Note, 34 NEB. L. REv. 88 (1954).
", "Thirteen other individuals brought suit for reinstatement after their dismissal
for pleading the privilege against self-incrimination in the same federal investi-
gation." 350 U. S. 551, 555 and n. 2.
1 "There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person ex-
cluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the com-
munity, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy. Espe-
cially is this so in time of cold war and hot emotions when 'each man begins to eye
his neighbor as a possible enemy.'" Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 190-91
(1953).
1" Section 903 New York City Charter states, "If any ... employee of the city
shall, after lawful notice or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any
... body authorized to conduct any hearing..., or having appeared shall refuse
to testify, or to answer any question regarding ... affairs of the city ... on the
ground that his answer would tend to incriminate him, . . .his term or tenure of
• .. employment shall be vacant and he shall npt be eligible to ...employment
under the city. ..."
This section was not aimed at communists but was designed to help in the
elimination of graft and corruption. In the past, numerous public employees had
refused to testify as to criminal acts on the ground of self-incrimination and New
York wished to remove these persons from public employment. See, IN THE
MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FINAL REPORT BY SAMUEL SEABURY, December 27,
1932, pp. 9-10.
"'The investigation was being conducted on a national scale by the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and
related to subversive influences in the American Educational system. Recogniz-
ing education to be primarily a state function, the chairman stated that the
inquiry would be limited to "considerations effecting national security, which




ment while testifying before that committee. Although he had twenty-
seven years' experience; was entitled to tenure under state law; and could
only be dismissed for cause, after notice, hearing and appeal;18 he was
summarily discharged from his position.19 The New York Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal as constitutional but the United States
Supreme Court reversed the finding of that Court and held that the
summary dismissal of the appellant, Slochower, violated due process of
law.20
The appellant, in addition, had attacked the constitutionality of the
act on the ground that it abridged the privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States since it in effect imposed a penalty on the
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court did not
decide the privilege and immunity question 2' but held it unconstitutional
as a violation of due process.
22
The principal case does not involve a loyalty oath; nevertheless, an
examination of the loyalty oath cases and their background should be
undertaken since the Court relied largely upon those cases for authority
to support its decision. The examination will provide a better under-
standing of the use of this authority in the present case and will help
explain the basis on which the majority placed its opinion, an opinion
which the minority felt struck deep into the authority of a state "to
protect its local governmental institutions from influences of officials
whose conduct does not meet the declared state standards for employ-
ment."
23
The problems concerning the right to employment in the federal
government are more complex than those concerning state government,
as already indicated24 and the discussion of the former2 5 will be limited
to those aspects of the federal problem as are necessary to the dis-
"
8McKinney's New York Laws; Education Law § 6206(2).
"0 The Court of Appeals of New York has held § 903 to mean that "the asser-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination is equivalent to a resignation."
Daniman v. Board of Education, 306 N. Y. 532, 538; 119 N. E. 2d 373 (1954).2  350 U. S. 551, 559.
2 1 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Considering the Court's past approach to
the privilege and immunities question, it is doubtful that there would be any relief
forthcoming under this provision. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) ;
Barron v. Mayor, ETC., of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (U. S. 1830);
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (U. S. 1873).22Although two different types of statutes are involved, the Court finds that
their effect is similar. It states, "the heavy hand of the statute fall alike on all
who exercise their constitutional privilege, the full enjoyment of which every
person is entitled to receive. Such action fall squarely within the prohibition of
Wienzan v. Updegraff... there has not been the protection of the individual from
arbitrary action. . . ." 350 U. S. 551, 558.
23 350 U. S. 551, 559-60.
2, See note 3 supra.
22 Shapiro, Government Employment and the Loyalty-Security Progran, 15
LAW GurLD REv. 131 (1955) ; Garrison, supra note 2, at 1.
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cussion of the loyalty oath cases; which primarily, in recent years, have
concerned state statutes. 26
The principle of the loyalty oath is not new and has been used
in this and other countries in earlier times in attempts to determine
or test loyalty.2 7  In the past known as the test oath, the loyalty oath
is its modern counterpart. 28 The United States Supreme Court struck
down attempts by the states 29 and by Congress"0 to establish test oaths
and thereby prevent former Confederates from practicing certain pro-
fessions. These oaths were held to be unconstitutional both as ex post
facto laws and as bills of attainder. The loyalty oaths have been at-
tacked on the same grounds, but in most instances the Court has held
the modern oaths to be valid.
In the current series of loyalty oath cases, four leading decisions had
laid the foundation for the opinion in the Slochower case. They are
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,31 Garner v. Board of Public Works,32
Adler v. Board of Education,38 and Wienwan v. Updegraff. 4 The first
of these, the Gerende case, questioned the constitutionality of a Mary-
land statute8 5 which apparently required every candidate for public
office to swear that he was not engaged in nor advocated any activity
the purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force or
violence and that he was not a member of any organization which did
so. However, the Maryland Supreme Court had interpreted the statute
and stated that the oath was intended to apply to those engaged "in one
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force
or violence" or who are "knowingly" members of organizations that
do so.8 6 The United States Supreme Court interpreted this Maryland
decision to mean that the candidate need not only take an oath that he
is not "knowingly" a member of an organization engaged in an attempt
to overthrow the government by force or violence and this interpre-
tation was made only on the assurance of the Maryland Attorney Gen-
eral that affidavits stating that the candidate was not ". . . knowingly a
member of an organization engaged in such an attempt"37 would meet
" See note 8 supra.
"Koenigsberg and Stavis, Test Oaths: Henry VIII to the American Bar
Association, 11 LAW. GuiLD RFV. 111 (1951).
28 Fraenkel, Law and Loyalty, 37 IA. L. REv. 153 (1951).
29 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
"oEx Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
1'341 U. S. 56 (1951).
32 341 U. S. 716 (1951) ; See note 6 supra.
3342 U. S. 485 (1952); See Notes, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 111 (1952), 100 U.
PA. L. ZEv. 1244 (1952), 36 MiNe. L. REv. 961 (1952).
"344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; See note 49 infra, for a citation of LAW REviEw notes
commenting on this case.
"
2MD. LAws c. 86, § 15 (1949).
20 Shub v. Simpson, 76 Atl. 2d 332 (Md. 1950).
m 344 U. S. 183, 189.
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the requirements of the oath. Thus, in a brief per curiam decision
without a discussion of any of the other basic issues involved, the Court
pointed out a fundamental requirement for any valid loyalty oath-
scienter.8 s
The Garner case questioned the constitutionality of a City of Los
Angeles ordinance of 1948 requiring an oath that the employee had not
advocated or belonged to an organization advocating the overthrow of
the government by force or violence during the five preceding years.
8 9
The Court assumed that scienter was implicit in each clause of the
oath and that there was no denial of due process.40
The oath was attacked as a bill of attainder and as an ex post facto
law in that it denied government employment to persons because of an
affiliation that might have been terminated at the time the oath was
enacted into law. The majority of the Court held that it was not ex
post facto since it did not punish past lawful conduct 41 and that in the
absence of punishment, neither was it a bill of attainder. 42 The Court
cited U. S. v. Lovett4 3 for a definition of a bill of attainder 44 and ap-
parently limited its holding in that case by its decision in the Garner case.
In Adler v. Board of Education, the issue was the constitutionality
" Note, The Scienter Requirement and Retrospective Clauses in Loyalty Oaths,
3 D. B. J. 93 (1953).
"' The ordinance was passed pursuant to a 1941 Amendment to the City of Los
Angeles Charter which provided that no person should hold public office who had
within 5 years of the adoption of the amendment advocated, or belonged to a
organization which advocated the overthrow of the United States Government
or the Government of the State of California by force or violence. The amend-
ment gave the city council authority to pass an ordinance effecting it.
40 The Court stated, "We have no reason to suppose that the oath is or will be
construed by the City of Los Angeles or the California Courts as affecting ad-
versely those persons who during their affiliation with a proscribed organization
were innocent of its purpose, or those who severed their relations with any organi-
zation when its character became apparent.. ." 341 U. S. 716, 723.
"' The 1941 Amendment had been in force for the 5 years preceding the enact-
ment of the oath. For that reason, the conduct involved was not lawful at the time
it was engaged in and the subsequent act did not punish prior lawful conduct.
Therefore, it was not ex post facto. See notes 29 and 30 supra. The dissenting
judges would hold it to be a bill of attainder and hold Cummings v. Missouri, note
29 supra, and Ex Parte Garland, note 30 supra, to be applicable.
"2 The Court pointed out that punishment is a prerequisite to a bill of attainder
and stated, "We are unable to conclude that punishment is imposed by a general
regulation which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for
employment." 341 U. S. 716, 722.
" 328 U. S. 303 (1946). Congress had provided in the Urgent Deficiency Ap-
propriation Act of 1943, § 304 that the appropriation for the Interior Department
would lapse if it was used to pay the salaries of certain named employees. The
Court stated, "this permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the
government is punishment and of a most severe type. . . . Section 304, thus,
clearly accomplishes the punishment of named individuals without a judicial trial."
Id. at 316.
" "Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named indi-
viduals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by
the constitution." 328 U. S. 303, 315.
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of the New York Feinberg Law45 which barred from employment in
the public schools persons who advocate or belong to organizations
which advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence.
Membership in certain listed organizations was made prima facie evi-
dence of the person's ineligibility to teach. This act was upheld on
the basis of a New York decision which had interpreted the law to re-
quire knowledge of the purpose of such organizations before the law
was applicable.46 The Court reiterated its past approach to the ques-
tion of right to government employment, stating, "it is equally clear that
they have no right to work for the state in the school system on their
own terms. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947).
They may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid
down by the proper authorities of New York. 47 In the past, gov-
ernment employment had been treated as a privilege rather than a con-
stitutional right.4
8
However, in the last case of the series, the Wienian case,40 the Court
with reference to the above quotation from the Alder case stated "that
to draw from this language the facile generalization that there is no
constitutionally protected right to public employment is to obscure the
issue."50  But the Court further stated, "We need not pause to con-
sider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is
sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or
discriminatory."51
The Wieman case questioned the constitutionality of an Oklahoma
statute52 requiring public employees to take an oath similar to those in
Gerende and Garner. However, in Wieman, there was no requirement of
scienter in the language of the statute itself nor was there a state court
decision that made "knowledge" of the purpose of the organization a part
of the oath.53 The statute was attacked on the usual grounds that the
"IN. Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3021-22.
"' Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N. Y. 476, 95 N. E. 2d 806 (1950).
,7 342 U. S. 485, 492.
"'Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (D. C. Cir. 1950); aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 314 U. S. 918 (1951).
"'For discussions of this case, see: Note, Constitutional Law: Oklahoma
Loyalty Oath Unconstitutional as a Denial of Due Process, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 188
(1953) ; Note, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendnent-Validity of Statutes
Requiring Loyalty Oaths, 22 U. CGN. L. REv. 243 (1953); Note, Oklahoma
Loyalty Oath Void, 25 RocrY Mr. L. REv. 395 (1953); Note, Constitutional Law
-Due Process-Validity of State Statutes Requiring Public Employees to Take
Loyalty Oath-, 51 Micir. L. REv. 1076 (Mar.-Ju.-1953).0o 344 U. S. 183, 191.
3' Id. at 192.
1151 OK1.A. STAT. §§ 37.1-37.8 (1951).
"' The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had limited the organizations forbidden
by the statute to those listed as subversive by the attorney general prior to the
effective date of the statute and had upheld the constitutionality of the oath.
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oath is denial of due process, an ex post facto law, and a bill of at-
tainder.54  The Court distinguished the Wieman case from Gerende,
Garner, and Adler with the following statement, "Yet under the Okla-
homa Act the fact of association alone determines disloyalty and dis-
qualification, it matters not whether association existed innocently or
knowingly.... Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing
activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends
due process."55  In each of these cases, it had been emphasized that
the state must conform to the requirement of due process. 50
The Court does not go so far as to hold that one has a constitutional
right to public employment, but it makes it clear that one will be pro-
tected from exclusion by a statute which operates in a patently arbi-
trary or discriminatory manner 57 and that any such oath, to be consti-
tutional, must require scienter.58
Although the decision in the principal case will probably be of little
practical value to Professor Slochower in his attempt to retain his
tenure rights and job, the more liberal interpretation of the due process
clause, as contrasted to that advocated by the dissent,59 was desirable.
The Court in considering the question of a person's right to gov-
ernment employment in the Slochower case points out that "To state
that a person does not have a constitutional right to government em-
ployment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful,
and non-discriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities."60
It appears from these decisions that the Court does not consider gov-
ernment employment to be a constitutional right but it will give consti-
tutional protection to those already employed. It will not permit the
summary dismissal of an employee by operation of statute without op-
portunity for a hearing. The extent of the protection in the future may
be broadened but at the present time the statute providing for dismissal
must require evidence of the employee's unfitness. In the case of loyalty
Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131 (1951). The Okla-
homa Court refused to permit the teachers to take the oath as thus construed and it
denied petition for rehearing which was partly based on the ground that this
refusal was a denial of due process. The United States Supreme Court felt that
this refusal meant that the Oklahoma statute did not require scienter and was
faced with the question of whether innocent membership was sufficient basis for
removal from public employment.
"See notes 31, 32, and 33 supra.
rII 344 U. S. 185, 191. 350 U. S. 551, 556.
57 344 U. S. 185, 192. 8 See note 38 mstpra.
"' "For this Court to hold that state action in the field of its unchallenged powers
violates the Due Process . . . demands that this Court say ... that the action of
the Board . . . was inconsistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. A denial
of due process is 'a practice repugnant to the conscience to mankind.' Surely no
such restriction exists here." 350 U. S. 551, 562-3.
60 350 U. S. 551, 555.
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oaths, that evidence must show scienter on the part of the employee and
in the case of dismissal for use of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in a federal investigation or proceeding, a proper inquiry that
would show the employee's retention to be inconsistent with the best
interest of the state. This is a minimum of protection for the employee
but it is a recognition that some constitutional protection is necessary
and shows some tendency on the part of the Court to liberalize its
past interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment in the area of loyalty
oaths and statutes such as the one in the Slochower case.
CHARLES J. NooE
Criminal Law-Burglary in North Carolina
At common law, burglary was a felony punishable by death ;1 it was
regarded as an infamous offense against the habitation and not against
the property,2 or, as expressed at an early date, ". . . man's house is his
castle, and its security must not be lightly invaded." 3 To preserve this
security the law created safeguards imposing severe penalties on their
infringement. From the common law concept of burglary, however,
a number of statutory crimes associated with burglary have evolved,
each one extending the original scope further into the area of property
protection. Illustrative of this expansion is a recent amendment 4 to
G. S. § 14-54,5 which states where non-burglarious breaking or enter-
ing ". . . shall be wrongfully done without intent to commit a felony or
other infamous crine," (Emphasis added) a misdemeanor has been
committed. This amendment virtually completes the statutory modifica-
tion of crimes associated with the elements of common law burglary.
A brief examination of the development of these related crimes within
the framework of the North Carolina statutes and decisions is the
purpose of this note.
Burglary was defined originally as the breaking and entering, in
the night time, of a dwelling house of another," with intent to commit
a felony therein. 7 Since 1889, the offense has been divided into two
degrees. The gravamen of first degree burglary is that the crime is
14 BLACxSTONE, COMMENTARIES *228.
212 C. J. S., Burglary § lb (1944).
39 AM. JUR., Burglary, 240 (1937) ; State v. Williams, 90 N. C. 728 (1884).
See also State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 52 S. E. 2d 880 (1949).
IN. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1015; see also 33 N. C. L. REV. 538 (1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1955).
6 Under common law, it was immaterial that the occupant of the dwelling house
was not present. State v. Foster, 129 N. C. 704, 40 S. E. 209 (1901) ; 4 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARES *225.
1 State v. Langford, 12 N. C. 253 (1827). Under common law, it was imma-
terial that the felony intended was not committed, State v. Morris, 215 N. C.
552, 2 S. E. 2d 554 (1939) ; State v. Allen, 186 N. C. 302, 119 S. E. 504 (1923).
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committed when the dwelling house or sleeping apartment is actually
occupied at the time of the commission of the crime.8 Second degree
burglary is the crime committed when (1) the dwelling house or sleep-
ing apartment is not occupied at the time of the commission of the
crime, or (2) when the crime is committed on any house within the
curtilage of a dwelling house, or (3) in any building not a dwelling
house, in which is a room used as a sleeping apartment but is not actu-
ally occupied as such at the time of the commission of the crime.9 From
these statutory distinctions it is apparent that common law burglary
persists today under G. S. § 14-51 (defining first and second degree
burglary) ; other related statutory crimes embrace one or more elements
of the common law concept of burglary and might properly be said to be
derivative.
For example, according to the early concept of burglary, there had
to be a breaking, removing or putting aside of something material which
constituted a part of the dwelling house relied on as security against
intrusion.10 Any force employed to effect an entrance through any usual
or unusual place of ingress was a breaking sufficient in law, but force
or violence was essential. Obviously, this required such acts of force
as knocking a hole in a wall, burning a hole in a house, and breaking out
a window or door to effect an entry, or, under certain circumstances,
breaking an inner door or window, even though entrance to the building
itself was effected without a breaking.'1  This requirement of a violent
or forceful breaking was soon abandoned and breaking was held to be
"any violation of the mode of security," which the occupant had
adopted,' 2 using some measure of force, however slight. Consequently,
unlocking or unlatching a door, lifting a hook with which a door was
fastened, pushing open a door which was shut but neither locked nor
latched, the mere picking of a lock, the turning of a key, and the raising
of a window kept in its place only by its own weight, were adjudged
to be "actual" breaking.13 The element of breaking was extended
judicially by the concept of "constructive" breaking; so that convic-
tion was made possible when, by some trick, the offender entered
through an open door or window,14 or a hole in the wall or roof,15 or
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1953). See also State v. Mumford, 227 N. C.
132, 41 S. E. 2d 201 (1946).
I N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1953). For a development of this statute, see
Laws of 1889, c. 434, s. 1; Rev., s. 3331 (1905) ; C. S., s. 4232 (1919).
1o State v. Boon, 35 N. C. 244 (1852).
i State v. Foster, 129 N. C. 704, 40 S. E. 209 (1901). See also 9 Am. JCR.,
Burglary § 9 (1937); 12 C. J. S., Burglary § 4 (1944); 5 WORDS AND PHRASES
777 (1938).
1 State v. Henry, 31 N. C. 463 (1849).
"3 State v. Fleming, 107 N. C. 905, 12 S. E. 131 (1890) ; State v. Henry, 31
N. C. 463 (1849). See also State v. Madden, 212 N. C. 56, 192 S. E. 859 (1937).
" State v. Henry, 31 N. C. 463 (1849).
15 Ibid.
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where entrance was gained by procuring an occupant by strategem to
remove the inner lock.16 "Constructive" breaking was defined loosely
as an entrance through an open door or window obtained by conspiracy,
fraud or threat of violence. This included the entrance obtained by
procuring the servant or some inmate to remove the fastening,'7 once
even by imitation of a voice of a friend.' 8 It was extended to the
point where it was held that when the defendant encountered the owner
of a dwelling house immediately outside the house at night time, marched
him into the house at the point of a gun and stole money hidden in the
house, the method of entry was held to be a constructive breaking.19
Perhaps the first statute modifying the common law concept of
burglary was the English statute of Anne.20 By this statute, breaking
out of a dwelling house in the night time was made a crime of the same
degree of gravity as breaking in, making the crime of burglary complete
when a person entered a dwelling house by day or night with intent
to commit a felony therein and broke out in the night time.21 This
statute of Anne was incorporated into the statutory law of North Caro-
lina in 1854 and has remained since that time.22  It is important to note
that although the modification of "actual" breaking, "constructive"
breaking, and the statute involving a "breaking out" extended the orig-
inal concepts of what constituted "breaking," they did not change the
requisite elements of burglary. Breaking, whether "actual," "con-
structive," "in" or "out" was essential to the commission of the offense
until 1879, at which time a crime related to burglary was formulated to
eliminate this element. The North Carolina legislature passed "An
Act to Punish the Entering of a Dwelling House in the Nighttime
othernise than by Breaking,"2 3 (Emphasis added) the very title of
which suggests the object: to make indictable the entry into a dwelling
house in the night time by other than a burglarious breaking.24 Under
this section, now part of G. S. § 14-54, a breaking has never been a
prerequisite of guilt, and proof thereof is not required.25
"' State v. Rowe, 98 N. C. 629, 4 S. E. 506 (1887).
17 Ibid.
18 State v. Johnson, 61 N. C. 186 (1865). See also State v. Mordecai, 68
N. C. 207 (1873).
19 State v. Rodgers, 216 N. C. 572, 5 S. E. 2d 831 (1939).
2012 Anne c. 7, s. 3 (1713).
"1 See further 12 C. J. S., Burglary § 15 (1944).
2  N. C. Grx. STAT. §14-53 (1953).3 Public Laws 1879, c. 323; this act amended an act of 1875, which had been
a legislative attempt to extend limited protection to buildings other than dwelling
houses. See State v. Hughes. 86 N. C. 662 (1882).
", State v. Alston, 233 N. C. 341, 64 S. E. 2d 3 (1950) ; State v. Chambers, 218
N. C. 341, 11 S. E. 2d 280 (1940) ; State v. McBryde, 97 N. C. 393 (1886). For
a development of this statute, see Laws of 1874-5, c. 166; 1879, c. 323; CODE, S.
996 (1883); REv., s. 3333 (1905); C. S., s. 4235 (1919); 1955, c. 1015; N. C.
GEr. STAT. §14-54 (Supp. 1955).
" State v. Mumford, 227 N. C. 132, 41 S. E. 2d 201 (1946).
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Both at common law and under G. S. § 14-51, the offense of burglary
is not committed unless there is an entry. However, "entry" does not
require intrusion of the entire body into the building, but may consist of
the insertion of any part thereof for the purpose of committing a felony,
such as a hand, arm, or foot through the place broken.28 Entry of any
part of the body is sufficient if the ultimate intent is to commit a felony,
although the immediate intent may be only to make a further opening for
the body. It is not even necessary that the entry be by any part of the
body. It can be by instrument, as where a hook is put into a dwelling
to take out goods, or a pistol with intent to kill.2 7 There is no North
Carolina case to demonstrate that a breaking without an entry is
sufficient to constitute the offense created by G. S. § 14-54, although it
would probably be sufficient to constitute an "attempt" under either
G. S. § 14-51 or G. S. § 14-54.
Neither breaking nor entering is essential for a conviction under
G. S. § 14-55, s2 originally passed in 1883, which makes it a crime to
make "preparation to commit burglary or other housebreakings," and
includes the possession, without lawful excuse, of implements of house-
breaking, making separate the crimes of preparation and possession.
This statute is designed to allow the apprehension of potential offenders
before their criminal intent is fulfilled by a burglary or an attempt.
Probably the greatest modifications in the concept of burglary have
taken place in the definition of the "dwelling house." Laborious dis-
tinctions have been made in defining which buildings fall within the
definition. Such distinctions as "buildings within the curtilage, '29 or
"buildings appurtenant to the dwelling,"30 and the exceptions to these
general rules were all defined, including a rebuttable presumption that
buildings contiguous to the dwelling were prima facie within the cover-
age of burglary;31 all were utilized to bring the building within the
definition of a "dwelling house," upon which, occupied or not, burglary
could be committed. In 1875, the predecessor of G. S. § 14-54 was
" The North Carolina Supreme Court has not been faced with the delineation
of these borderline areas, since the question has never been raised on appeal.
See, however, 9 Am. JuR., Burglary, § 16 (1937); 12 C. J. S., Burglary §§ 10-12(1944).
19 Am. Jun., Burglary, § 16 (1937); 12 C. J. S., Burglary §§ 10-12 (1944).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. 9 14-55 (1953). For a general development of this statute,
see CODE, s. 997 (1883); REv., s. 3334 (1905) ; 1907, c. 822; C. S., s. 4236. See
also State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 52 S. E. 2d 880 (1949) ; State v. Baldwin,
226 N. C. 295, 37 S. E. 2d 898 (1946) ; State v. Boyd, 223 N. C. 79, 25 S. E. 2d
456 (1943) ; State v. Vick, 213 N. C. 235, 195 S. E. 779 (1938).
2 State v. Wilson, 2 N. C. 202 (1795). See also State v. Whit, 49 N. C. 349(1857).
o State v. Twitty, 2 N. C. 102 (1794).
81 State v. Langford, 12 N. C. 253 (1827). See also State v. Jenkins, 50 N. C.
430 (1858).
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enacted; and in 1889, with the passage of the now G. S. § 14-51,
burglary became a crime of degrees, as follows:
1) Breaking and entering an occupied dwelling house is first degree
burglary, punishable by death ;32
2) breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling house, or any
house within the curtilage of a dwelling house, is second degree burg-
lary, punishable by life imprisonment or a term of years, in the dis-
cretion of the court ;33
3) breaking or entering otherwise than by a burglarious breaking
into any storehouse, shop, warehouse, banking-house, countinghouse or
other building where any merchandise, chattel, money, valuable security
or other personal property shall be, is punishable as a felony by im-
prisonment of not more than ten years ;34
4) merely being found in "a dwelling, or other building whatsoever,"
with intent to commit a felony or other infamous crime therein, is a
felony punishable by fine or imprisonment ;36
5) breaking into or entering railroad cars containing any thing of
value has been a crime since 1907, punishable by not more than five
years; and this section is accompanied by the statutory presumption
that "any person found unlawfully in such car shall be presumed to have
entered in violation of this section.13 6  Thus, from occupied dwelling
houses to railroad cars, protection has been extended to an ever in-
creasing area. The gradual expansion of protection from the dwelling
to the curtilage to the warehouse to the railroad car demonstrates the
shift to the policy of property protection.
To constitute burglary, the common law required the felonious
breaking and entering to be in the night time, defined as "insufficient
light to discern a man's face."' 37 This is still the law in North Carolina
as to first and second degree burglary. However, it seems clear that
the words of G. S. § 14-54 ". . . otherwise than by a burglarious
breaking . . ." would include a breaking or entering in the day time
as well. This applies to both G. S. § 14-55 ("Preparation to commit
burglary or other housebreakings") 38 and G. S. § 14-56 ("Breaking
22 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1953). 33 Ibid.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1955).
*1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1953). 'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-56 (1953).
17 State v. McKnight, 111 N. C. 690, 16 S. E. 319 (1892). See also State v.
Whit, 49 N. C. 349 (1857).
2" As to the evolution of the now N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54: the original act
(1874-5, c. 166) made no mention of the element of "night time"; however, the
subsequent act in 1879 (1879, c. 323) specifically mentioned "in the night time";
by the time the Code of 1883 (sec. 996) was printed, the words "in the night time"
were omitted. An amending act causing this revision cannot be found in the laws
of 1881, where it would logically seem to be. However, it is a fairly safe presump-
tion that the omission was deliberate.
In the case of the present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55, however, the words "by
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into or entering railroad cars") since both specifically omit reference
to day or night time. However, G. S. § 14-5711 ("Burglary with ex-
plosives") defines the crime ". . . either by day or by night."
At common law, a criminal intent to commit a felony at the time
of the breaking and entering was an essential element of the crime of
burglary.40 It was among the few offenses, if not the only one, where
crime in the highest degree was not dependent upon the execution of
the felonious intent. The offense was complete when the dwelling house
was entered with the required intent; what the accused did afterward was
merely evidence of his intent at the time of the entering.41 It was,
therefore, no defense that the intent was abandoned after entry 42 or
before actually being committed; or that the defendant changed his mind
and committed ... or attempted to commit . . . a different crime,43 or
that the circumstances prevented him from carrying out his intent.44
This concept of intent to commit a felony runs through the statutory
crimes associated with burglary as an integral part of first and second
degree burglary, of the crime of breaking out, of the crime of "non-
burglarious breaking or entering," of the crime of preparation to com-
mit burglary, and of breaking into or entering railroad cars. "Intent
to commit crime" is essential under G. S. § 14-57 ("Burglary with
explosives"), while the offense of having implements of housebreaking
requires a negative "without lawful excuse." 45  The latter phrase is
the only apparent effort to depart from the requirement of the proof of
intent until the 1955 amendment to G. S. § 14-54, which made it a
misdeameanor to wrongfully break or enter without intent to commit
a felony or other infamous crime.46
Thus, the full cycle in the breakdown of the common law elements
has been reached. It has been suggested4 7 that the delineation between
first and second degree burglary (depending upon whether or not the
dwelling house is occupied) would suggest a concern for the protection
of life and limb rather than the one-time rationale of the protection of
the security of the habitation. Further, the words in G. S. § 14-54 "....
night," present in the original (24, 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 58) enactment in the North
Carolina Code of 1883, were specifically omitted by 1907, c. 822.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-57 (1953).
40 State v. Spears, 164 N. C. 452, 79 S. E. 869 (1913) ; State v. Boon, 35 N. C.
244 (1852). See also supra, note 7.
"1 State v. Bowden, 175 N. C. 714, 95 S. E. 145 (1918); see also 2 N. C. L.
Rav. 110 (1924).
" State v. Boon, 35 N. C. 244 (1852).
" State v. Reid, 230 N. C. 561, 53 S. E. 2d 849 (1949).
"' State v. McDaniel, 60 N. C. 245 (1864). See further State v. Hooper, 227
N. C. 633, 44 S. E. 2d 42 (1947).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1953).40N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1015. See further 33 N. C. L. REv. 538 (1955).
See Statutory Burglary-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 411 (1951).
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where . . . other personal property shall be . . ." in context with the
corresponding extensions of the other statutory crimes, suggest that the
true purpose is the protection of property and not the sanctity of the
home.
FRANKLIN A. SNYDER
Criminal Law-Presumption of Coercion-Crimes Committed by Wife
in Husband's Presence
With the exception of certain crimes, when a wife commits a crim-
inal offense in the presence of her hubsand, there arises a common-law
presumption that she was acting under his threats, commands, or
coercion ;1 thus, in the absence of any rebutting evidence, the wife must
go free.2 The two basic requisites to the raising of this presumption are
that there must have been a marriage s and that the criminal act must
have been committed in the physical or constructive presence of the
husband.4 Although there is a tendency in the courts recently to hold
that the presumption is a slight one and more or less easily rebuttable
I State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa 589, 38 N. W. 503 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Neal,
10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105 (1813) ; Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559(1846); 1 BuRnicK, CRIME p. 210 (1946).
2 This defense of marital coercion, even without the accompanying presumption,
is different from the general defense of coercion. In order to obtain benefit of the
general defense, "one must have acted under apprehension of imminent and impend-
ing death, or of serious and immediate bodily harm. Fears . . . of future bodily
harm do not excuse an offense.. ." 1 Buanxcx, CUE p. 262 (1946). A wife
on the other hand is excused if she committed the criminal act under her husband's
coercion, 1 BuD.icK, CRIME p. 210 (1946), which does not require "apprehension
of imminent and impending death, or of serious and immediate bodily harm." The
defense has been allowed when the husband was in jail at the time of the criminal
offense and therefore could have done no more than make threats of future conse-
quences. State v. Miller, 162 Mo. 253, 63 S. W. 692 (1901).
Quaere whether or not the defense of marital coercion and the general defense
of coercion had the same historical basis. The general defense seems to be based
on the doctrine that: "Since every crime requires a willing or voluntary mind, it
may be a defense to a criminal charge that the criminal act was not committed
voluntarily but was the result of coercion, compulsion, or necessity." 1 BuIwicK,
CRIME p. 260 (1946). The basis for the defense of marital coercion is less certain.
One theory is that it is based on the principal that a wife owes her husband the
highest obedience. 1 HAWKINS, PL.AS OF THE CROWN p. 4, n. 7 (Curwood ed.
1824). Others suggest that the defense arose from the practice of granting the
husband benefit of clergy and leaving the wife to bear the harsh punishments that
were administered for relatively minor crimes. 1 BuRoicx, CRIME p. 209 n. 84
(1946).
'Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559, 560 (1846).
'State v. Shee, 13 R. 1. 535 (1882). Although it is agreed that the act must
have been committed in the presence of the husband in order for the presumption
to apply, there arises the problem of what constitutes presence within the meaning
of the rule. It has been held in an extreme case that a wife was in her husband's
constructive presence when he was confined in jail and she took him a revolver
to aid in his escape. The court there held that the wife was entitled to the benefit
of the presumption. State v. Miller, 162 Mo. 253, 63 S. W. 692 (1901). It is not
the intention of this note to deal with the problem of presence. See Annot., 4
A. L. R. 266 (1919), 71 A. L. R. 1118 (1931).
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by the state,5 still the wife cannot be convicted for most offenses com-
mitted in the presence of her husband without the introduction of some
rebutting evidence tending to show that she was acting voluntarily and
of her own free will.s It is a jury question whether or not the pre-
sumption was rebutted by the state's evidence.7
Where the common law has not been changed by statute, this pre-
sumption of coercion has traditionally been subject to several exceptions,
but it has never been agreed specifically which offenses fall within the
exceptions. In each jurisdiction in which a statute has been passed
approving or modifying the defense of presumed coercion arising from
a wife's commission of an offense in her husband's presence, provision
has been made in the statute to exclude specific offenses. Thus in those
jurisdictions, all uncertainty as to the inclusion of specific offenses is
removed; the problem remains only in those states still following the
common-law rule. This note will first discuss the common-law excep-
tions to the presumption and will then deal with the legislative and
judicial action taken in the various states relative to this common-law
doctrine of presumed coercion.
COMMON-LAW EXCEPTIONS TO PRESUMPTION OF COERCION
Text writers and courts have frequently referred to crimes such as
those "forbidden by the law of nature, which are inala in se" 8 as being
excepted from the rule. Others prefer an affirmative rule, saying that
benefit of the presumption is granted only in cases involving crimes "of
minor grade."9  However, since this is so indefinite that it would be of
little help in a concrete case, a study of the cases themselves is needed.
When on trial for murder or treason, the wife is almost universally
denied the benefit of the presumption that she was coercedY° Perjury,
at least in the case of a wife's testifying at her husband's criminal trial,
is generally excepted also, since a wife cannot be compelled to testify
against her husband." Likewise excluded from the favorable presump-
tion are the domestic offenses of maintaining a brothel and maintaining
IO'Donnel v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 1, 117 P. 2d 139 (1941).
6 State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa 589, 38 N. W. 503 (1888) ; CLARK & MARSHALL, A
T sx.rTSE ON THE LAW OF C~amEs p. 123 (5th ed. 1952).
' State v. Carpenter, 67 Idaho 277, 176 P. 2d 919 (1947).
S Commonwealth v. Neal, 10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105, 106 (1813).
o State v. Shee, 13 R. I. 535, 536 (1882) (dictum) (an action for maintaining
a nuisance in which the decision was based on the finding that the husband was
not present at the time of the offense).
10 Bibb v. State, 94 Ala. 31, 10 So. 506 (1892) ; Cothron v. State, 138 Md. 101,
113 Atl. 620 (1921); Martin v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 479, 123 S. E. 348
(1925); CLARx & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES p. 123 (5th
ed. 1952). But see State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa 589, 38 N. W. 503 (1888).
"' Commonwealth v. Moore, 162 Mass. 441, 38 N. E. 1120 (1894) ; Smith v.
Meyers, 52 Neb. 1, 74 N. W. 277 (1898).
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a gaming house.1 2  This exception is based on two principles. First,
these offenses are in a class considered activity normally carried on by
women.' 3  Second, these are offenses concerned with the management
of the house, and it is assumed that the wife has at least an equal part
in its management.14 The exception for maintaining a brothel has
carried over into the closely related field of transportation of a girl for
the purpose of prostitution, since this too is generally considered activity
more likely to be engaged in by women.',
Manslaughter remains a question mark, without direct holdings
either way and with conflicting dicta on the question. It has been said
that the wife gets the benefit of the presumption in a case involving
murder,16 which would seem to include manslaughter; on the other
extreme it has also been stated that the presumption applies only to
crimes "of minor grade. '17  No conclusion is drawn here on which
view the courts are likely to accept. Another crime which is in a some-
what questionable category is robbery. Some text writers say that
robbery is probably one of the exceptions in which the presumption does
not arise.' 8 However, all of the direct holdings found on this point
are to the contrary,19 and thus it would seem that benefit of the pre-
sumption is given the wife in robbery cases.
In conspiracy cases the general, but not unanimous, view is that
a husband and wife cannot be convicted of conspiring to commit an
offense without the involvement of a third person.2 0  This is based
partially on the presumption that the wife was coerced by her husband,2 '
but primarily on the basic assumption of the law that husband and wife
are one person and thus cannot conspire.2 2 The entry of a third person
into the alleged conspiracy rebuts all such defenses, however, and both
"State v. Gill, 150 Iowa 210, 129 N. W. 821 (1911) ; State v. Grossman,
95 N. J. L. 497, 112 Atl. 892 (1921) ; Hudson v. Jennings, 134 Ga. 373, 67 S. E.
1037 (1910).
"State v. Gill, supra note 12; State v. Grossman, supra note 12.
"State v. Gill, supra note 12.
Dawson v. United States, 10 F. 2d 106 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied 271 U. S.
687 (1926).
"State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa 589, 38 N. W. 503 (1888).
17 State v. Shee, 13 R. I. 535, 536 (1882) (dictum) (action for maintaining a
nuisance).
" MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW p. 142 (1934) ; see BURDICK, CRI E p.
211 (1946).
9 People v. Wright, 38 Mich. 744, 31 Am. Rep. 331 (1878) ; State v. Murray,
316 Mo. 31, 292 S. W. 434 (1927) ; Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559(1846) ; Miller v. State, 53 Okla. Crim. 247, 10 P. 2d 292 (1932); Regina v.
Dykes, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 771 (1885); Regina v. Torpey, 12 Cox Crim. Cas.
45 (1871).
" People v. Miller, 82 Cal. 107, 22 Pac. 934 (1889); Gros v. United States,
138 F. 2d 261 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Dawson v. United States, 10 F. 2d 106 (9th Cir.
1926).
" Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920) (presumption not allowed
because of statute).
"' People v. Gilbert, 26 Cal. App. 2d 1, 78 P. 2d 770 (1938).
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husband and wife may be convicted ;23 this is true even when the third
person is not tried at the same time.2 4
Benefit of the presumption has also been given to the wife in
cases involving arson, 26 battery,26 larceny,27 forgery,28 liquor law viola-
tions,29 illegal possession of narcotics,80 maintaining a nuisance, 3' and
sale of obscene cards.3 2  In one rather unusual case, benefit of the pre-
sumption was granted to a wife charged with aiding and abetting her
husband in the crime of statutory rape.33
TREATMENT OF THIS COMMON-LAw DOCTRINE IN THE VARIOUS STATES
There is little uniformity in the different states as to what should be
done with the common-law doctrine of presumed coercion. Treatment
has varied from complete abolition of the defense of marital coercion at
the one extreme to recognition of it by statute at the other: four states
have abolished the defense entirely; nineteen (fourteen by statute, five
by court decision) have abolished the presumption but left the defense;
sixteen still recognized the doctrine when the issue was last before the
court; and three have specifically provided for the presumption by
statute.
In one group of four states-Minnesota, New York, Washington,
and Wisconsin 34-- "the defense of marital coercion . . . has been abro-
gated . . .,,35 by statute. Virtually the same wording is used in the
statutes of Minnesota and Washington as that in the New York statute:
"It is not a defense to a married woman charged with crime, that the
alleged criminal act was committed by her in the presence of her hus-
band."3 6 The Wisconsin statute is even stronger in its wording: "It
is no defense ... that the alleged crime was committed by command of
23 Ibid.21 Ibid.
-" Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559 (1846).
" Commonwealth v. Neal, 10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105 (1813).
. State v. Buchanan, 111 W. Va. 142, 160 S. E. 920 (1931) ; State v. Hollis,
163 La. 952, 113 So. 159 (1927).
2 State v. Palton, 347 Mo. 303, 147 S. W. 2d 467 (1941) ; Zammer v. State,
51 Okla. Crim. 125, 300 Pac. 325 (1931).
"Kelso v. State, 255 P. 2d 284 (Okla. Crim. 1953) ; Paris v. State, 60 Okla.
Crim. 236, 90 P. 2d 1078 (1939). However, when the illegally possessed liquor is
found in the home, some courts tend to consider the act as one of the domestic
offenses and therefore do not allow the presumption. See Crocker v. State, 148
Tenn. 106, 251 S. W. 914 (1923).
"Winer v. State, 36 Okla. Crim. 316, 253 Pac. 1025 (1927).
" State v. McMillan, 144 S. C. 121, 142 S. E. 236 (1928).
3 State v. Martini, 80 N. J. L. 685, 78 Atl. 12 (1910).
Commonwealth v. Balles, 62 Montg. 293 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1946).
&MIN¢. STAT. ANN. § 610.06 (1947) ; N. Y. PEN. LAw § 1092 (1944), United
States v. Swierzbenski, 18 F. 2d 685 (W. D. N. Y. 1927); WAsH. REv. STAT.§ 10.46.150 (1952) ; Wis. STAT. § 939A6 (1955).
United States v. Swierzbenski, supra note 34, at 685.3 6 N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1092 (1944).
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her husband. . .. ,,"7 Thus the legislatures of four states have said that
a married woman will not be excused from criminal acts even though
she could prove that she was acting under the command of her husband,
unless she could also prove the elements of the general defense of
coercion.88 These legislatures apparently feel that married women today
are not under the control of their husbands to the extent of committing
criminal offenses under their orders.
Fourteen other states have taken legislative action to modify the
common-law rule by statute without abolishing the defense entirely.
These include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas,
and Utah. 89 In these jurisdictions, statutes have been passed abolish-
ing the presumption of coercion which arose from the fact of coverture
when the crime was committed in the husband's presence. The defense
itself continues to be available to the accused, but the burden is on her
to prove that she was acting in her husband's presence and under his
coercion, rather than leaving the burden on the state to rebut the pre-
sumption. Thus, in these states, a married woman could be convicted
for an offense committed in the presence of her husband without the
state's offering any proof to show that she acted of her own free will.
It would seem, then, a rebuttable presumption would exist that she was
acting of her own free will and not under the coercion of her husband.
These fourteen states have used several different approches in
abolishing the old presumption. Of these states, five4" have enacted
statutes listing various classes of people who under certain circum-
stances cannot be punished for their acts. Included in the typical statute
are "married women... acting under the threats, command or coercion
of their husbands .... ,,41 The Arkansas statute says much the same
thing but uses the words it must "appear from the facts that"'42 she was
coerced. Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, and Nevada go a little farther than
the others in this group by requiring that violent threats, command, or
coercion be used in order to relieve the liabilty for an offense. This
approaches but does not go so far as the position taken by the first group
"' Wis. STAT. § 939.46 (1955). This statute then goes on to say that married
women will be judged under the standards of the general defense of coercion.
" See note 2 supra for the requirements of the general defense of coercion.
"ApIz. PEN. CODE § 43-114 (1939); Anx. STAT. ANN. § 41-114 (1947); CAL.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 26 (1956) ; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-8 (1953) ; GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-401 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 18-201 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 38-596(1935); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35-6 (1951) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1071 (1954) ;
MONT. REv. CODE § 94-201 (1947); Nev. Comp. LAWS § 9952 (1929); N. J. STAT.
ANN. § 2:103-3 (1939) ; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 32 (1952) ; UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-1-41 (1953).
40 Arizona, California, Montana, Utah, and Idaho.
"ARiz. PEN. CODE § 43-114 (1939).
"ARa. STAT. ANN. § 41-114 (1947).
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of states mentioned above, where it must appear that the act was com-
mitted under fear of "imminent and impending death, or of serious and
immediate bodily harm."43 "A married woman acting under the threats,
command or coercion of her husband shall not be found guilty . . . pro-
vided it appears from all the facts and circumstances of the case that
violent threats, command or coercion were used. . . . "4 (Emphasis
added.) Maryland, Michigan, and New Jersey simply make statements
to the effect that the presumption will no longer be indulged. Maryland
goes on to say that "it shall be a good defense for her to prove" 45 that
she was coerced. Texas takes an unusual position by abolishing the
presumption and then providing that if a wife were so acting under her
husband's coercion, she would, in non-capital cases, receive only one-
half the punishment that would otherwise be administered, and in capital
cases, be punished only by imprisonment. 46 Thus, Texas has modified
the common law rule to such an extent that coercion, when proved, does
not excuse the crime, but only serves to mitigate the punishment.
England has also abolished by statute the presumption of coercion,
but preserved the defense with the burden of proof on the wife. The
statute, after abolishing the presumption, provides that "it shall be a
good defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence
of, and under the coercion of, the husband." 47
The question has arisen as to what effect the Married Woman's
Acts in the various jurisdictions have had on the presumption of co-
ercion. Four state courts which have passed directly on this point are
evenly split. Kentucky and Tennessee have held that the acts giving
married women equal property and political rights have, by implication,
abolished the presumption,4 8 since the husband no longer has control
over the wife's person and property. On the other hand, Alabama and
Missouri have held that the presumption was not affected by these
statutes giving equal rights to women.49 In the Alabama case, the court
said: "These rules of the common law are adapted to and are necessary
for the well-being of society, and the various statutes of this state rela-
tive to married women and their rights to property do not change this
rule."50
Courts in other states have gone ahead without relying on legisla-
1 BURDICK, CRIME p. 262 (1946).
"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-8 (1953).
"MD. ANN. CODE art. 35-6 (1951).
'ITEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 32 (1952).
" CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 1925, 15 & 16 GEo. 5, c. 86, § 47.
"8 King v. City of Owensboro, 187 Ky. 21, 218 S. W. 297 (1920) ; Morton v.
State, 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S. W. 644 (1919).
" Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 So. 657 (1919) ; State v. Murray, 319
Mo. 31, 292 S. W. 434 (1927).
0 Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 So. 657, 659 (1919):
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five implication and have declared that the presumption no longer
exists because of the changing times. Such is the case in Iowa, Kansas,
and Nebraska.51 The Iowa court held that since the reason for the rule
had long since ceased to exist, it followed that the rule itself should be
discarded. 52 In Kansas it was said that the law presumes "that all
persons of mature age and sound mind act upon their own volition,"' 58
and that they should thereby be responsible for their acts. Nebraska
added: "Such a presumption runs . . . counter to the reason of men,
in view of the domestic relations as they now exist .... A wife is no
longer a marionette, moved at will by the husband, either in fact or in
law." 54
In a majority of jurisdictions in which the legislature has not taken
action, the presumption apparently is still the law, having been recog-
nized the last time the issue came before the courts. This largest single
group includes Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina Virginia, and West Virginia. 8
The courts of many of these states, however, have not had occasion
to pass on the question for some years,56 nevertheless, very few states
have abolished the presumption without legislative action, and the as-
sumption can be made that most of these courts will continue to apply
the doctrine in the absence of statutory change.
The North Carolina Supreme Court first passed on the question in
State v. Williams,57 a case in which a man and wife had been convicted
of assault and battery without instructions on the question of coercion.
Reversing the wife's conviction, the court said: "if a wife commit any
felony (with certain exceptions not material now to consider) in the
presence of her husband, it shall be presumed, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that she did it under constraint by him, and she is there-
" State v. Renslow, 211 Iowa 642, 230 N.W. 316, 71 A.L.R. 1111 (1930); State
v. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, 4 Pac. 1050 (1884); Smith v. Meyers, 54 Neb. 1, 74
N. W. 277 (1898).
" State v. Renslow, supra note 51.
"' State v. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, 564, 4 Pac. 1050, 1053 (1884).
" Smith v. Meyers, 54 Neb. 1, 7, 74 N. W. 277, 278 (1898).
"Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 So. 657 (1919); State v. Clark, 9
Houst. 536, 33 Atl. 310 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1891); Conner v. State, 95 Fla. 765,
117 So. 852 (1928) ; Tomasello v. State, 91 Ind. App. 670, 173 N. E. 235 (1930) ;
State v. Hollis, 163 La. 952, 113 So. 159 (1927) ; State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 8
Am. Rep. 422 (1871); Commonwealth v. Helfman, 258 Mass. 410, 155 N. E. 448(1927) ; State v. Ready, 251 S. W. 2d 680 (Mo. 1952) ; State v. Asper, 35 N. M.
203, 292 Pac. 225 (1930) ; State v. Cauley, 244 N. C. 701, - S.E. 2d - (1956) ;
Tabler v. State, 34 Ohio St. 127 (1877) ; Commonwealth v. Hand, 59 Pa. Super.
Ct. 286 (1915) ; State v. Boyle, 13 R. I. 537 (1882) ; State v. Minor, 171 S. C.
120, 171 S. E. 737 (1934) ; Martin v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 479, 129 S. E. 348
(1925) ; State v. Buchanan, 111 W. Va. 142, 160 S. E. 920 (1931).
" Dates of cases cited note 55 supra represent most recent decisions found for
each state.
.7 65 N. C. 398 (1871).
[Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
fore execused."' r  In State v. Nowell59 the court approved a charge to
the jury which included the same doctrine as presented in the Williams
case. In State v. Seahorn6 ° the majority upheld the conviction of hus-
band and wife for liquor law violation on the grounds that the charge
to the jury had substantially complied with the doctrine as set forth
in the previous North Carolina cases. Chief Justice Clark wrote a con-
curring opinion6l in which he strongly advocated abolishing the pre-
sumption by court decision without waiting for legislation, in order to
bring the rule in accordance with Twentieth Century conditions. These
three cases, all of which recognized the presumption, are the only ones
found in which the North Carolina Supreme Court has been called
upon to decide the issue.*
In addition to those states which have continued to apply the
common-law presumption, three others-Oklahoma, Oregon, and South
Dakota-have enacted statutes which specifically provide that the law
will presume coercion when the wife commits an offense in the presence
of her husband.6 2 The Oregon statute lists various presumptions which
the law of that state recognizes; among them: "A wife acting with her
husband in the commission of a felony, other than murder, acted by
coercion and without guilty intent. ' 68 Thus it would seem Oregon re-
quires not only that the act charged must have been committed in the
presence of her husband, but also that she must have been acting in con-
cert with him. Oklahoma and South Dakota have similar statutes saying
that subjection will be inferred when the offense was committed "in the
presence and with the assent of her husband," 64 followed by a list of
crimes which are specifically exempt from the presumption. Oklahoma
lists eighteen such exceptions; South Dakota, even though it lists twenty-
three exceptions, provides that in the event duress is shown the wife
will be excused from punishment even for those crimes.
The remaining six states-Connecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming-so far as could be determined
"State v. Williams, 65 N. C. 398, 399 (1871).
"156 N. C. 648, 72 S. E. 590 (1911).00 166 N. C. 376, 81 S. E. 687 (1914).
" State v. Seahorn, 166 N. C. 376, 378, 81 S. E. 687, 689 (1914).
* In a recent decision handed down since this material first went to press, the
North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of presumed coercion in the
much publicized child-beating case of State v. Cauley, 244 N. C. 701, - S. E. 2d -
(1956). Here the husband was charged under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1953)
with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injuries;
and the wife was charged with aiding an abetting in the assault. Both were
convicted, and both appealed. The court held that the presumption did exist, and
granted the wife a new trial on the judge's failure to instruct the jury accordingly.
02 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 157 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT. § 41.360 (1955);
S. D. CoDE § 13.0503 (1939).
03 ORE. REV. STAT. § 41.360 (1955).04 OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 157 (1951); S. D. CODE § 13.0503 (1939).
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have not passed on this question either by court decision or by legisla-
tive action.
It is the conviction of this writer that the presumption should be
abolished. At the time of its creation the presumption was in keeping
with the then prevailing domestic relations; today it has no sound basis.
However, the doctrine should not be abrogated in its entirety. Even
now there still may be a few women who, either because of a marriage
vow to obey their husbands or for other reasons, would follow their
husband's orders-even to the extreme of violating the law. These
women should be entitled to prove coercion as a defense. It is therefore
suggested that a statute on the order of the English act"5 should be
passed placing the burden of proof on the wife, yet allowing her the
opportunity to prove actual coercion and be excused.
DAVID S. EVANS
Criminal Law-Sentences to Different Places of Confinement-Con-
current or Consecutive under North Carolina Law
A new statute' was enacted during the 1955 session of the North
Carolina General Assembly which provides as follows:
"When by a judgment of any court or by operation of law a
prison sentence runs concurrently with any other sentence a
prisoner shall not be required to serve any additional time in
prison solely because the concurrent sentences are for different
grades of offenses or that it is required that they be served in
different places of confinement."
This note is an attempt to analyze the effect of this statute on the law
of North Carolina. The determination of this question necessitates a
review of the North Carolina case law governing the imposition of con-
current and consecutive sentences prior to the enactment of the 1955
legislation.
The great weight of authority in this country takes the view that a
court has power derived from the common law to impose consecutive or
cumulative sentences on the conviction of separate offenses charged in
separate indictments or separate counts of the same indictment.2 North
" CRIMINAL JUsTIcE Acr, 1925, 15 & 16 GEO. 5, c. 86, § 47: "Any presumption
of law that an offence committed by a wife in the presence of her husband is com-
mitted under the coercion of the husband is hereby abolished, but on a charge
against a wife for any offence other than treason or murder it shall be a good
defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under
the coercion of, the husband."
N. C. Gai. STAT. § 15-6.2 (1955).
15 Am. Jua., Criminal Law § 464 (1938).
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Carolina is in accord with this view ;3 but as in all other jurisdictions the
exercise of that power must conform with certain standards in order
for the court's intention to impose consecutive sentences to be effectu-
ated: (1) The last sentence must explicitly state that the latter term of
imprisonment is to commence at the expiration of the former. 4 (2) The
reference to the former sentence in the latter must be so certain and
definite that there can be no doubt as to the times at which the latter
term of imprisonment will begin and expire.5 The Supreme Court has
declared that uncertainties and ambiguities contained in sentences pur-
porting to be consecutive will not be resolved by resort to evidence
dehors the record. 6 The court has required of the trial courts a great
degree of particularity in the imposition of consecutive sentences, 7 but
the standard of certainty required is in no event higher than the nature
of the case will permit.8 The reasons underlying these requirements of
certainty and definiteness have been explained by the Supreme Court:
"The question here is not merely one of the intention of the
' State v. Duncan, 208 N. C. 316, 180 S. E. 595 (1938) where defendant was
convicted of several offenses charged in separate counts of same indictment; In Re
Black, 162 N. C. 457, 78 S. E. 273 (1913) where defendant was convicted of
several offenses charged in separate indictments and tried by the same court; In
Re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 35 S. E. 2d 169 (1945) where defendant was convicted
of several offenses charged in separate indictments and tried in different courts.
'In Re Black, 162 N. C. 457, 78 S. E. 273 (1913) ; State v. Duncan, 208 N. C.
316, 180 S. E. 595 (1938); State v. Stonestreet, 243 N. C. 28, 89 S. E. 2d 734
(1955).
'I Re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 35 S. E. 2d 169 (1945). Petitioner was sentenced
to seven years in the State prison for automobile theft by the Lenior County
Superior Court. After his escape and before his recapture, he was sentenced to
three years in the State prison for larceny by the Martin County Superior Court,
that sentence "to begin at the expiration of the sentence in case number C. P.
31355." Evidence aliunde showed that the letters "C. P." meant Central Prison
and that the numbers following designated the number attached to the case by the
prison for administrative purposes. The court held that this was not a sufficient
reference to the previous sentence, that the second sentence was indefinite and
ambiguous, and that the sentences must therefore run concurrently.
I Id. at 374, 35 S. E. 2d at 172: "It is true, of course, that the intention of
the court imposing the sentence should prevail where clearly expressed. . . But
we do not think this implies that such intention should be sought through evidence
dehors the record-at least such as is here made necessary ;-that it is open to
the same sort of proof as if the judge were writing a will or making a contract."
7 Id. at 372, 35 S. E. 2d at 171. The court cited certain deficiencies in the
second sentence which caused it to run concurrently with the first: "It does not
name the county or court in which trial was had and in which the judicial
record was made and is kept, or the date or term of court, or even the name of
the defendant; nor does it give any description of the offense for which the
defendant was convicted, or designate the term of the sentence imposed-by means
of which the Lenoir County sentence, the expiration of which is to determine from
the beginning of the Martin County sentence, could be identified from the judicial
records themselves and the sentence given significance." However the court in
It Re Smith, 235 N. C. 169, 69 S. E. 2d 174 (1952), declared that it did not
intend that the indicia listed in the Parker case should be all-inclusive in every
case.8 State v. Cathey, 170 N. C. 794, 87 S. E. 532 (1915). A reversal of a previous
sentence or a diminution of a previous sentence for good conduct will not cause
a subsequent sentence to begin on the expiration of the previous sentence to fail.
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judge imposing the sentence, and the method of ascertaining it;
it is also a question of the adequate expression of that intent
within acceptable standards of certainty in dealing with the lib-
erty and lives of those charged with violations of the law."0
If the intention of the court to impose consecutive sentences is not
adequately expressed in accordance with the above requirements of
certainty and definiteness, the sentences will be presumed to run con-
currently. The rule as stated in several decisions of the North Carolina
Supreme Court is as follows:
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, and unless it
sufficiently appears otherwise in the sentence itself, it is generally
presumed that sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction, to be
served at the same place or prison, run concurrently, although
imposed at different times, and by different courts and upon
a person already serving sentence." 10
The state has the burden of showing that the sentences are consecutive;
this burden is carried when the sentence is certain and definite within
itself." The court has declared that no presumption will be indulged
in favor of sustaining a sentence as cumulative.' 2
In In Re Smith,:3 however, the court held that sentences to different
places of confinement are by their very nature cumulative and that two
sentences in order to run concurrently must be to the same place of
confinement. In that case defendant, already serving a sentence in the
State prison, was sentenced to the Jackson County jail for a term of
eighteen months to be assigned to the roads under the supervision of the
State Highway and Public Works Commission. The court stated that
the sentences could not run concurrently even if it were conceded that
the second sentence lacked the required degree of certainty and definite-
ness to impose consecutive sentences in a situation where the place of
confinement in each sentence is the same. The rule of In Re Smith was
reiterated in a recent decision of the North Carolina Court14 where the
sentences were imposed prior to the enactment of the 1955 statute above.
The court commented that the statute had apparently changed the rule
of In Re Smith as to sentences imposed after the enactment, but un-
fortunately made no further observations on the effect of the statute on
North Carolina law.
'In Re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 373, 35 S. E. 2d 169, 172 (1945).0Id. at 372, 35 S. E. 2d at 171; In Re Smith, 235 N. C. 169, 171, 69 S. E.
2d 174, 175 (1952).
In Re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 35 S. E. 2d 169 (1945).12 Ibid.
13235 N. C. 169, 69 S. E. 2d 174 (1952). See also Ex Parte Bentley, 240
N, C. 112, 81 S. E. 2d 206 (1912), in accord with In Re Smith.
"In Re Swink, 243 N. C. 86, 89 S. E. 2d 792 (1955).
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The provisions of the 1955 enactment present difficulties of interpre-
tation important not only to those concerned with the administration of
the law but perhaps even more so to those whose lives and liberty are
directly affected by the legislation. A comparison of the statute with
prior North Carolina case law raises these questions:
(1) To what extent is the rule of In Re Smith abrogated? If a
sentence to confinement in the State prison is imposed upon one pre-
viously sentenced to confinement in a county jail or any other place of
confinement, the statute clearly provides that the difference of places
of confinement is not enough in itself to cause the sentences to run
consecutively. This is a clear departure from prior North Carolina
law and the weight of authority in this country.15
If the writer might speculate, the intention of the legislature in
enacting the new law would seem to be a grant to the courts of the
power of discretion necessary to render justice in all cases, i.e., to im-
pose sentences in a manner most compatible with the public good and
the rehabilitation of the individual prisoner. The rule of In Re Smith
was apparently repugnant to the senses of the enactors. If this assi tmp-
tion is true, then the statute may fall short of the goal set for it. The
statute speaks only of "additional time in prison"; its language does not
provide that a prisoner shall not be required to spend additional time
in a county jail when it is the desire of the court to impose a subsequent
jail sentence to run concurrently with a previous sentence to a term in
the State prison. If the word "prison" is given a literal construction,
that it means the State prison, then it would seem that the rule of In Re
Smith is still applicable in this situation. On the other hand, if "prison"
is construed to mean any place of confinement, then the statute would
accomplish its purpose in this situation. In view of the fact that the
word "prison" has been used previously in the same statute to mean
the State prison as opposed to all other places of confinement, the latter
construction would be liberal indeed.1 6 The statute is at least an im-
portant step toward the elimination of the In Re Smith doctrine,
a stringent rule which in some cases may be a stumbling block to the
1124 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1996 (1941). But the new North Carolina
rule imposed by the statute is not without legal precedent. See Capone v. United
States, 51 F. 2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 669 (1931), where it
,vas held that a sentence to a county jail ran concurrently with a sentence to a
federal prison. This case is an exception to the federal rule usually stated. See
United States v. Remus, 12 F. 2d 239 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, Remus v.
United States, 271 U. S. 689 (1926).
"' Quaere: Should not the word "prison" as used in the phrase "any additional
time in prison" be construed as meaning any place of confinement even though
such construction would violate the rule that identical words used in the same
section of a statute should be given like meanings? All laws are to be construed
sensibly; what otherwise would be a strained construction is unobjectionable if
necessary to avoid a foolish or unjust result.
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administration of justice; however whether it constitutes such a complete
rejection of the North Carolina law that a court is now vested with the
power to use its discretion as to the imposition of concurrent or consecu-
tive sentences in this situation depends upon the extent to which the
Supreme Court is willing to pursue the apparent intention of the legis-
lature.
The imposition of several sentences to terms in separate county
jails raises still another problem under the new enactment. In no sense
does the 1955 statute authorize the imposition of concurrent sentences to
confinement in separate jails; however there is some doubt as to whether
the rule of In Re Smith prohibited such concurrent sentences. The
rule was stated: "Two sentences, in order to run concurrently, must
be to the same place of confinement."' 1 "Place" would seem to indicate
geographical position rather than a type of penal institution; however
in the Smith case the sentences in question were to terms in separate
types of institutions, viz. the State prison and the Jackson County jail.
The rule as stated in some jurisdictions is that the presumption of con-
currency of sentences exists when the sentences are to imprisonment
in the same institution or same type of institution.' 8 This latter rule,
rather than a strict interpretation of the rule of the Smith case, has been
adopted in effect by the State Highway and Public Works Commission
as a matter of practice, but only where both of the sentences to separate
county jails provide that the prisoner is to work under the supervision
of that commission. It would appear likely that the Supreme Court
would interpret the rule of the Smith case to conform with this logical
administrative policy.
However, where a prisoner has been sentenced to a term in a county
jail and assigned to the jail itself or some other county institution other
than under the State Highway and Public Works Commission, a sub-
sequent sentence to a different county jail regardless of assignment has
been administratively construed to run consecutively to the first sentence
because of the In Re Smith rule. The same is true where the chrono-
logical order of such sentences is reversed. The statute is not applicable
in this situation. Unless the Smith rule is construed to mean that two
sentences in order to run concurrently must be to the same institution
or the same type of institution, two such sentences could not run con-
currently particularly in the absence of the connotation of "same place"
furnished by provisions in both sentences for assignment to the State
Highway and Public Works Commission.
(2) How is the presumption of concurrency of sentences affected by
the statute? The presumption as declared by the Supreme Court arose
'7235 N. C. 169, 172, 69 S. E. 2d 174, 176 (1952).
1824 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1996 (1941).
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only when two sentences were imposed against the same person to the
same place of confinement.19 Now that a prison sentence may be imposed
to run concurrently with any other sentence, it would logically follow
that the presumption of concurrency should arise in this situation, not-
withstanding that the places of imprisonment are different. Stated an-
other way, cessante ratione legis cessat. It would seem that the presump-
tion should exist in every situation where one sentence may run concur-
rently with another. The statute was apparently intended to eliminate
every vestige of the old rule that a sentence to the State prison could not
run concurrently with any other sentence. 20  With that objective as a
background for the interpretation of the statute, it would seem the better
view that in the absence of a definite and certain expression of the in-
tention of the court to the contrary, one sentence shall be presumed to
run concurrently with any other unless the sentences are cumulative as
a matter of law. If the difference in places of confinement is no ground
for holding that one sentence must run consecutively to a prior sentence,
it can only be fair to the prisoner that the state must show the required
certainty and definiteness of the latter sentence in order to make the
sentences run consecutively.
The questions presented here must be dealt with when this statute
is presented to the courts for construction. If the intention of the
enactors is to grant to the courts the power of discretion to impose con-
current or consecutive sentences as they deem appropriate, that intention
may well be frustrated as a result of the restrictive wording of the
statutory provisions. The power of discretion to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences necessary to a court in order to render justice in
all cases would be most effectively afforded by a remedial statute pro-
posed as follows:
Concurrent Sentences for Offenses of Different Grades or to be
Served in Different Places.
Where two or more sentences to confinement are imposed against
the same person, regardless of whether said sentences are to different
places of confinement or are for different grades of offenses, it shall be
presumed that the sentences are to be served concurrently unless the
contrary clearly appears; and any reasonable doubt or ambiguity must
be resolved in favor of the prisoner.
ROBERT B. MIDGETTE
"o See note 10 supra.
20 In Re Smith, 235 N. C. 169, 69 S. E. 2d 174 (1952).
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Criminal Law-Sufficiency of Indictments in Statutory Language
The North Carolina Constitution declares that every person charged
with a crime has the right to be informed of the accusation made against
him.' In considering this section of our Constitution, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has observed that it is "an embodiment of the com-
mon law rule requiring the charge against the accused to be set out in
the indictment or warrant with sufficient certainty to identify the offense
with which he is sought to be charged, protect him from being twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense, enable him to prepare for trial, and
enable the court to proceed to judgment according to law in case of
conviction."
12
For statutory offenses, the general rule is that an indictment or
warrant charging an offense in the language of the statute is sufficient.3
Exceptions to this general rule were rare in North Carolina until recent
years. Though our court has been reluctant to require more than the
language of the statute, many cases involving this problem have been
decided by a divided court. Gradually exceptions have been engrafted
upon this general rule of pleading statutory offenses, and in three recent
cases4 the court ruled that an indictment in the language of the statute
is not sufficient.
Determining the sufficiency of an indictment in statutory language
is not a new problem in North Carolina. In a very early case the ma-
jority decided that an indictment for murder must state the length and
depth of the mortal wounds of the deceased. Even the majority ex-
pressed dislike for requiring such detail in an indictment but thought
the problem should be left to the legislature for correction. Conse-
quently in 1811 an act8 was passed which stipulated that the charge for
a criminal offense be stated only in a plain, intelligible, and explicit1 N. C. CoNsT. art. I, § 11 (1868) : "In all criminal prosecutions, every person
charged with crime has the right to be informed of the accusation and to confront
the accusers and witnesses with other testimony, and to have counsel for defense,
and not be compelled to give self incriminating evidence, or to pay costs, jail fees,
or necessary witness fees for the defense, unless found guilty."
2 State v. Jenkins, 238 N. C. 396, 397, 77 S. E. 2d 796, 797 (1953).
'JoYcE, INDICTMENTS § 454 (1924); United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483(1887) ; United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360 (1877) ; State v. Jackson, 218
N. C. 373, 11 S. E. 2d 149 (1940) ; State v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618, 61 S. E.
61 (1908); State v. Howe, 100 N. C. 449, 5 S. E. 671 (1888); State v. Liles,
78 N. C. 496 (1878) ; State v. Stanton, 23 N. C. 424 (1841).
' State v. Cox, 244 N. C. 57, 92 S. E. 2d 413 (1956); State v. Powell, 244
N. C. 121, 92 S. E. 2d (1956); State v. Lucas, 244 N. C. 53, 92 S. E. 2d 401(1956).
'State v. Owen, 5 N. C. 452 (1810).
'Now N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-153 (1811): "Every criminal proceeding by war-
rant, indictment, information, or impeachment is sufficient in form for all intents
and purposes if it express the charge against the defendant in a plain, intelligible,
and explicit manner; and the same shall not be quashed, nor the judgment thereon
stayed, by reason of any informality or refinement, if in the bill of proceeding,
sufficient matter appears to enable the court to proceed to judgment."
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manner. Our court decided cases involving sufficiency of indictments
again in 18197 and 18298 and in these decisions expressed pleasure in
not having to require the formality and detail that obtained prior to the
Act of 1811.
During the next seventy-five years the sufficiency of a number of in-
dictments was questioned in cases in which the statutory language was
not followed, and in every case the court required strict adherence to
the statutory language.9 Undoubtedly these cases served to mold an
opinion among state law enforcement officials and members of the bar
that an indictment following statutory language would be sufficient.
However, as previously noted, exceptions to this general rule were
soon to be made and the court usually explained these exceptions by
pointing out that the statute was written in mere general or generic
terms, that the statute did not sufficiently define the crime, or that all
essential elements of the crime were not included in the statute. In
State v. Whedbee' ° an indictment for obtaining goods under false pre-
tense was drawn in the words of the statute.'1  The court held the
indictment insufficient in that it failed to inform the defendant of the
offense charged as required by the North Carolina Constitution.' 2 In
State v. Cole's the indictment was drawn in the language of the statute
declaring it unlawful to make a false entry in bookkeeping.14 After re-
viewing the authorities concerning the general rule on indictments in
statutory language, the court held that this statute did not set forth all
essential elements of the offense and therefore an indictment in the
language of this statute is insufficient.
The court has twice considered the sufficiency of an indictment
drawn in the language of the statute making it an offense to assault a
7 State v. Cherry, 7 N. C. 7 (1819).
' State v. Johnson, 12 N. C. 360 (1827).
'State v. Mays, 132 N. C. 1020, 43 S. E. 819 (1903); State v. Bagwell, 197
N. C. 859, 12 S. E. 254 (1890) ; State v. Noblett, 47 N. C. 418 (1855) ; State v.
Hathcock, 29 N. C. 52 (1846).
10152 N. C. 770, 67 S. E. 60 (1910).
N . C. Gmx. STAT. § 14-100 (1811): "If any person shall knowingly and de-
signedly by means of any forged or counterfeited paper, in writing or in print, or
by any false token, or other false pretense whatsoever, obtain from any person
or corporation ... with intent to cheat or defraud ... shall be guilty of a felony
... Provided further, that it shall be sufficient in any indictment for obtaining or
attempting to obtain any such property by false pretenses to allege that the party
accused did the act with intent to defraud, without alleging an intent to defraud any
particular person, and without alleging any ownership of the chattel, money, or
valuable security.....
12 For an illustration of a sufficient indictment charging violation of N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-100 see State v. Howley, 220 N. C. 113, 16 S. E. 2d 705 (1941).13202 N. C. 592, 163 S. E. 594 (1932).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 53-129 (1921): ". . . whoever being an officer, employee,
agent, or director of a bank, makes or permits the making of a false statement or
certificate, as to a deposit, trust fund or contract, or makes or permits to be
made a false entry in a book, report, statemenf or record of such bank . . . shall
be guilty of a felony....
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person with an intent to kill and the infliction of serious injury not re-
sulting in death.15 In State v. Battle'6 the court explained that the
term "serious injury" used in an indictment drawn in statutory language
was too vague and indefinite. Then forty-one years later in State v.
Gregory17 the court held that it was unnecessary to describe the extent
of a serious injury in an indictment as the extent of injury became a
matter of proof upon trial and an indictment in statutory language in
this case was sufficient. Thus the latter decision removed an exception
to the general rule of indicting in statutory language.
The court held that more was required than mere statutory language
in three cases involving the "resisting arrest" statute.18 In State v.
Jenkins'9 and State v. Scott20 the warrants were drawn according to
the language of the statute, but the court refused to allow prosecution
without specific statements as to the official character of the person
alleged to have been resisted. In State v. Eason,21 although the de-
fendant was charged in the language of the statute, the arresting officer
was not named, the official duty he was performing was not shown, and
the manner in which the defendant resisted, delayed, or obstructed arrest
was not stated. Because of the omission of these facts, the warrant was
declared insufficient and the court explained that statutory words must
be supplemented if necessary to set forth every essential element of the
offense, so as to leave no doubt in the minds of the accused and court
as to the specific offense intended to be charged.
State v. Burton22 presents an example of the difficulties encountered
in drafting that most frequent indictment, violation of a municipal
ordinance. The warrant charged violation of a parking meter ordinance
but failed to give the exact location of the defendant's car at the time
of the offense. In explanation, the court said that the location of the
parking meter must be stated so the defendant or his attorney can go to
the city ordinance and see if parking at that time and place constituted
a violation.2 3
The North Carolina statute pertaining to offering of bribes24 was be-
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1919): "Any person who assaults another with
a deadly weapon with intent to kill, and inflicts serious injury not resulting in
death, shall be guilty of a felony. .. "
-6 130 N. C. 655, 41 S. E. 66 (1902).
17 223 N. C. 415, 27 S. E. 2d 149 (1943).
11N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1889): "If any person shall willfully and
unlawfully resist, delay, or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to
discharge a duty of his office, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
19 238 N. C. 396, 77 S. E. 2d 796 (1953).
20241 N. C. 178, 84 S. E. 2d 654 (1954).21242 N. C. 59, 86 S. E. 2d 774 (1955).
22 243 N. C. 277, 90 S. E. 2d 390 (1955).
2" This would seem to require a warrant charging multiple violations of a
parking meter ordinance to state the exact time and location of each violation.
2 
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-218 (1870) : "If any person shall offer a bribe, whether
it be accepted or not, he shall be guilty of a felony. . ..
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fore our court in State v. Greer.25 -It was held that an indictment in the
language of this statute was insufficient. The court pointed out that
this statute neither defines bribery, nor sets forth its essential elements
and declared that the statutory words must be supplemented by other
allegations which would set forth the essential elements of the offense.
In State v. Lucas,2 6 the Court noted that the commission of perjury
is a basic element of the offense of subornation of perjury. Therefore,
the court held that an indictment drawn in the language of G. S. 15-146,
the subornation of perjury statute, is insufficient since the indictment
must include the matter alleged to have been falsely sworn by the
person suborned and also that the suborner knew such to be false or
was in conscious ignorance of its truth. The court said that this statute
must be read in conjunction with G. S. 15-145, the perjury statute, and
indictments drawn accordingly.
A striking example of the difficulties encountered in drafting in-
dictments for statutory offenses is furnished by the cases dealing with
indictments under subsection 7 of our aiding and abetting prostitution
statute.27  The first six subsections of this statute described specific
ways of violations; subsection 7 is the familiar "catch all" phrase and
concludes by saying "by any means whatsoever." Even a cursory
examination of cases dealing with indictments in the language of sub-
section 7 of this statute reveals the oscillation of the court's views on the
matter of sufficiency. Indictments in the language of subsection 7 have
been before the North Carolina Supreme Court four times in the past
twenty-two years. In State v. Waggoner28 it was decided that the
indictment was in the language of subsection 7 and therefore sufficient.
Then in State v. Johnson29 the majority opinion declared an indictment
in the language of this subsection was sufficient to afford the accused
his constitutional rights. Thus indictments drawn in the words of sub-
section 7 came under the general rule of being sufficient. In the recent
case of State v. Cox3 ° the court overruled the Johnson case by declaring
that indictments drawn in the language of subjection 7 are no longer
sufficient.31 The court explained that "by any means whatsoever" can
cover a multitude of acts and therefore the warrant must charge the par-
25 238 N. C. 325, 77 S. E. 2d 917 (1953).
20 244 N. C. 53, 92 S. E. 2d 401 (1956).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-204 (1919) : "It shall be unlawful: ... (7) to engage
in prostitution or assignation, or to aid or abet prostitution or assignation by
any means whatsover."28 207 N. C. 306, 176 S. E. 566 (1934).
29 220 N. C. 773, 18 S. E. 2d 358 (1941).
2 244 N. C. 57, 92 S. E. 2d 413 (1956).
" It should be noted that all these decisions pertained only to subsection 7 of
the statute and so an indictment in the language of the first six paragraphs pre-
sumably would be sufficient.
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ticular acts and circumstances constituting the offense. In an even more
recent case,3 2 the court reaffirmed its ruling set out in the Cox case.
From this brief review of the North Carolina cases of indictments in
statutory language it might be concluded that at least seven exceptions to
the general rule of charging an offense in the language of the statute now
exist in North Carolina. Indictments or warrants charging offenses un-
der the statutes pertaining to false pretense, false entry in bookkeeping,
resisting arrest, offering of bribes, local ordinance on parking, suborna-
tion of perjury, and aiding and abetting prostitution have all been
declared exceptions by the North Carolina Supreme Court in recent
years. The solicitors and law enforcement officers of our state might
take note of the tendency of our court to declare exceptions to the general
rule and pay heed to the language in State v. Albarty:83
"There can be no valid trial, conviction, or punishment for a crime
without a formal and sufficient accusation. As a consequence it is
impossible to overmagnify the necessity of the rules of pleading in
criminal cases. The first rule of pleading in criminal cases is that
the indictment or other accusation must inform the court and the
accused with certainty as to the exact crime the accused is alleged
to have committed." 34
While it seems that most of the North Carolina Statutes defining or
creating criminal offenses are so worded that the statutory language is
sufficient for the indictment or warrant, exceptions do obviously exist.
Those charged with the responsibility of preparing warrants and in-
dictments would do well to note these exceptions. 3 5
A study of the cases in which the indictment in statutory language
has been declared insufficient reveals the most common fault to be a
failure to describe the manner of circumstances under which the offense
was committed. Although a rather general one, the best test for the
drafter of an indictment for a statutory offense would seem to be:
Are the circumstances surrounding the offense and the manner
in which it was committed so specified that the defendant can
prepare for trial and, if convicted, that he could not be tried again
for this offense?
HERBERT L. Toms, JR.
State v. Powell, 244 N. C. 121, 92 S. E. 2d 681 (1956).
'238 N. C. 130, 76 S. E. 2d 381 (1953).
"Id. at 131, 76 S. E. 2d at 382.
"State v. Thorne, 238 N. C. 392, 395, 78 S. E. 2d 140, 141 (1953); "Scant
heed was paid to the rules of pleading in criminal cases in the preparation of the
warrant in the instant action."
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Criminal Law-The Sleeping Motorist
In the recent case of State v. Mundy,' the Supreme Court of North
Carolina for the first time considered the criminal liability of the sleep-
ing motorist.2  The defendant, a highway patrolman, went off duty
shortly before 4:00 a.m. after eighteen hours' continuous duty. Driving
home with two friends the defendant apparently went to sleep allowing
his car to run off the the highway into a parked auto. One of his guest
passengers was killed in the collision. The defendant was tried and
convicted of involuntary manslaughter.3 In reversing the conviction
for an erroneous charge, the Supreme Court stated its position in regard
to the criminal liability of the sleeping motorist, saying:
"... [The] mere fact that the operator of a motor vehicle
involuntarily goes to sleep while operating his automobile does
not, nothing else appearing, constitute culpable negligence. In
determining the question of culpable negligence, the focal point of
inquiry is whether the operator, because of drowsiness, previous
tiring activities, or other premonitory symptoms of sleep, be-
came aware of the likelihood of falling asleep, but nevertheless
continued to operate the vehicle under circumstances evincing a
thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference
to the rights and safety of others upon the highway, proximately
resulting in injury or death." 4
The inference from this case is that the court has adopted the test
of the majority of the courts in the United States that have considered
the question. The majority of the cases state that if the state only
proves the act of falling asleep while driving a motor vehicle, a nonsuit
' 243 N. C. 149, 90 S. E. 2d 312 (1955).2 The number of cases involving the sleeping motorist has constantly increased
since the invention of the automobile. During the years 1900 to 1919, there was
only one decision considering the liability of the sleeping motorist. However, this
number increased to 40 cases from 1940 to 1949. Kaufman and Kantrowitz, The
Case of the Sleeping Motorist, 25 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. (1950). In 1948, approxi-
mately 4 per cent of the deaths resulting from automobile accidents throughout
the United States were attributed to the driver falling asleep or becoming un-
conscious. ACCIDE NT FACTS (National Safety Council 1948). In North Carolina
during 1955, the sleeping motorist was involved in slightly more than 3 per cent
of the fatal accidents, or 32 fatal accidents and 651 accidents. NoaRT CAROLINA
ANNUAL MOTOR VEHIcLE ACCIDENT SUMMARY (1955).
'The court in State v. Whaley, 191 N. C. 387, 389, 132 S. E. 6, 8 (1926) said,
"The degree of negligence necessary to be shown on an indictment for man-
slaughter, where an unintentional killing is established, is such recklessess or care-
lessness as is incompatible with a proper regard for human life. A want of due
care or a failure to observe the rule of the prudent man, which proximately pro-
duces an injury will render one liable for damages in a civil action, while culpable
negligence, under the criminal law, is such recklessness or carelessness, resulting in
injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless
indifference to the safety and rights of others."
' State v. Mundy, 243 N. C. 149, 153, 90 S. E. 2d 312, 315 (1955).
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for defendant would be proper. Therefore, a driver who while asleep
has driven his automobile so as to kill someone is not guilty of negligent
homicide unless he had such warning of falling asleep that under all
the circumstances he drove recklessly or in marked disregard of the
safety of others and such driving was the proximate cause of the death.
However in State v. Olsen,6 the Utah Supreme Court took a con-
trary view. In this case the court held that the fact of going to sleep
while driving an automobile, without more, at least presents a question
for the jury as to whether the driver was negligent and that the jury
could find that the defendant, in allowing himself to go to sleep, was
guilty of negligence manifesting a marked disregard for the safety of
others on the highway. The significance of this case is that upon the
state proving that the defendant went to sleep, the defendant must come
forward with evidence to show that he did not have any prior warning
of going to sleep or else take the chance that the jury may find him
guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Involuntary manslaughter in North Carolina is based on culpable
negligence, which is such conduct that evinces a thoughtless disregard
of consequences or a heedless indifference to the rights and safety of
others.7 Although the above rule is not controlling in civil actions, it
may aid the treatment of this problem to see how the courts have treated
the sleeping motorists in civil cases involving negligence.
The cases of Baird v. Baird8 and Hobbs v. Queen City Coach Co.9
seem to give a good indication of the civil liability of the sleeping motor-
ist in actions based on ordinary negligence in North Carolina. The
cases indicate that the Supreme Court of North Carolina will adopt the
majority rule in the United States. The majority rule is that if in an
action based on ordinary negligence, the plaintiff proves that the de-
fendant went to sleep while driving, that fact alone justifies an infer-
ence of ordinary negligence sufficient to make out a prima facie case
and make it a question for the jury.10
In Baird v. Baird the court applying the law of New York, because
the accident occurred there, could find no New York case dealing with
this question but found the applicable law in a case dealing with a sleep-
ing passenger. The court said:
'Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d 671 (1941) ; People v. Robinson, 253
Mich. 507, 235 N. W. 236 (1931) ; Novesky v. Mac Duff, Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, 280 App. Div. 953, 116 N. Y. S. 330 (1952) ; State v. Champ, 172 Kan.737, 242 P. 2d 1070 (1952) ; In re Lewis, 11 N. J. 217, 94 A. 2d 328 (1952).
0 State v. Olsen, 108 Utah 377, 160 P. 2d 427 (1945).
See note 3 supra.
8223 N. C. 730, 28 S. E. 2d 225 (1943).
S225 N. C. 323, 34 S. E. 2d 211 (1945).
"0 See Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925) ; which is ap-
parently the leading case in the United States on civil liability of the sleeping
motorist. See also 28 A. L. R. 2d 1, 45 (1953).
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"Ordinarily, one cannot go to sleep while driving an auto-
mobile without having relaxed the vigilance which the law re-
quires, and it lies within his own control to keep awake or to cease
from driving, and so the mere fact of his going to sleep while
driving is a proper basis for an inference of negligence sufficient
to make out a prima facie case against him for injuries sustained
by another while so driving and sufficient for a recovery if no
circumstances tending to excuse or justify his conduct are
proven."' 1
Although this statement was dictum in the case and the court expressly
said that this decision would not be binding upon later cases in North
Carolina, it seems to be a sound inference that the court would adopt
such a rule when faced with a case involving the liability of the sleeping
motorist based on ordinary negligence.
This inference is strengthened by the case of Hobbs v. Queens City
Coach Co. where the driver of a bus ran out of his lane of traffic thereby
running into the automobile of the plaintiff who was in his proper lane.
After the accident the driver remarked that he must have fallen asleep.
Although the court made no direct statement that sleeping while driving
a motor vehicle was negligence, it did say that it wis a general rule of
law that operators of a motor vehicle must exercise the care which an
ordinary prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.
The court went farther to say that in the exercise of such duty it is
incumbent upon the operator to be reasonably vigilant. Although the
court did not speak the word "sleep" in this statement, its relationship
to vigilance will be clarified by referring to the statement in Baird v.
Baird, where the court said that ordinarily one cannot go to sleep while
driving an automobile without having relaxed the vigilance which the law
requires. Therefore it is a logical inference that the court in speaking of
the operator having a duty to be reasonably vigilant, meant that a person
has a duty to keep awake while driving a motor vehicle and proof that
he went to sleep is an inference of negligence without showing more.
The court in Baird v. Baird, explains the rationale of this rule by
saying:
"The approach of sleep, 'tired nature's sweet restorer,' is usu-
ally indicated by certain premonitory symptoms, and does not
come upon one unheralded. His negligence, if any, lies in the fact
that he does not heed the indications of its approach or the circum-
stances which are likely to bring it about."' 
2
"'Baird v. Baird, 223 N. C. 730, 732, 28 S. E. 2d 225, 227 (1943).
1 Id. at 732, 28 S. E. 2d at 227.
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In view of this the test would seem to be whether the defendant was
negligent in permitting himself to fall asleep in the first place. This
logic would be in accord with the reasoning of the well-settled rule
that one who is involved in a collision due to sudden paralysis or un-
expected epileptic seizure is not negligent.13 It would follow that one
overcome by sleep without warning could not be said to be negligent,
but it should be up to him to prove that he did not have any warning. 14
Some of the most frequent circumstances said to impute warning of
sleep by other states are: (1) lack of sleep; (2) length of time at the
wheel; (3) presence of premonitory symptoms (frequent yawning,
drowsiness, prior napping); and (4) driving under the influence of
liquor.15
North Carolina is not concerned with different degrees of negligence
as are other states with guest statutes. However, in Farf our v. Fahad,16
our court, interpreting the law of Virginia which requires gross neg-
ligence, followed the majority rule as to gross negligence. It held that
the mere falling asleep while driving does not give rise to an inference
of gross negligence necessary to make a prima facie case.17 The majority
of cases requiring a finding of wilful and wanton negligence apparently
apply the same rule.'8 The court unaminously agreed that the driver of
an automobile who falls asleep while driving is grossly negligent if he
had some prior warning of the likelihood of his going to sleep. There-
fore, if the plaintiff in an action based on gross or wilful and wanton
negligence shows merely that the operator of the motor vehicle fell
asleep while driving, a directed verdict for the defendant is proper. Most
of the cases of the sleeping motorist involving gross and wilful and
wanton negligence come up in states having guest 0 statutes which re-
quire gross or wilful and wanton negligence for liability.20
1 1 VARTANIAN, THE LAW OF AUTOMOBILES IN NORTH CAROLINA, 85 (3d ed.
1947). Also see Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925) for the
medical basis for the rule.
1 In forecasting what the Supreme Court of North Carolina will do in cases
involving civil liability of the sleeping motorist in actions based on ordinary
negligence, it is interesting to note that no case has been found in which the
operator of a motor vehicle who fell asleep has been absolved of liability in an
action based on ordinary negligence, unless there were other circumstances to
relieve the defendant of liability. 5 Am. JuR., AUTOMOBILES § 180 (1956 Supp.).13See 28 A. L. R. 2d 1 §§ 26, 27, 28, 29 (1953).
10214 N. C. 281, 199 S. E. 521 (1938).17Id. at 287.
18 For example, see Covington v. Carley, 197 Miss. 535, 19 So. 2ct 817 (1947)
applying the law of Alabama; Phillips v. Harper, 60 Cal. App. 2d 298, 140 P. 2d
686 (1943); Secrist v. Raffleson, 326 Ill. App. 489, 62 N. E. 2d 399 (1941);
Butine v. Stevens, 319 Mich. 176, 29 N. W. 2d 325 (1947).
19 A "Guest" in an automobile is one who takes ride in automobile driven by
another person, merely for his own pleasure or on his own business, and without
making any return or conferring any benefit to the automobile driver. BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
20 Statutes which relieve the owner or operator of a motor vehicle of liability
for injury to a guest unless he has been grossly negligent or wilful or intentional
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Continuing to drive under the following conditions which resulted
in falling asleep have justified a finding of gross or wilful and wanton
negligence; (1) drinking of intoxicating beverages; (2) prior warning,
refusal of relief; (3) excessive length of time at the wheel; and (4)
statutes limiting driving time.2 '
While the threat of civil liability serves as a deterrent to drivers
falling asleep while driving, a look at accident statistics indicates that
more extreme measures should be taken. Since the Supreme Court
of North Carolina apparently has adopted the rule as set out in State
v. Mundy regarding criminal liability, this writer would like to see
the legislature pass a statute similar to a recent Michigan statute.22
Although this statute does not speak expressly of sleeping at the wheel,
it does make negligence of a lesser degree than wilful and wanton, re-
sulting in death, a misdemeanor. Thus, if the rationale inferred in
Baird v. Baird and Hobbs v. Queen City Coach Co. is followed, the state
could get a conviction under this statute by proving the fact of falling
asleep alone without more. Such a measure should have some effect
in reducing highway fatalities.
PARKS ALLEN ROBERTS
Descent and Distribution-The Right of a Prospective Heir to Release
or Assign an Expectancy
During his lifetime, deceased entered into an agreement with four
of his eight children whereby in consideration of $6,000.00 paid to each
of them by him they released all interest and right of inheritance in his
estate. After the death of the deceased, the administrator of the estate
brought an action in which he sought to have the court rule upon the
legal effect of the instrument purporting to be a release. The North
Carolina Supreme Court unanimously held that the release was binding
and enforceable in equity if fairly made upon a valuable consideration
misconduct have been enacted in many states. These are commonly denominated
"guest" statutes. Certain things may amount to gross negligence or wilful and
wanton misconduct within the meaning of the guest statutes. Whether or not
there is such negligence as the statute requires is ordinarily a question for thejury. With its conclusion the courts do not ordinarily interfere. 5 AM.-JUR.,
Automobiles, 237, 240 (1933). Also see cases cited note 18 supra.
21 For example, see Belletete v. Morin, 322 Mass. 214, 76 N. E. 2d 660 (1948)
Oast v. Mopper, 58 Ga. App. 566, 199 S. E. 249 (1938) ; Smith v. Williams, 180
Ore. 232, 178 P. 2d 710 (1947) ; Masters v. Cardi, 186 Va. 261, 42 S. E. 2d 203
(1947).
"g MicH. STAT. ANN. c. 286a, § 28.556 (1954), which reads: "Any person who,
by the operation of any vehicle at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless,
feckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death
of another, shall be guilty of a [misdemeanor] punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison not more than two years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00..
Also see 49 Cal. Code, Penal § 500 (1956) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. § 8-529 (1947).
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and not accompanied by fraud or undue influence.' Thus, the four re-
leasing children were estopped to claim any part of the estate.
. Prior to the above case, Price v. Davis,2 there were only three cases
decided in North Carolina which considered the right of a prospective
heir to releases his expectancy4 in his ancestor's estate.5 The first of
these cases, Cannon v. Nowell,0 decided in 1859, held that a release of
this kind was invalid and unenforceable. Ruffin, J., said: "Heirs take
by positive law when the ancestor dies intestate and the course of
descents cannot be altered by words excluding particular heirs, or by any
agreement of parties."7 The court in the Price case would not accept
Cannon v. Nowell as still being the law in North Carolina, probably
because it was an action at law rather than equity before the fusion of
the two in this state. It seems to be the universal rule that the release
of an expectancy is recognized only in equity.8
Not until 1938 and 1939 did the question arise again in the cases
of Allen v. Allen9 and Coward v. Coward,10 which involved agreements
in the nature of a release. In the Allen case the parents of one of the
plaintiffs agreed with each other and with their children to pool their
separately held real estate and divide it during their lifetime among
their children. Two of the children received deeds for their shares; the
deeds made to the other children were never delivered to them. On the
death of the parents, one of the sons and the children of his deceased
sister sought to share with the other children in the real estate left
by the parents. The court held the plaintiffs estopped from taking any
real estate since that son and the sister had accepted the deeds as their
full shares of the lands belonging to their mother and father. Barnhill,
J., said: "It would be contrary to all principles of equity to permit them
'Price v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956).
2244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956).
'By a release is meant "the relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right,
claim, or privilege, by the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the
person against whom it might have been demanded or enforced." BLACK, LAW
Dicrion&ARY 1453 (4th ed. 1951).
' "An expectancy is the possibility of an heir apparent or presumptive that he
may inherit land; the possibility of the prospective next of kin that he acquire
personalty by a distribution or intestacy; and the possibility of a prospective legatee
or devisee that he may acquire property by will on the death of the testator."
SIMES & SMITH, FuTruRE INTEREsTs § 391 (2d ed. 1956).
Coward v. Coward, 216 N. C. 506, 53 S. E. 2d 537 (1939); Allen v. Allen,
213 N. C. 264, 195 S. E. 801 (1938); Cannon v. Nowell, 51 N. C. 436 (1859).
6 51 N. C. 436 (1859).
Cannon v. Nowell, 51 N. C. 436, 437 (1859).
'In re Edelman, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 692 (1905); In re Simon, 158 Mich.
256, 122 N. W. 544 (1909); Nesmith v. Dinsmore, 17 N. H. 515 (1845) ; Price
v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956); Power's Appeal, 63 Pa. 443(1869) ; Gore v. Howard, 94 Tenn. 577, 30 S. W. 730 (1895) ; Coffman v. Coffman,
41 W. Va. 8, 23 S. E. 523 (1895).
p213 N. C. 264, 195 S. E. 801 (1938).
10216 N. C. 506, 5 S. E. 2d 537 (1939).
[Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
[the plaintiffs] now to disavow the conditions upon which the deed was
given to them and to successfully assert a further interest in the real
estate of their parents.""1  "They accepted the benefits of the gift or
advancement and must abide by the conditions upon which it was
made.' 2  Except for the parties, the facts in the Coward case were
identical to those in the above case, and the court cited Allen v. Allen
with approval. The recent Price case predicated its decision mainly on
these two cases,' 3 and as a result there can now be no doubt that North
Carolina is in line with the greater weight of authority in holding such
contracts for the release of an expectancy valid and enforceable.
The majority jurisdictions' 4 enforce. the release on various theories.
It is frequently held that the release operates as an equitable estoppel,15
with some courts enforcing the release in equity because they presume
that the ancestor relied upon the agreement and, except for it, would
have made a will,16 and because the heir should be compelled to abide
by his promise in order to prevent the expectation of the ancestor from
being disappointed.' 7 One court applies the equitable estoppel theory in
order to secure equality among those who have equality of right.' 8
Several courts hold that the release acts as an extinguishment of the
11 Allen v. Allen, 213 N. C. 264, 271, 195 S. E. 801, 805 (1938).
'12 Id. at 269, 195 S. E. at 804. The court seems to have based its decision in
part on the theory that the deeds constituted an advancement liquidated by agree-
ment as to each child's share in the realty.
13 Price v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 233-34, 93 S. E. 2d 93, 96-97 (1956).
Arkansas: Leggett v. Martin, 203 Ark. 88, 156 S. W. 2d 71 (1941) ; Felton
v. Brown, 102 Ark. 658, 145 S. W. 552 (1912); California: In re Estate of
Wickersham, 153 Cal. 603, 96 Pac. 311 (1908) ; In re Garcelon's Estate, 104 Cal.
570, 38 Pac. 414 (1894); Georgia: Barham v. McKneely, 89 Ga. 812, 15 S. E.
761 (1892); Newsome v. Cogburn, 30 Ga. 291 (1860) ; Illinois: Mires v. Lauben-
heimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N. E. 106 (1916) ; Crum v. Sawyer, 132 Ill. 443, 24 N. E.
956 (1890); Indiana: Brown v. Brown, 139 Ind. 653, 39 N. E. 152 (1894) ; Boyer
v. Boyer, 62 Ind. App. 73, 111 N. E. 952 (1915); Iowa: Stennett v. Stennett,
174 Iowa 431, 156 N. W. 406 (1916); Jones v. Jones, 46 Iowa 466 (1877);
Maine: Hilton v. Hilton, 103 Me. 92, 68 Atl. 595 (1907) ; Smith v. Smith, 59 Me.
214 (1871) ; Massachusetts: Kenney v. Tucker, 8 Mass. 143 (1811) ; Michigan:
In re Simon's Estate, 158 Mich. 256, 122 N. W. 544 (1909); New Hampshire:
Nesmith v. Dinsmore, 17 N. H. 515 (1845) ; New Jersey: Phillips v. Phillips, 122
Atl. 620 (N. J. Ch. 1923) ; Havens v. Thompson, 26 N. J. Eq. 383 (1875) ; New
York: Kinyon v. Kinyon, 72 Hun 452, 25 N. Y. S. 225 (1893); North Caro-
ina: Price v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956) ; Pennsylvania:
Estate of Summerville, 129 Pa. 631, 18 Atl. 554 (1889); West Virginia: Adams
v. Adams, 82 W. Va. 244, 95 S. E. 859 (1918); Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W. Va.
8, 23 S. E. 523 (1895) ;. Wisconsin: Lifinger v. Field, 78 Wis. 367, 47 N. W. 613
(1890); England: Medcalf v. Medcalf, 1 Atk. 64, 26 Eng. Rep. 42 (Ch. 1737);
Canada: In re Lewis, 29 Ont. 609 (1898).
"In re Edelman, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 692 (1905) ; Pylant v. Bums, 153 Ga.
529, 112 S. E. 455, 28 A. L. R. 423 (1922) ; Boyer v. Boyer, 62 Ind. App. 73, 111
N. E. 952 (1916); Brands v. DeWitt, 44 N. J. Eq. 545, 10 Atl. 181 and 14 Atl.
894 (1888) ; Sis & SmITH, FuuR INTERESTS § 394 (2d ed. 1956).
"0 Eissler v. Hoppel, 158 Ind. 82, 62 N. E. 692 (1901) ; Brands v. DeWitt, supra
note 15; Martin v. Martin, 222 S. W. 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
1 Cases cited note 16 mpra.
18 Brands v. DeWitt, 44 N. 3. Eq. 545, 10 At. 181 and 14 Atl. 894 (1888).
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heir's right to take by descent.19 Once the consideration vests in the
releasor, it is held that the contract becomes binding in equity.2" The
minority jurisdictions21 on the other hand base their view on the reason-
ing of the common law in holding that a man cannot release what he does
not have22 and that the course of descent cannot be altered by any
agreement of the parties.
23
If the releasor dies before his ancestor, the release will bind the re-
leasor's heirs taking by representation. 24  This is based on the idea
that since the releasor would be estopped if he were alive from asserting
any claim in the estate, his heirs should likewise be estopped. 25  How-
ever, the release is not literally enforced in all cases. In Georgia it was
held that where the effect of the release is to disinherit a sole lineal heir
in favor of collateral heirs, the release will not be enforced because it is
opposed to that state's statute of distribution requiring the estate to
descend to heirs of the first degree and because disinheritance of a sole
descendant heir would be an unreasonable construction of the release. 28
A contract of release between a grandparent and a grandchild made
during the life of the grandchild's parents releasing the child's ex-
pectancy in his parent's estate has been held unenforceable because it
violates the law of descents and distributions and cuts off the grand-
child's right to take by inheritance his due proportion of his parent's
estate.
2 7
If fraud and gross inequality are not present, the consideration for
1 Mires v. Laubenheimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N. E. 106 (1916); Crum v.
Sawyer, 132 Ill. 443, 24 N. E. 956 (1890) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 122 Atl. 620 (N. J.
Ch. 1923).2 In re Edelman's Estate, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962 (1905) ; In re Garcelon's
Estate, 104 Cal. 570, 38 Pac. 414 (1894) ; Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, 109
N. E. 1015 (1915).2 Kentucky: Elliott v. Leslie, 124 Ky. 553, 99 S. W. 619 (1907) ; Tennessee:
DeVault v. DeVault, 48 S. W. 361 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898); South Dakota: In re
Thompson's Estate, 26 S. D. 576, 128 N. W. 1127 (1910); Virginia: Headrick
v. McDowell, 102 Va. 124, 45 S. E. 804 (1903); accord: Florida: Towles v.
Roundtree, 10 Fla. 299 (1863) ; Ohio: Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432, 70 Am.
Dec. 85 (1857) ; Vermont: Simonds v. Simond's Estate, 96 Vt. 110, 117 Atl. 103(1922) ; see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 316 (1940).
"Elliott v. Leslie, supra note 21; Ferendaugh v. Ferendaugh, 104 Ohio St.
556, 136 N. E. 213 (1922) ; Simonds v. Simond's Estate, supra note 21.
"
2Towles v. Roundtree, 10 Fla. 299 (1863) ; Elliott v. Leslie, 124 Ky. 553,
99 S. W. 619 (1907) ; Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432 (1857); Headrick v.
McDowell, 102 Va. 124, 45 S. E. 804 (1903).
2 Simpson v. Simpson, 114 Ill. 603, 4 N. E. 137 and 7 N. E. 287 (1885);
Smith v. Smith, 59 Me. 214 (1871) ; Allen v. Allen, 213 N. C. 264, 195 S. E. 801
(1938) ; Powers Appeal, 63 Pa. 443 (1869); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 76 W. Va.
91, 85 S. E. 29 (1915) ; Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W. Va. 8, 23 S. E. 523 (1895) ;
In re Lewis, 29 Ont. 609 (1898). "It would seem that if the releasing child and
all his brothers and sisters predecease the source, the shares of the grandchildren
should not be affected by the release." ATKINSON, WILLS § 130 (2d ed. 1953).20 See note 24 supra.
20 Pylant v. Burns, 153 Ga. 529, 112 S. E. 455 (1922). Contra, RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 316, comment f and illustration 6 (1940).27 Pritchard v. Pritchard, 76 W. Va. 91, 85 S. E. 29 (1915).
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the release will usually be held fair even though its amount may later
turn out to be an inadequate share of the estate.28  The burden of
proving want of consideration is on the party asserting such want.
29
All that is required of the instrument to constitute a release which will
bar the releasor's descendants is that it meet the formalities of an
ordinary written contractY3° However, the release must be certain, clear
and unambiguous,31 executed by one competent to contract,32 and
sufficient to satisfy the local Statute of Frauds 33  This would indicate
that the courts do not favor a release by implication and that a draftsman
might well use the word "release" and specifically provide for the bar of
the releasor's descendants in case he should predecease his ancestor.
Another type of transaction closely related to and resembling the
release of an expectancy is the assignment of an expectancy. In most
states34 equity will enforce the assignment35 of an expectancy to a third
-"SEissler v. Hoppel, 158 Ind. 82, 62 N. E. 692 (1902); Boyer v. Boyer, 62
Ind. App. 73, 111 N. E. 952 (1916) ; Kenney v. Tucker, 8 Mass. 143 (1811) ; In re
Simon, 158 Mich. 256, 122 N. W. 544 (1909) ; Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W. Va. 8,
23 S. E. 523 (1895) ; It re Lewis, 29 Ont. 609 (1898).
"In re Edelman, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962 (1905) ; Summerville's Estate,
129 Pa. 631, 18 Atl. 554 (1889) ; Mow v. Baker, 24 S. W. 2d 1 (Tex. Com. App.
1930).
30 Mires v. Laubenheimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N. E. 106 (1915); Rodemeier v.
Brown, 169 Ill. 347, 48 N. E. 468 (1897) ; Binns v. Dazey, 147 Ind. 536, 44 N. E.
644 (1896) ; Brown v. Brown, 139 Ind. 653, 39 N. E. 152 (1894) ; Swigt v. Miles,
75 Ind. App. 85, 130 N. E. 130 (1921) ; Stolenburg v. Dierchs, 117 Iowa 25, 90
N. W. 525 (1902).
"' Williams v. Swango, 365 Ill. 549, 7 N. E. 2d 306 (1937) ; Mires v. Lauben-
heimer, supra note 30.
" Bishop v. Davenport, 58 Ill. 105 (1871).
"Gary v. Newton, 201 Ill. 170, 66 N. E. 267 (1903); Chidester v. Harlan,
180 Iowa 171, 159 N. W. 659 (1916) ; Riddell v. Riddell, 70 Neb. 472, 97 N. W.
609 (1903) ; Brands v. DeWitt, 44 N. J. Eq. 545, 10 Atl. 181, 14 Atl. 894 (1888).
However, the agreement may be oral if the parent has carried out the agreement.
Mixture Guano Co. v. McKoone, 168 Ga. 317, 147 S. E. 711 (1929) ; Mires v.
Laubenheimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N. E. 106 (1916).
" Alabama: Fuller v. Nichols, 219 Ala. 58, 121 So. 52 (1929) ; California:
Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 126 Pac. 149 (1912) ; Connecticut: Brown v.
Brown, 66 Conn. 493, 34 Atl. 490 (1895) ; Idaho: Casady v. Scott, 40 Idaho 137,
237 Pac. 415 (1925); Illinois: Thornton v. Louch, 297 Ill. 204, 130 N. E. 467(1921) ; In re Landis, 41 F. 2d 700 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 282 U. S. 872 (1930) ;
Iowa: Burk- v. Morain, 223 Iowa 399, 272 N. W. 441 (1937); Mally v. Mally,
121 Iowa 169, 96 N. W. 735 (1903) ; Kansas: Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kan. 523,
38 Pac. 792 (1895) ; Maine: Curtis v. Curtis, 40 Me. 24 (1855) (family agree-
ment); Maryland: Keys v. Keys, 148 Md. 397, 129 Atl. 504 (1925); Massachu-
setts: Gadsby v. Gadsby, 275 Mass. 159, 175 N. E. 495 (1931) ; Missouri: Bank
of Moberly v. Meals, 222 Mo. App. 862, 5 S. W. 2d 1113 (1928) ; New Hampshire:
Peterborough Sav. Bank v. Hartshorn, 67 N. H. 156, 33 Atl. 729 (1891); New
Jersey: Bacon v. Bonham, 33 N. J. Eq. 614 (1881); New York: In re Strange,
164 Misc. 929, 300 N. Y. S. 23 (Surr. Ct. 1937); North Carolina: Boles v.
Caudle, 133 N. C. 528, 45 S. E. 835 (1903) ; Mastin v. Marlow, 65 N. C 695
(1871) ; McDonald v McDonald, 58 N C. 211 (1859) ; accord, Kornegay v. Miller,
137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E. 315 (1905) ; Ohio: Hite v. Hite, 120 Ohio St. 253, 166
N. E. 193 (1929); Oklahoma: Kaylor v. Kaylor, 172 Okla. 535, 45 P. 2d 743
(1935) ; Pennsylvania: In re Norris, 329 Pa. 483, 198 Atl. 142 (1938) ; South
Carolina: Wallace v. Quick, 156 S. C. 248, 153 S. E. 168 (1930) ; Tennessee:
Tate v. Greenlee, 141 Tenn. 103, 207 S. W. 716 (1918) ; Texas: Young v. Hollings-
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person if made free from fraud and oppression and in good faith upon
a valuable consideration by one sui juris who survives the ancestor.a0
Another element necessary in some but not all of the majority rule
states is that the ancestor consent to the assignment of the expectancy.8 7
Equity treats the assignment as an executory contract to convey the
property to the assignee if and when it ceases to be an expectancy and
comes into the assignor's possession as a vested estate or interest, and
specific performance of the contract itself is decreed.38 In this situation
the purchaser receives only what the seller has; therefore, if the assigner
dies before his ancestor, no interest has ever vested in the seller nor will
any vest in his estate which will pass to his assignee. Thus, the as-
signor's heirs are not bound by the assignment because in such case
they take directly as heirs of the ancestor.8 9
North Carolina has for a long time followed the majority rule and
enforces the assignment of an expectancy to a third person.40 In Mc-
Donald v. McDonald,41 decided in 1859, Battle, J., said: "[The assignor]
had a right to make a contract to convey whatever interest he might in
future have in his cousin's property; and such a contract, when fairly
made upon a valuable consideration, the Court of Chancery will enforce
whenever the property shall come into his possession.1 42  As in other
worth, 16 S. W. 2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Vermont: Hoyt v. Hoyt, 61 Vt.
413, 18 AtI. 313 (1889) (family agreement); Virginia: Lewis v. Madisons, 15 Va.(1 Munf.) 303 (1810) (family agreement) ; Wisconsin: Hofineister v. Hunter, 230
Wis. 91, 283 N. W. 335, 121 A. L. R. 444 (1939); England: Bennett v. Cooper,
9 Beav. 252, 50 Eng. Rep. 340 (Rolls Ct. 1845).
"By assignment is meant a transfer of the expectancy to a third party,
stranger or co-heir, who is not the ancestor of the assignee.
"See cases cited note 34 supra.
Consent required: McClure v. Raben, 133 Ind. 507, 33 N. E. 275 (1893);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Wood, 78 Ind. App. 147, 134 N. E. 899 (1922);
Curtis v. Curtis, 40 Me. 24 (1855) ; Stevens v. Stevens, 181 Mich. 438, 148 N. W.
225 (1914). Contra: Gannon v. Graham, 211 Iowa 516, 231 N. W. 675 (1930) ;
Gadsby v. Gadsby, 275 Mass. 159, 179 N. E. 495 (1931) ; Hale v. Hollon, 90 Tex.
427, 39 S. W. 287 (1897); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 61 Vt. 413, 18 Atl. 313 (1889);
Hofmeister v. Hunter, 230 Wis. 81, 283 N. W. 330 (1939); inference that no
consent needed: Stover v. Eycleshimer, 3 N. Y. 620 (1867); McDonald v. Mc-
Donald, 58 N. C. 211 (1859); Fritz's Estate, 160 Pa. 156, 28 Atl. 642 (1894);
Steele v. Frierson, 85 Tenn. 430, 35 S. W. 649 (1887).
38 In re Barnett, 124 F. 2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Hooker v. Hooker, 130 Conn.
41, 32 A. 2d 68 (1943) ; Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kan. 523, 38 Pac. 792 (1895) ;
Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, 109 N. E. 1015 (1915) ; In re Strange's Estate,
.164 Misc. 929, 300 N. Y. S. 23 (Surr. Ct. 1937); McDonald v. McDonald, 58
N. C. 211 (1859) ; Bayler v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. 37 (1861); Tate v. Greenlee,
141 Tenn. 103, 207 S. W. 716 (1918) ; Hale v. Hollon, mpra note 37; Hofmeister
v. Hunter, supra note 37.
" Donough v. Garland, supra note 38; Benson v. Benson, 180 N. C. 106, 104
S. E. 68 (1920); Johnson v. Breeding, 136 Tenn. 528, 190 S. W. 545 (1916);
French v. McMillon, 79 W. Va. 639, 91 S. E. 538 (1917).
"' Boles v. Caudle, 133 N. C. 528, 45 S. E. 835 (1903) ; Mastin v. Marlow, 65
N. C. 695 (1871); McDonald v. McDonald, 58 N. C. 211 (1859).
158 N. C. 211 (1859).
2 Id. at 214.
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jurisdictions, the assignment is treated as an executory contract en-
titling the assignee to a specific performance as soon as the assignor has
acquired the power to perform it.43
Where there is an assignment of a possibility coupled with an in-
terest, equity will also take cognizance of the transaction. 44 A possi-
bility coupled with an interest is a contingent one created in an instru-
ment, such as an executory devise, contingent remainder, springing use,
or shifting use.45 Such a future interest may be sold, transmitted, or
devised since it is a present contingent interest in an estate.48 The va-
lidity of the assignment of a possibility coupled with an interest "has
been sustained as an executory contract to convey, passing no present
interest or estate, but a mere right in equity, to be enforced by suit when
the contingency upon which the estate vests occurs. Such assignments
are sometimes sustained upon the doctrine of estoppel, especially when
the deed contains a warranty of title. It has also been held that an
assignment of such interest, while not passing any present legal title
or estate, does pass the equitable title of the assignor, which is perfected
by converting the assignor into a trustee for the benefit of the assignee
when the estate vests.' 47
Neither the release nor the assignment of an expectancy are favorites
of the courts and such transactions are examined with caution.4" They
may result in the taldng of undue advantage of an heir in distressed
and unfortunate circumstances. 49 Both are in disfavor because they
allow an expectant heir to spend his inheritance before it comes into
his possession. 5° The assignment has been the special object of criticism;
it has been called a gambling contract and therefore held unenforceable
in at least one jurisdiction.51 Also it has been said that an assignment
tends to destroy or lessen the ancestor's control over the expectant heir
by giving him independent means of gratifying his desires, thus en-
couraging extravagance and vice on his part.5 2  It may also create a
McDonald v. McDonald, 58 N. C. 211 (1859).
"Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E. 1015 (1915) ; SI mEs & SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 402 (2d ed. 1956) ; see also SIMES, FUTrRE INTEmSTS § 712(1st ed. 1936).
"Kornegay v. Miller, supra note 44, at 665, 50 S. E. at 318 (dictum).
"Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E. 315 (1905); Bodenhamer v.
Welch, 89 N. C. 79 (1883).
,7Id. at 664, 50 S. E. at 317.
8 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P. 2d 841 (1945) ; Kaiser v. Cobbey,
400 Ill. 214, 79 N. E. 2d 604 (1948); Gannon v. Graham, 211 Iowa 516, 231
N. W. 675 (1930) ; Kornegay v. Miller, supra note 46; Hite v. Hite, 120 Ohio
St. 253, 166 N. E. 193 (1929) ; McConnell v. Corgey, 153 Tex. 49, 262 S. W. 2d
944 (1954) ; Graef v. Kanouse, 205 Wis. 597, 238 N. W. 377 (1931).
"'Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112 (1810) ; Hale v. Hollon, 90 Tex. 427, 39
S. W. 287 (1897); SIXEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 395 (2d ed. 1956).
" Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N. C. 659, 669, 50 S. E. 315, 319 (1905) (dicttm);
SIMEs & SMITm, FUTURE INTERESTS § 395 (2d ed. 1956).
" McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 25 N. E. 179 (1890).
52 Id. at 147, 25 N. E. at 182.
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desire in the purchaser for the early death of the ancestor. And, in
addition, it has been held that an assignment operates as a fraud upon
the ancestor, perhaps deluding him into leaving his property not to
the person intended but to a stranger."4 Thus it would appear that of
the two, the release is looked on less harshly because it generally keeps
the inheritance in the family and is more in the nature of a family
settlement, which is favored by the courts. 55
It would appear that Allen v. Allen and Coward v. Coward actually
left little room for doubt as to the validity of the relase of an expectancy
in North Carolina. However, the seemingly square holding contra in
Cannon v. Nowell caused confusion in this area. Price v. Davis has
at last removed this confusion.
THOMAS STEPHEN BENNETT
Fire Insurance-Estate by the Entirety-Insurable Interest-Right
to Proceeds
A husband and wife own an estate in land as tenants by the entirety.
The spouses are separated, the husband remaining the occupant of the
dwelling-house. He insures the home in his name alone for $4,000 and
pays the premiums from his own funds. The home burns and pending
payment of the claim by the insurance company the spouses obtain an
absolute divorce. To whom do the proceeds of the policy belong?
The above facts presented a case of first impression in North Caro-
lina.' The supreme court, reversing the decision of the trial court,
held in Carter v. Continental Ins. Co.2 that the husband's interest in
the property was not insurable for his benefit alone as a separate moiety
apart from the estate owned by him and his wife and the proceeds of a
policy so taken inured to the benefit of the entire estate. Thus, upon
absolute divorce the wife was entitled to one half of the proceeds,8
even though she was not named as insured or beneficiary in the policy
and had not contributed to the payment of premiums.
Ordinarily a fire insurance policy is a personal contract to indemnify
the insured for a loss sustained;4 and where one has an insurable in-
3 McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 147, 25 N. E. 179, 182 (1890).
" In re Edelman's Estate, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962 (1905) ; Hale v. Hollon,
90 Tex. 427. 39 S. W. 287 (1897) ; See SImEs & SMITrH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 395
(2d ed. 1956).
" Bank of Wadesboro v. Hendley, 229 N. C. 432, 50 S. E. 2d 302 (1948);
Redwine v. Clodfeter, 226 N. C. 366, 38 S. E. 2d 203 (1946) ; Fish v. Hanson, 223
N. C. 143, 25 S. E. 2d 461 (1943).
1 Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N. C. 578, 89 S. E. 2d 122 (1955).
2242 N. C. 578, 89 S. E. 2d 122 (1955).
' Divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common.
'VANCE, INSURANCE § 13 (1951).
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terest in the property and pays the premiums from his own funds, the
proceeds inure to his sole benefit.5 Normally, one not a party to a fire
insurance contract can have no lawful claim in any amount realized by
the insured.6 In view of these general insurance principles, it is interest-
ing to observe the rationale of the court in reaching a seemingly con-
trary result in the Carter case. The facts of the case raise questions
concerning theories which the court did not consider in its opinion. It
is the purpose of this note to explore these questions. There seem
to be relatively few cases concerning the points of law involved; therefore
analogies must be drawn from related cases.
It is seemingly well settled in most jurisdictions that the husband
has an insurable interest 7 in the whole of the premises held by him and
his wife as tenants by the entireties.8 The case of Conley v. Fidelity-
Phenix Fire Ins. Co.9 presented an interesting problem. The husband
and wife owned certain property by the entireties which included a
$4,000 home. The husband insured the home for $2,000 and loss oc-
curred. The insurance company resisted on the ground that the hus-
band's interest was limited to half of the value of the policy since the
wife had an equal interest in the property. The court held that he was
entitled to the full amount of the insurance, saying that the policy covered
the interest of the insured-which in a tenancy by the entirety is of the
whole and not of the moiety.10
'Wattenbarger v. Tullock, 280 S. W. 2d 925 (Tenn. 1955).
'See Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 523, 84 S. E. 2d 419, 423 (1954): "... if
the insurance so procured exceeds the value of the insured's insurable interest, then
the excess is of no concern to any other person who also has an interest in the
property, but it is a question exclusively between the insured and the insurer."
"See Federal Land Bank v. Atlas Assurance Co., 188 N. C. 747, 125 S. E.
631 (1934) (any interest is insurable if peril insured against would bring pecuniary
loss upon insured by immediate and direct effect) ; BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 942
(4th ed. 1951) (all that is required for an insurable interest is ". . . such a real
and substantial interest in specific property as will prevent the contract from being
a mere wager policy"). The exact nature of of the husband's interest in an estate
by the entirety might be one or more of the following: (1) right of survivorship
(2) right of usufruct (3) his interest in the estate (4) the joint interest in the
estate.
' North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Sciandra, 256 Ala. 409, 54 So. 2d
764, 27 A. L. R. 2d 1047 (1951) (where husband and wife each owned undivided
one-half interest in property destroyed, held: husband's insurable interest under
the policy in his name was not confined to his estate in the property but his
interest extended to pecuniary benefit expected from its continued existence);
Emery v. Clark, 303 Mich. 461, 6 N. W. 2d 746 (1942) (where creditor sought
to have policy issued in name of husband on tenancy by the entirety reformed to
include the wife in order to get judgment against both, held: husband had insurable
interest in the whole of the premises in his own right and policy may not be
reformed) ; Clawson v. Citizen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 121 Mich. 591, 80 N. W. 573,
68 A. L. R. 365 (1899); Miotke v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Lien Ins. Co., 113
Mich. 166, 71 N. W. 463 (1897); Lux v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 30
S. W. 2d 1090 (Mo. App. 1930).
' 102 F. Supp. 474 (W. D. Ark. 1952).
"0 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6. (Casner ed. 1952): each spouse
is seised per tout et non per iny.
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In some jurisdictions the failure of the husband to disclose the in-
terest of his wife may void the policy for breach of warranty that he
was sole and unconditional owner of the fee in the premises." However,
G. S. § 58-180.112 removes this from consideration in the instant case,
since it provides that the naming of either spouse alone shall be sufficient
and the policy shall not be void for a failure to disclose the interest of
the other spouse. 13 It may be noted that the statute does not state that
the insurer will be liable for the full value of the policy but only that
it shall not be void. In the principal case the insurer admitted liability
on the policy; thus the litigation concerned only the rights of the re-
spective spouses to the proceeds of the policy paid into court.
The estate by the entirety exists in North Carolina as at common
law with all its incidents.14 These incidents were vividly set out by
the late Chief Justice Stacy in his notable opinion in Davis v. Bass15 and
were relied on by the court in the Carter case. Those pertinent to the
instant case appear to be:
(a) The estate is based on the common law doctrine that a hus-
band and wife were regarded as one person, and a conveyance
to them by name was a conveyance in law to but one person.
(b) Each spouse is seised per tout et non per my, each being
seised of the whole and not of a moiety or undivided portion.
(c) The husband is entitled to the rents and profits of the land
for his life (unsufruct).
(d) The estate is only severed by absolute divorce or by consent
of both parties.
(e) One spouse, without the consent of the other can neither have
the property partitioned nor sell the whole or a part thereof.
(f) Upon the death of either spouse the entire estate vests in the
other, not solely by right of survivorship, but also by virtue of the
grant which vested the entire estate in each grantee.
"' Cook v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ass'n, 139 W. Va. 700, 83 S. E. 2d 71 (1954)
But see Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 35 F. 2d 675 (6th Cir. 1929). The
latter case said that under the law of Tennessee there is but one owner; the legal
existence of the wife is incorporated into that of the husband. Thus insurance in
the name of the husband procured on an estate by the entirety satisfies the policy
requirement of sole and unconditional ownership.
" N. C. GEx. STAT. § 58-180.1 (1950): "Policy issuted to husband or wife onjoint property.-Any policy of fire insurance issued to husband or wife, on build-
ings and household furniture owned by the husband and wife, either by entirety, in
common, or jointly, either name of one of the parties in interest named as the
insured or beneficiary therein, shall be sufficient and the policy shall not be void
for failure to disclose the interest of the other, unless it appears that in procuring
of the issuance of such policy, fraudulent means or methods were used by the in-
sured or owner thereof."
" See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30 (1950) which provides that statements in an
application of insurance shall be deemed representations and not warranties.
x' Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms Inc., 239 N. C. 481, 86 S. E. 2d 472 (1954).188 N. C. 200, 204-09, 124 S. E. 566, 567-71 (1924).
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Legal separation does not affect the rights of the parties in the estate, 16
but divorce absolute converts the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy
in common by operation of law.' 7
In the Carter case the supreme court did not comment on an interest-
ing theory which prevails in some jurisdictions. In Scutella v. County
Fire Ins. Co.' s a husband took out insurance in his name alone on prop-
erty held by himself and his wife as tenants by the entireties. It was
held that when the husband died, after loss but pending payment of the
claim, the wife was entitled to the whole of the proceeds by right of
survivorship.19 This would seem to import the idea that the proceeds
due on the policy in one sense replaced the property destroyed and were
impressed with its real property characteristics2 If this were the posi-
tion of North Carolina it would greatly simplify the situation in the
Carter case. It seems that North Carolina, however, follows a con-
trary view in this type of situation.2 ' An analysis of a few similar cases
seems to verify this proposition. It is well settled that a tenancy by the
entirety does not exist in personal property in North Carolina.22
It has been held that a life tenant insuring his interest is entitled
to the proceeds of the policy without having to share with the
remainderman.23 The life tenant may recover not merely in proportion
to the value of his life estate but for the full amount due under the
policy up to the fee value of the property destroyed.2 4  In In re will of
Wilson2 5 the husband held a life estate by curtesy right after his wife
1" Freeman v. Belfer, 173 N. C. 581, 92 S. E. 486 (1917). The majority of the
court were of- opinion that divorce a tnensa et thoro did not sever the marital
relationship and thus did not affect the rights of the spouses in a tenancy by the
entirety. There were vigorous dissents.
17 McKinnon v. Caulk, 167 N. C. 411, 83 S. E. 559 (1914). It severs the unity
of person, one of the five unities required in the holding of the title as tenants by
the entireties.18231 App. Div. 343, 247 N. Y. S. 689 (4th Dep't 1931).
" Rigby v. Allegany County Cooperative Fire Ins. Co., 242 App. Div. 809, 275
N. Y. S. 211 (4th Dep't 1934) (memorandum decision following the Scutella case
as conclusive).
20 Rolater v. Rolater, 198 S. W. 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (a similar line of
reasoning was used: where a home is destroyed by fire, the proceeds of insurance
thereon stand in place of and instead of the insured property and has the same
character, community or separate, as the insured property); In re Hickman's
Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 519, 250 P. 2d 524 (1953).
-"See Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N. C. 396, 42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947); Stockton v.
Maney, 212 N. C. 231, 193 S. E. 137 (1937). But see Campbell v. Murphy, 55
N. C. 357 (1856) ; Graham v. Roberts, 43 N. C. 99 (1851).
"Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N. C. 515, 91 S. E. 2d 176 (1956) ; Turlington v.
Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923) ;' Note, 6 N. C. L. Rrv. 342 (1928).23 Stockton v. Maney, 212 N. C. 231, 193 S. E. 137 (1937). Where husband
held a life estate by curtesy right and insured the property, held: nothing else
appearing the husband insured only his interest in the dwelling and upon de-
struction by fire he was entitled to the entire proceeds of the policy and the
remainderman had no interest in the real property bought by the life tenant with
the proceeds.
2" Ibid.
D5224 N. C. 505, 31 S. E. 2d 543 (1944).
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died intestate. He insured the home for its full value and it was de-
stroyed by fire. The heirs of the deceased wife brought suit for their
ratable portion of the proceeds. The court held that unless an intention
to insure for the benefit of the heirs appeared, the husband was entitled
to the whole amount of the insurance. The rationale of this view ap-
pears to be: (1) that the interest of the life tenant and the remainder-
man are entirely separate (2) that the insurance arises not out of the
propery itself but from an independent contract.
However, the situation seems otherwise if a testator devises property
on which he holds insurance and loss occurs after his death. It has
been held that a life tenant under the devise receives the interest on the
proceeds in lieu of the use of the destroyed property and at his death the
principal passes to the remainderman.2 6  Apparently this is one instance
where North Carolina has followed the view that the proceeds in a sense
replace the property and retain its characteristics. 27
In another analogous insurance situation it has been held that one
joint owner may insure his interest to the exclusion of the other,28 and
in most instances collect the total amount of the insurance proceeds
for his sole benefit.29 Where a wife and husband held property by joint
tenancy and the wife insured the family dwelling as sole owner for its
full insurable value and paid the premiums from her own earnings, it
was held that she was entitled to the whole of the proceeds and the hus-
band could not maintain an action in law or equity for any portion there-
of.30 In this and other cases the courts declined to set up a fixed rule
as to the right of the non-insuring joint owner to share in the proceeds.
Rather the decision appeared to depend on "the equities of the particular
case" in deciding whether the other joint owner had a right to share
in the proceeds of the insured's personal contract.3 1
It seems clear in North Carolina that when an estate by the entirety
is sold the funds derived from the sale become personalty32 and are held
2 Graham v. Roberts, 43 N. C. 99 (1851). VANCE, INSURANCE § 133 (1951)
says that since the insurance policy is a personal contract, the right of action is in
the personal representatives of the deceased who hold the proceeds in trust for
those entitled to succeed by inheritance or devise to the insured property. This
doctrine applies only to inheritance or devise and not grants inter vivos.
27 See Graham v. Roberts, supra note 26; cf. Campbell v. Murphy, 55 N. C.
357 (1856).
28 14 AM. JuR., Cotenancy § 23 (1938).
2 Clapp v. Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Assn, 126 N. C. 388, 35 S. E. 617
(1900) ; American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 205 S. W. 2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
2 Miles v. Miles, 211 Ala. 26, 99 So. 187 (1924) ; accord, Bell v. Barefield, 219
Ala. 319, 122 So. 318 (1929).
"1 Currier v. North British Etc. Co., 98 N. H. 366, 101 A. 2d 266 (1953)
Godfrey, Some Limited-Interest Problems, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 415, 423
(1950).
"2 Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923) (where husband
and wife sold an estate by the entirety and received mortgage secured by bonds,
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by the parties as tenants in common. 33 In Wilson v. ErvinU4 the hus-
band and wife sold property held by the entireties and the money was
deposited in the bank in the husband's name. After the death of the
husband, the wife asserted that she was entitfed to the whole amount of
the money by right of survivorship. It was held that no right of sur-
vivorship existed in such funds and she was entitled to only half. The
rationale of this view seems to be: (1) the sale of the property terminates
the estate by the entirety by joint act and consent of both spouses, making
them each entitled to half the proceeds as tenants in common. (2) the
money or claim for money replaces the property only in the sense that
it represents the value.P5 Similar cases in other jurisdictions have held
that such sale proceeds go by right of survivorship.
36
The court might have considered the theory that the husband in the
Carter case insured the property in trust for himself and his wife. It
seems clear that there was no intention present which is essential to the
existence of an express or implied trust.3 7 A constructive trust might be
plausible.38  Constructive trusts are created by courts of equity39 and
arise entirely by operation of law without reference to any actual or
supposed intention to create a trust but often contrary to such intention.
40
Generally a constructive trust is declared only when equity finds that
one has obtained or now retains title to property by any kind of wrong-
doing; or where, although title was obtained originally without fraud or
wrong, it is against equity that the property should be retained by him
held: the bonds were personal property and at the death of the husband jus ac-
crescendi did not apply to vest the whole of the proceeds in the wife) ; Moore v.
Greenville Banking and Trust Co., 178 N. C. 118, 100 S. E. 269 (1919) ; Note, 13
N. C. L. REv. 256 (1935). But cf. Place v. Place, 206 N. C. 676, 174 S. E.
747 (1934) ; Isley v. Sellars, 153 N. C. 374, 69 S. E. 279 (1910).
"Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N. C. 734, 89 S. E. 598 (1955).
1227 N. C. 396, 42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947).
"For an excellent discussion of this doctrine see In re Estate of Blumenthal,
236 N. Y. 448, 141 N. E. 911, 30 A. L. R. 901 (1923).
" Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N. E. 117 (1924) (tenancy by the
entirety does not exist in personalty except as to personal property directly derived
from real estate held by that title such as proceeds arising from the sale of
property so held) ; Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 Atl. 635 (1923) ; Johnson v.
Johnson, 268 S. W. 2d 439 (Mo. App. 1954) (where husband and wife sold an
estate by the entirety and the money was deposited in the bank in the name of the
husband, held: proceeds of sale retained all features and characteristics of an
estate by the entiretly and upon the death of the husband the wife was entitled
to the whole amount of the deposit by right of survivorship) ; Citizens Sav. Bank
and Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 91 Vt. 13, 99 Atl. 250 (1916).
"
T BOGERT, TRUSTS § 77 (1952).
3 See Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 35 F. 2d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 1929)
(dictum) : "Nor do we decide that the husband is entitled to the sole and exclusive
enjoyment of the proceeds of the policy. . . . It might well be that the proceeds
are held by the husband as trustee for the wife and the wife's interest thus pre-
served." See note 11 supra for facts and holding of this case.
"Lefkowitz v. Silver, 182 N. C. 339, 109 S. E. 56 (1921).
"0 Speight v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 209 N. C. 563, 183 S. E. 734
(1936).
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who holds it.41 Evidence to establish a constructive trust must be clear,
strong, cogent, and convincing.42  It does not appear that in the prin-
cipal case the husband was guilty of any wrongdoing or that it would
be against equity to allow him to recover the full amount of the pro-
ceeds. The wife could have protected her own interest by insuring the
property in her own behalf.
The supreme court in the instant case did not comment on the
possibility that the insurance proceeds might have been impressed with
real property characteristics or that the husband procured the insurance
in trust for his wife. Rather it based the decision on the common law
nature of the estate. Since the husband and wife were each seised per
tout et non per my, there was no moiety of interest which the husband
could insure for his sole benefit.4 3 It seems both have an equal interest
in the res, but that interest is not severable.44 This distinguishes the
instant case from the analogous insurance cases previously considered.
Joint tenants are seised per tout et per my45 and tenants in common are
seised per my et non per tout.48  In each instance there is a per my
interest, a moiety, which one cotenant may claim as his own.
This apparently means that in North Carolina a husband must have
a moiety of interest in order to insure for his separate benefit. Is this
not contrary to accepted insurance theories? 47 The decision in the
Carter case does not appear to rest on any presumption that the husband
insures for the benefit of both spouses.48 Rather the rationale of the
court seems to be: (1) that the insurance policy as written and the loss
benefits created thereby inured to the benefit of the entire state as owned
by both husband and wife (2) that since the entire estate, as so insured,
was severed by absolute divorce, it necessarily follows that the wife is
entitled to half the proceeds of the policy. Though there was no ex-
press reference to the proceeds taking the characteristics of real prop-
erty ;the rationale seems to imply that the court treated the proceeds as
being endowed with the characteristics of an estate by the entireties be-
fore the divorce and necesarily taking the characteristics of tenancy in
.1 Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N. C. 288, 199 S. E. 83 (1938).2Atinson v. Atkinson, 225 N. C. 120, 33 S. E. 2d 666 (1945).
"But see Ross v. Ross, 35 N. J. Super. 242, 113 A. 2d 700 (1955). New Jersey
has modified the common law and asserts that in a tenancy by the entirety the
wife holds in her possession during their joint lives one half of the estate in com-
mon with her husband and as between themselves the respective rights of the
parties are those of tenants in common.
" Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941) ; New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Oates, 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269 (1936).
"12 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
"2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
"See note 7 supra.
'sCf. 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy § 14 (1947) which says where the act of onejoint tenant is beneficial to his cotenant, his act is regarded as the act of all so far
as sharing in the benefit of the act is concerned.
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common after divorce, thus enabling the wife to share in the proceeds.
This might mean then that the wife could have recovered half the pro-
ceeds prior to divorce absolute.
It may be noted in the instant case that the policy was issued in the
name of the husband. The question arises whether the result would
have been the same had the policy specifically excluded the wife. Ap-
parently this is the only further action which the husband here could




It is the opinion of the writer that by this decision the supreme
court has placed a restriction on the tenancy by the entirety which has
not before been judicially recognized. Just as neither spouse alone
can have the estate partitioned and neither alone can alienate his in-
terest, so likewise in North Carolina neither spouse can insure the
property to the exclusion of the other. Thus it appears that it becomes
another incident of the tenancy by the entirety which the parties accept
when they choose to hold such an estate.
WILLIAM H. KIRKMAN, JR.
Joint Tort-Feasors-Contribution-Effects of Statute on Covenant
Not to Sue
A recent New Jersey case, Sinootz v. lennil involved a problem
which has not been decided in North Carolina. The plaintiff was a
passenger in the defendant's cab and was injured in an accident between
the cab and a vehicle operated by a third party. In the plaintiff's action,
the defendant cab company filed a third party complaint against the other
driver for relief under the New Jersey Joint Tortfeasors Contribution
Law. 2  The other driver had obtained a covenant not to sue3 from the
" The equities of the instant case seem to be heavily in the husband's favor
since: (1) he had paid all the premiums from his own funds; (2) he had the
policy issued in his name alone; (3) the husband and wife were living separate
and apart when the policy was issued; (4) the insurance covered the homestead
in which the husband was residing.
1237 N. J. Super. 529, 117 A. 2d 675 (1955).
' N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -3 (1952): "For the purpose of this act
the term 'joint tortfeasors' means two or more persons jointly or severally liable
in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has
been recovered against all or some of them. . . . The right of contribution exists
among joint tortfeasors. . . . [Where a joint tortfeasor pays all or part of a
judgment] he shall be entitled to recover contribution from the other . . . joint
tortfeasors for the excess so paid over his pro rata share; but no person shall
be entitled to recover contribution under this act from any person entitled to be
indemnified by him in respect to the liability for which the contribution is
sought. ... "
'Where there are joint tort-feasors there can be but one recovery and a settle-
ment with one is a release of the others. Howard v. Plumbing Co., 154 N. C.
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plaintiff and because of this moved for a summary judgment.4 This
motion was granted, but the court also entered an order to the clerk to
reduce any judgment of the plaintiff against the original defendant by
one half of the verdict.
The court rested its decision on a deliberate dictum written the
previous year by Justice Brennan for the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.5 The justice had said that the basis of the statute allowing ac-
tions among the joint tort-feasors was to assure that none paid in excess
of his pro rata share,6 thus achieving the result dictated by equity and
justice. He stated two alternative ways of gaining equality between
the tort-feasors in this type of case: (1) letting the plaintiff get a judg-
ment for his total damage less the amount he received for his covenant,
giving the tort-feasors who pay more than their pro rata share the right
to contribution against the one who settled; or (2) reducing the plain-
tiff's verdict by a credit in the amount of the settler's full pro rata share
of the verdict instead of the mere amount paid to the plaintiff for the
covenant not to sue. Justice Brennan expressed a fear that the first
alternative would encourage collusive settlements; and, this was said
to be a mischief incident to the common law denial of the right of con-
224, 70 S. E. 285 (1911) ; Sircy v. Reese, 155 N. C. 297, 71 S. E. 310 (1911).
But there is an exception where there is not a release but a covenant not to sue
given to one tort-feasor, in which case the money paid is simply a credit to be
entered on the total recovery. Holland v. Utilities Co., 208 N. C. 289, 170 S. E.
592 (1935) ; Braswell v. Morris, 195 N. C. 127, 131, 141 S. E. 489, 491 (1928) ;
Slade v. Sherrod, 175 N. C. 346, 95 S. E. 557 (1918); Mason v. Stephens, 168
N. C. 370, 84 S. E. 527 (1915). For an example of a statute changing the above
common-law distinction between the release and the covenant not to sue: "A release
by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor . . . does not discharge the other
tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other
tortfeasors in the amount paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion
by which the release provides that the claim shall be reduced, if greater than
the consideration paid." UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AmoNa TortFEAsoas ACr[1939] § 4, 9 U. L. A. 161 (1951).
The original defendant opposed the motion for judgment on the ground that
he was entitled to get an adjudication- of joint tort-feasorship between himself
and the third party defendant as a basis for his statutory claim for contribution.
He argued that private accord between the plaintiff and the third party defendant
could neither defeat his right to the adjudication nor serve as a substitute in
the light of the express statutory definition. The New Jersey statute requiresjoint liability rather than any joint judgment as a condition precedent to contri-
bution. In deciding against the contention of the original defendant, the court
merely admitted that the argument had a certain "logical appeal" and never squarely
met it. It would seem that in case the plaintiff recovers a verdict against the
original defendant the joint liability required by statute might be furnished here
by some kind of estoppel of the plaintiff for selling the covenant not to sue.
'.Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N. J. 67, 92-93, 110 A. 2d 24, 36-37
(1954) (dictum).
, Ordinarily a sued tort-feasor will have an action only for the amount he has
paid in excess of his proportionate share; if there are two tort-feasors and one
of them is forced to pay the entire liability, he may recover only one half of the
amount paid. 13 Am. Jua., Contribution § 57 (1938). Pro rata means according
to a measure which fixes proportions. It has no meaning unless referable to some
rule or standard. Hendrie v. Lowmaster, 152 F. 2d 83, 85 (1945) (dictum).
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tribution which was one of the reasons for the statutory change. More-
over, the settler's adjustment with the injured party would not end the
matter between them because the settler could still be sued by his co-
wrongdoers for contribution. Thus the settlement would lack finality,
and the basic policy of encouraging compromise would be stifled.
If the second alternative were taken, according to Justice Brennan,
collusive settlements would be made wholly ineffective since a credit of
the settler's pro rata share would be the required result of any settlement.
This would be fair to the other tort-feasors, requiring them to pay
only their portion of the liability; it would also be fair to the injured
party because the reduction would be a direct result of his own act of
deliberately accepting less than he might possibly have gotten from this
particular tort-feasor had he not compromised. Since compromises are
almost always made on the basis of the plaintiff's own appraisal of the
risks of recovery, the court felt it unlikely that he would be especially
deterred here because of the uncertainty of what might be lost by the
compromise. Unlike the first alternative, this solution assures the
settling tort-feasor of the finality of his settlement. 7
Unlike New Jersey, North Carolina not only gives the right of con-
tribtuion between joint tort-feasors but also expressly provides in its
contribution statute for a defendant's bringing in a joint tort-feasor as
a third party defendant.8 This statute created a new right, no right
of action existing at common law between joint tort-feasors who stood
in pari delicto.9 joint tort-feasors, within the contemplation of the
statute, are those who act together in committing a wrong, or whose
acts, though independent of each other, unite in causing a common in-
jury.10
Where two or more tort-feasors are jointly liable to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff has the option of suing any or all of them.'1 If the action is
brought against only one, then so far as the plaintiff is concerned the
others are not necessary parties and he may not be compelled to bring
" Neither alternative necessarily affected the question of need for adjudication
of joint tort-feasorship under' the statute. This problem did not arise in the
Judson case, according to Justice Brennan, because the plaintiff had originally
served all of the alleged joint tort-feasors with process. The contribution issue
emerged when the plaintiff settled and took a nonsuit as to two of them.
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
'Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, 242 N. C. 67, 86 S. E. 2d 780 (1955). The
right of contribution is purely statutory and must be enforced in accord with the
provisions of the statute. Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237
N. C. 559, 75 S. E. 2d 768 (1953); Tarkington v. Rock Hill Printing Co., 230
N. C. 354, 53 S. E. 2d 269 (1949) ; Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N. C.
647, 27 S. E. 2d 736 (1943).
1 White v. Keller, 242 N. C. 97, 86 S. E. 2d 795 (1955).
'Glazener v. Safety Transit Lines, 196 N. C. 504, 146 S. E. 134 (1929);
Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928).
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them in.1 2 They may, however, be brought in by the original defendant
on a cross-claim for contribution in case the plaintiff recovers judg-
ment against him.13 To maintain this cross-claim the original defendant
must allege facts sufficient to show that if he is liable to the plaintiff
both he and the additional defendant are liable as joint tort-feasors.14
The original defendant cannot rely upon the liability of the third party
to the plaintiff, but must recover, if at all, upon the liability of such party
to him.' If the original defendant files a cross-claim asking that a tort-
feasor be brought in, the plaintiff may not take a voluntary nonsuit as
to the joint tort-feasor since the original defendant requested affirmative
relief against the tort-feasor and is enitled to hold him as a party under
the statute.16
North Carolina has not passed on the question of whether a cove-
nant not to sue exempts a defendant from his duty to contribute, but
there are three cases, discussed below, which present a close analogy.' 7
In Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co.,18 an employee cov-
ered by the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act'0 was injured
by the concurring negligence of the employer and two other joint tort-
feasors. The employer paid the employee workmen's compensation on
account of his injury. The employee then brought action against the
other tort-feasors alleging that his injury was caused by their combined
actionable negligence. The tort-feasor filed a cross-complaint against
the employer, asking that he be brought into the case for the purpose
.
2Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N. C. 285, 56 S. E. 2d 684 (1949); Watts
v. Lefler, 194 N. C. 671, 140 S. E. 435 (1927).
" Hayes v. Wilmington, 239 N. C. 238, 79 S. E. 2d 792 (1954); Wilson v.
Massagee, 224 N. C. 705, 26 S. E. 2d 911 (1943) ; Lackey v. Southern Railway
Co., 219 N. C. 195, 13 S. E. 2d 234 (1941); Freeman v. Thompson, 216 N. C.
484, 5 S. E. 2d 434 (1939); Mangum v. Southern Railway Co., 210 N. C. 134,
185 S. E. 644 (1936).
" Freeman v. Thompson, supra note 13. The defendant's cross-claim in God-
frey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N. C. 647, 27 S. E. 2d 736 (1943) read: "That
if this defendant was guilty of any negligence .... said [third party] was liable
therefor as a joint tort-feasor." Transcript of Record, p. 20, Godfrey v. Tide-
water Power Co., supra. But see Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, 242 N. C.
67, 86 S. E. 2d 780 (1955) ; Hayes v. Wilmington, 239 N. C. 238, 79 S. E. 2d 792
(1954).
- Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N. C. 360, 363, 26 S. E. 2d 911, 914 (1943).
"6 Smith v. Kappas, 218 N. C. 758, 12 S. E. 2d 693 (1940).
1' Larson, A Problem in Contribution: The Tortfeasor with an Individual
Defense Against the Injured Party, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 467, noted that the
problem could arise as to five principal individual defenses: (1) non-liability be-
cause of personal relationship between the injured party and the tortfeasor to bejoined; (2) non-liability because the injured party is the employee of one tort-
feasor and thus his suit is barred by the terms of the Workmen's Compensation
Act; (3) non-liability because, as to the tortfeasor sought to be joined, the in-jured party had assumed the risk; (4) non-liability because the injured party
has given a covenant not to sue to the tortfeasor sought to be joined; and (5)
non-liability of one tortfeasor because, as to him, the statute of limitations has
run on the injured party's claim.
18 237 N. C. 559, 75 S. E. 2d 768 (1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 through -122 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
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of contribution. The court held that, under the North Carolina Work-
men's Compensation Act, the liability of the employer is to be limited
to the amount he has to pay under the statute,2 0 and to force the em-
ployer to pay more indirectly through the hands of a third person is to
"lose the substance of the law by grasping at its shadow." 21 The Work-
men's Compensation Act removes the employer from the position of
joint tort-feasor and instead makes him absolutely liable regardless of
negligence. 22 Thus there can be no parity of status to furnish a basis
for contribution between one liable only for negligence and another liable
whether negligent or not. The same idea was controlling in a recent
wrongful death case.22a The father sued as administrator for the death
of his small child caused when the child was struck by the defendant's
automobile. The defendant moved to have the mother joined as a
defendant for contribution or for indemnity because of her negligence in
permitting the child to go on the highway unattended. The court re-
jected this motion apparently on the simple basis that the mother was not
liable at a1122b and therefore could not be a joint tort-feasor, which status
is seemingly a pre-requisite for either contribution or for indemnity
under the theory of primary or secondary liability.
Although the preceding cases might seem to indicate that North
Carolina would not enforce contribution where one joint tort-feasor has
an individual defense, Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co.23 holds the other
way. Here the plaintiff sued one joint tort-feasor shortly before the
statute of limitations expired. After the statute had run, the original de-
fendant made a motion to join the other joint tort-feasors. This motion
was denied by the trial court; the supreme court reversed, saying that
common liability to suit must have existed as a condition precedent to
contribution, but that it was not essential that it continue to exist as to
all of the joint tort-feasors. All joint tort-feasors to be made parties
defendant may be brought in at any time before judgment so that
20 "The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee where he and his
employer have accepted the provisions of this article . . .shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of such employee . . .as against his employer...." N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-10 (1950).
"' Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N. C. 559, 571, 75
S. E. 2d 768, 777 (1953).
" Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N. C. 663, 73 S. E. 2d 886 (1952) ; Brown v. Southern
Railway Co., 202 N. C. 256, 162 S. E. 613 (1932) ; see Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 959
(1956).
" Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 243 N. C. 55, 89 S. E. 2d
788 (1955).2  N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1955) gives a cause of action for wrongful
death against those whom the injured party could have sued had he lived; thus,
technically, there was not merely an individual defense here, but no liability at all
on the part of the mother. There is, then, a possible distinction between this case
and one brought by the next friend of a child injured rather than killed.2 223 N. C. 647, 27 S. E. 2d 736 (1943).
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the whole controversy may be settled in a single suit.24 The distinction
to be made between this and the prior two cases is that no joint tort-
feasorship was found in the first two situations. Yet once this relation-
ship is dearly present, contribution seems to be regarded here as a
substantive right of the defendant, apart from the rights of the plaintiff.25
On this reasoning, it would appear arguable that North Carolina might
allow joinder of and contribution from a joint tort-feasor given a cov-
enant not to sue.
The problem has also arisen in New York. In the case of Blauvelt
v. Nyack,26 joinder was allowed and judgment was rendered against
the defendant who had purchased the covenant not to sue, but he was
credited on his pro rata share of the judgment with the amount he had
paid for the covenant. However, in Fox v. Western New York Motor
Lines, 27 the court held that the sued tort-feasor cannot compel the joinder
of the other, since the New York statute permits joinder only of one who
is liable to the sued tort-feasor by contract or status, and the other is not
liable over to the sued tort-feasor until the right to contribution has been
established by a joint judgment 2 against both tort-feasors.20 But North
Carolina does not require a joint judgment against the joint tort-feasor
as a prerequisite to contribution,"0 so, if the North Carolina courts choose
to follow the line of reasoning set down by the Blauvelt case, joinder
would be allowed with the settling tort-feasor having to pay the re-
mainder of his pro rata share.
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 differed
from the usual contribution statute in several notable respects. Under
the act it was necessary for the covenant not to sue to contain an express
provision for a reduction-to the extent of the pro rata share of the
2' Freeman v. Thompson, 216 N. C. 484, 5 S. E. 2d. 434 (1939).
" See Hayes v. Wilmington, 239 N. C. 238, 79 S. E. 2d 792 (1954) ; Davis v.
Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) ; Powell v. Ingram, 231 N. C. 427,
57 S. E. 2d 315 (1950) ; see also Bass v. Ingold, 232 N. C. 295, 60 S. E. 2d 114
(1950) (when an additional defendant is brought in by the original defendant for
the purpose of contribution under the statute, the propriety of such joinder will
be determined by the pleadings of the original defendant, unaffected by any
pleadings filed by the plaintiff) ; cases cited note 11 supra.
26 141 Misc. 730, 252 N. Y. S. 746 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
27232 App. Div. 308, 249 N. Y. S. 623 (4th Dep't 1931).
2See N. Y. Crv. PRAcrIcE Act § 211-a (Clenenger's 1956): "Where a
money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more defendants in an
action for a personal injury or for property damage, and such judgment has been
paid in part or in full by one or more of such defendants, each defendant who has
paid more than his own pro rata share shall be entitled to contribution from the
other defendants with respect to the excess so paid over and above the pro rata
share of the defendant or defendants making such payment . ... "
29 A joint judgment cannot be obtained upon the initiative of the original de-
fendant because joinder of the second tort-feasor cannot be compelled by him.
This ends, for all practical purposes, the value of the New York contribution
statute to a joint tort-feasor in such a situation. Accordingly, joinder is always
at the Plaintiff's discretion.
'ON. C. GEm. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
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released tort-feasor--of the injured person's damages recoverable against
all the other tort-feasors.31 This would seem to be the same rule as
that said effective by operation of law in New Jersey. However, under
the Uniform Act, the relative degrees of fault of the several tort-feasors
were to be taken into consideration by the jury when it apportioned
damages; there was no longer any requiring every tort-feasor, regard-
less of his degree of fault, to pay an equal share . 2 Thus, the introduc-
tion of a variable factor into the concept of pro rata share would tend to
minimize similarities betwen the working of the two rules.
If, on the other hand, the covenant not to sue failed to contain a spe-
cific provision releasing the tort-feasor to the extent of his pro rata
share, the tort-feasor would be liable for contribution and would only
receive credit for the amount actually paid. In this, the act adopted the
solution of the Blauvelt case. The act provided for such a reduction,
according to the commissioners who drafted it, for the purpose of
preventing the injured person from acting in collusion with one of the
tort-feasors. Without such a provision, it would be possible for the
plaintiff to place almost the entire burden of payment upon one tort-
feasor by selling the other tort-feasor a covenant not to sue for a small
price.
This provision was not effective. Not only was nothing done to pre-
vent collusion, but this section of the act made it almost impossible for
one tort-feasor alone to take a covenant not to sue and close the file on
the case. Plaintiff's attorneys were refusing to give any covenant which
contained a provision reducing the damages "to the extent of the pro rata
share of the released tort-feasor" because they had no way of knowing
what they were giving up. Under the section providing for the ap-
portioning of liability according to relative degrees of fault, the plaintiff
would not know whether he was giving up ten per cent of his claim or
ninety per cent of it until the jury had established the comparative
pro rata shares of the tort-feasors. Yet a defendant would not settle for
a fixed amount without such a provision in the covenant because he
would then remain open to contribution in an uncertain amount, de-
termined on the basis of a judgment against another in a suit to which
he would not be a party. Because of this, the 1939 Uniform Act has
been said to make settlements with one joint tort-feasor impossible.3 3
The commissioners decided it was more important not to discourage
settlements than to make a futile effort to prevent discrimination by
plaintiffs, so a new version of the act was promulgated in 1955. Under
31 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TOUTFEASORS AcT [1939] § 5, 9 U. L. A.
163 (1951).
"Id. § 2(4).
31 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HAND-
BOOK 224 (1955).
19561
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the new act, a "release" again3 4 does not release any of the other tort-
feasors from liability, but it does reduce the claim against them by the
amount stipulated by the covenant or by the amount paid for it, which-
ever is the greater.3 By a new provision, a covenant or release will
automatically discharge the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all
liability for contribtuion to any other tort-feasor3 6  A change was also
made in the method of determining the pro rata share of the tort-feasors,
and the comparative liability doctrine was abolished. The revised act
expressly says that the "principles of equity applicable to contribution
generally"37 are to be applied. The Comment of the commissioners
recognized a "lack of need for a comparative negligence or degree of
fault rule,"38 and indicated that the exclusion of intentional, wilful, and
wanton actors from the right to contribution substantially eliminates the
need for such a rule.39
In my opinion North Carolina should follow the reasoning of Justice
Brennan and credit any amount which the plaintiff receives in judgment
with the settler's pro rata share of the verdict. The 1939 Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act was not effective because of the
provision calling for apportionment of damages by the jury. The lack
of acceptance of this particular provision is shown by the fact that it
was adopted by only three states and Hawaii, 40 and was left out of the
amended act in 1955. Without this provision the plaintiff would be able
to figure on equal shares and would know as much about what he was
giving up as the settler in any case. Also, the settling tort-feasor would
be able to close his file on the case for good with the nonsettling tort-
" See note 3 su pra.
33 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT [1955] § 4(a), NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 223.
-'OId. § 4(b).
3'Id. § 2(c), at 220.
11NATIONAL CONTERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
HANDBOOK 220 (1955).
" Changes in the 1939 act by the 1955 act, other than those already mentioned,
include: (1) The definition of joint tort-feasor and the term itself have been
eliminated. This was done because the different definitions used in different states
were not all consistent with the one in the act. (2) Wrongful death has been
added as giving rise to the right of contribution. (3) Right of contribution in favor
of a tort-feasor who has intentionally caused or contributed to the injury or
wrongful death is now expressly denied, whereas the former act was silent. (4)
A liability insurer who has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tort-
feasor and thus discharged in full its obligation as insurer, is subrogated to the
tort-feasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess
of the tort-feasor's pro rata share of the liability. (5) The rule of equity which
requires class liability, such as that arising from vicarious relationships, to be
treated as a single share is invoked. (6) A separate action to enforce contri-
bution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has become final.
(7) The judgment of the court in determining the liability of several defendants
to the claimant for injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such
defendants in determining their right of contribution.
4 9 U. L. A. 160. The Uniform Act itself was adopted in: Arkansas, Delaware,
Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Id. at 153.
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feasors being given the actual benefits of contribution. The commis-
sioners were right in changing the act to encourage settlement, but in
doing so they went too far and gave the plaintiff too big an advantage.
The amended act allows the plaintiff to settle with one tort-feasor
with no chance of suffering detriment by doing so. If it turns out that
he settled with the tort-feasor for less than the tort-feasor's pro rata
share, the nonsettling tort-feasor would have to pay the difference.41
It is true that this solution would encourage settlement, but it would
also impose too great a burden on a tort-feasor who decided to take his
chance in court.42
WILBUR RITCHIE SMITH, JR.
Legislation-Control of Firearms
Commensurate with the greater regulation in all fields, firearms are
becoming a subject of increasing legislative control as regards their
purchase, sale, and posession. With very few exceptions,1 the posses-
sion, sale and purchase of rifles and shotguns are not restricted by state
legislation. The majority of restrictions are directed toward machine
guns, presumably because of their capacity for rapid firing, and pistols,2
because of their concealability and the ease with which they may be car-
ried. The purpose of this note is to summarize the law of firearms in
North Carolina as it pertains to machine guns and pistols, against the
background of policies followed by other states.
A conviction of possessing a machine gun without permission was
41 If the settling tort-feasor were joined under our statute, he could still
be credited with his pro rata share. Would the court give effect to an indemnity
clause in the covenant and allow a settlor, forced to contribute, to collect indemnity
from the plaintiff? Or would the court make a tort-feasor with such a "credit"
with the plaintiff contribute at all? Is there any likelihood that such a clause
might be construed by the court as changing a covenant not to sue into a general
release ?
"2 The settler, it is thought, should not even be made a party to the action.
By buying a covenant not to sue, he bought his peace and plaintiff, by giving the
covenant, perhaps should be estopped from denying that the settler is a joint tort-
feasor. See note 4 supra. North Carolina has actually reached the result of the
rule applied in New Jersey. Although the employer covered by workmen's com-
pensation and the beneficiary of the wrongful death proceeds are held not to be
joint tort-feasors so that they may not be brought into the suit or be sued for
contribution, the plaintiff's verdict in both cases may be reduced pro rata upon a
contributory negligence theory. See Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 959, 967-69 (1956).
The amount payable under workmen's compensation law is substracted from the
employee's verdict against a third person when the employer contributed to the
injury. Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N. C. 663, 73 S. E. 2d 886 (1953). And where
a parent immune from suit negligently contributes to the child's injury, the parent's
share of the wrongful death proceeds is credited against the verdict. Pearson v.
National Manufacture and Stores Corp., 219 N. C. 717, 14 S. E. 2d 811 (1941).
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.05 (1943) ; W. VA. CODE § 6050 (1955).
- Due to common usage, the term "pistol" will be used in this note to apply to
all types of firearms designed to be held in one hand when fired.
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affirmed3 by the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts, even though
the defendant did not have in his possession a clip or magazine for the
weapon. There was expert testimony that "the magazine or clip was a
vital and characteristic part of the sub-machine gun for purpose of auto-
matic, rapid and successive firing, that without the said magazine or clip
it was incapable of firing more than one shot without reloading. ' 4 From
the above evidence, it was the defendant's contention that the absence of
a clip or magazine caused the weapon to lose its character as a machine
gun, in which contention he was unsuccessful. The court held that
the weapon, by reason of the absence of a clip or magazine, did not
lose its character as a machine gun any more than the absence of a bullet
would destroy the character of a rifle. Emphasis was placed upon a
prior Massachusetts caseO in which the same statute was involved,0
where convictions of two defendants for possession of a Thompson .45
caliber sub-machine gun were upheld, even though the weapon was in-
capable of being fired due to the absence of a firing pin.7
From these two cases it would seem that the attitude of Massachu-
setts is rather extreme against the possession of automatic weapons.
From a reference to the laws of other states, this attitude does not seem
unusual. Tweny-nine statesS six of which have adopted the Uniform
Machine Gun Act,9 have direct legislation against the possession of
machine guns. Although in some of the states it is possible to possess
a machine gun by means of a license,' 0 and in others possession of them
is legal if the weapons are unservicable as such and are kept as me-
mentos, souvenirs, or ornaments,'1 in many the mere possession of
such a firearm constitutes a felony.'
2
' Commonwealth v. Colton, - Mass. -, 132 N. E. 2d 398 (1956).
'Id. at -, 132 N. E. 2d at 399.
Commonwealth v. Bartholomew, 326 Mass. 218, 93 N. E. 2d 551 (1950).
'MAss. LAWS ANN. c. 269, § 10 (1956).
'The reason for the holding was that a firing pin could easily be machined from
a piece of scrap metal, such as a nail.
8 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4507 to 41-4517 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 12220
(1956); DEL. CODE ANN. 11 § 465 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5109 (1933);
IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-4712 (1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 21-2601 (1949);
LA. REV. STAT. 40: 1752 (1950) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 439 to 450 (1951) ;
MASS. LAWS ANN. c. 269 § 10 (1956); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.422 (1938);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 616.45 (1945); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 564.590 (1953) ; MONT.
REV. CODES 94-3101 to -3111 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1010 (1948); N. J.
STAT. ANN. 2A:151-50 (1952); N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1897 (1) (a) (1944); N. C.
GEN. STAT. 14-409 (1953) ; N. D. REv. CODE 62-0206 (1943); Omo IEV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.04 (1953); ORE. IRV. STAT. § 166.250 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. 18
§ 4629 (1949); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 404, § 4 (1938); S. C. CODE LAWS § 16-123
(1952); S. D. CODE 21.0201 to .0209 (1939); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 489b,
§ 2 (1952) ; VA. CODE 18-135 to -145 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE 9.41.190 (1951);
W. VA. CODE § 6050 (1955); Wis. CRIm. CODE 164.01 to .20 (1955).
' Arkansas, Maryland, Montana, South Dakota, Virginia, Wisconsin. See
statutes cited note 5 supra.
10 Georgia, Massachusetts, Neew Jersey, Ohio. See statutes cited note 5 supra.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 616.45 (1945) ; OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.06 (1953).
SDEL. CODE ANN. 11 § 465 (1953) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-4712 (1956) ; GEN.
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In North Carolina it is a misdemeanor for an individual to own or
sell a machine gun unless he is a resident of the state and owned, as
a relic or souvenir, a machine gun used in former wars at the time of
the passage of the statute.13 He must also report such ownership to
the clerk of the superior court of his county of residence. Certain
classes of officers in the performance of official duties are excepted, and
businesses may secure a permit to possess such a weapon from the clerk
of the superior court of the county in which the business is located.
Aside from the category of automatic weapons, most of the restric-
tions against firearms are directed at those which are easily concealable,
hence the large amount of regulations concerning pistols. Unfortunate
aspects of this type of regulation are the varying degrees of severity and
the lack of uniformity among the several states, presenting a serious
problem to the conscientious citizen who might wish to take a pistol from
his home state to another, or to make a journey entailing travel through
several states.
In one form or another, it is forbidden to carry concealed weapons
in forty-five of the states, 4 with some states having provisions for citi-
zens to obtain licenses upon a showing of good character or cause.' 5
Provisions are frequently found which make possession of pistols illegal
by aliens' 6 and persons previously convicted of crimes of violence17 or
STAT. KAN. ANN. 21-2602 (1949) ; MASS. LAWS ANN. c. 269, s. 10 (1956) ; Micr.
STAT. ANN. § 28.422 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 616.45 (1945); Mo. STAT.
ANN. § 564.590 (1953); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1010 (1948); N. Y. PENAL LAW§ 1897 (1) (a) (1944) ; N. D. REv. CODE 62-0206 (1943) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2923.04 (1953) ; S. C. CODE LAws § 16-127 (1952) ; WASH. REv. CODE 9.41.210
(1951).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-409 (1953), N. C. Pub. Laws 1933, c. 261, § 1. This
statute applies to weapons capable of firing sixteen shots or more automatically.
'ALA. CODE t. 14, § 175 (1940) ; Aaiz. CODE ANN. § 43-2205 (1939) ; AK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-450 (1947) ; CAr.. PEN. CODE § 12025 (1956) ; COLO. REV. STAT.§ 40-11-1 (1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4166 (1949) ; DEL. CODE ANN. 11 § 461(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.01 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5101 (1933);
IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (1947) ; ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 38, § 155 (1935); IND. STAT.
ANN. § 10-4706 (1956) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 695.2 (1951) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
21-2411 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. § 435.230 (1953) ; LA. Rxv. STAT. 14:95 (1950);
ME. REv. STAT. c. 137, § 19 (1954); MD. CODE ANN. a. 27, § 44 (1951); MASS.
LAWS ANN. c. 269, § 10 (1956); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.424 (1938); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 2079 (1942); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 564.610 (1953); MONT. REv.
CODES 94-3525, -3526 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1001 (1948); N. H.
ZEv. STAT. ANN. 159:4 (1955); N. J. STAT. ANN. 2A:151-41 (1952); N. M.
STAT. 40-17-1 (1953); N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1897 (4), (5) (1944) ; N. C. GEN.
STAT. 14-269 (1953); N. D. REv. CODE 62-0301, -0105 (1943); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2923.01 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 21 § 1271, 1272 (1937); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 166.240 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. act 443, H. B. 96 (1955); R I. GEN.
LAws c. 404, § 4 (1938) ; S. C. CODE LAwS § 16-145 (1952) ; S. D. CoDE 13.1613,
21.0105 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. 39-4901 (1956); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art.
483 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. 76-23-4 (1953); VA. CODE § 18-146 (1950);
WASH. RE:v. CODE 9.41.050 (1951); W. VA. CODE § 6043 (1955); Wis. CRalm.
CODE 941.23 (1955); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. 9-1203 (1945).
15 See UTAH CODE ANN. 76-23-4 (1953).
See NEv. ComP. LAws § 2302 (1929).
'See MD. CODE ANN. a. 27 § 541 (1951).
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of felonies,"' sales and purchases are controlled,19 and one state requires
a written license to possess a firearm capable of being concealed on the
person.20
In most instances the restricting legislation has stood the test of
constitutionality. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that Amendment II of the United States Constitution, declaring that
the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, applies only to
infringement on the part of the federal government, and state legisla-
tion must be tested in the light of state constitutions.
21
The comparable section of the North Carolina Constitution, article
I, section 24, was construed and interpreted in State v. Kerner,22 where
the defendant was indicted under a local statute which prohibited the
carrying of a pistol by anyone in Forsyth County off his own premises,
concealed or otherwise, unless a permit therefor had previously been
obtained.2 3  The facts of the case were that the defendant, after being
accosted, procured a pistol in his store and carried it openly onto the
streets of Kernersville in defense of his person, for which he was indicted.
Upon a special verdict, the trial court declared the defendant not guilty
upon the ground of unconstitutionality, which result was affirmed upon
appeal by the State. The court held that the statute was void because as
a regulation it was an unreasonable one, and further, for all practical
purposes it was a prohibition of the constitutional right to bear arms.
Article I, section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution has two
parts. The first declares that the right of the citizens to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed, the second, added by the Constitutional
Convention of 1875, declares that nothing therein contained shall justify
the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the legislature
from enacting penal statutes against said practice. This last clause, it
was pointed out by Chief Justice Clark,24 is an exception to the first and
indicates the extent to which the right to bear arms can be restricted; i.e.,
the legislature can prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons, but no
further. It was stated in the case of State v. Speller25 that even without
this constitutional provision the legislature may regulate the right to
18 See MIcHr. STAT. ANN. § 28.92 (Supp. 1955).
1 See Vr. STAT. 8277 (1947).2 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1897 (4) (1944).
"' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875).
22181 N. C. 574, 107 S. E. 222 (1921).
23 N. C. Public-Local Laws 1919, c. 317, § 3. The statute required that in order
to obtain a permit, the applicant apply to a municipal court if a resident of a town,
and to the superior court if not residing in a town, describe the weapon, give the
time and purpose for which the weapon was to be taken off his premises, pay the
clerk of the court the sum of $5 for each permit, and file a bond in the lenalty of
$500 that he would not carry the weapon except as so authorized.
"' State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 575, 107 S. E. 222, 223 (1921).
.5 86 N. C. 697 (1882).
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bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. Thus, as is inti-
mated in the Kerner case, any reasonable regulation will be upheld.
North Carolina's concealed weapons law26 has been in force since
shortly after the Constitutional Amendment of 1875 declared the power
of the legislature to control the practice of carrying concealed weapons.
2 7
The elements of the offense are: (1) the defendant must be off his own
premises, (2) carrying a deadly weapon, and (3) the weapon must be
concealed about his person.2 8 Inasmuch as the area constituting a per-
son's premises is fairly well an adjudicated matter in North Carolina, and
the list of deadly weapons enumerated in the statute is extensive, the
two principal questions raised by the statute become: (1) what consti-
tutes the concealment prohibited by the statute, and (2) what location
of a weapon will bring it within the statutory language, "about the per-
son."
One of the first cases to arise was that of State v. WoodfinY where
the court approved a charge to the jury that the purpose for which the
defendant carried a pistol is immaterial, yet if he carried it off his own
premises concealed about his person, he is guilty. Strangely enough,
in State v. Gilbert,80 the case immediately following the Woodfin case
in the Reports, this holding was modified. The jury found that the
defendant was off his own premises, had a pistol in his overcoat pocket
concealed from view, but had no criminal intent in carrying the pistol
concealed, as he was a merchant, and was carrying it from the store
where he purchased it to another for the purpose of having it packed
with other goods. The question of guilt or innocence was submitted to
the court, which found that the defendant was guilty. In reversing
the judgment the supreme court based its decision squarely upon the
ground of intent, saying, "To conceal a weapon, means something more
than the mere act of having it where it may not be seen. It implies an
assent of the mind, and a purpose to so carry it, that it may not be
seetl."' 1
Soon after the decision of the Gilbert case, it was used as precedent
in reversing convictions in two cases, one in which the defendant was
carrying a pistol in his pocket for the purpose of delivering it to the
owner who had sent him for it,32 the other in which the pistol was car-
ried concealed solely for the purpose of trading.3 However, the Gilbert
case was expressly overruled by State v. Dixon,34 where the defendant
20 N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-269 (1953). 2' N. C. Public Laws 1879, c. 127.
'8 State v. Williamson, 238 N. C. 652, 78 S. E. 2d 763 (1953).20 87 N. C. 526 (1882). "87 N. C. 527 (1882).
Id. at 528.
"State v. Brodnax, 91 N. C. 543 (1884).
"State v. Harrison, 93 N. C. 605 (1885).
"114 N. C. 850, 19 S. E. 364 (1894).
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had carried a pistol concealed for the purpose of selling it. The court
attempted to draw a line beyond which a person would be guilty by
saying that the presumption of concealment raised by the statute may
be rebutted by an express finding of absence of guilty intent, as where
a pistol is carried from one store to another without intent to conceal
it, or where, under some circumstances, it is carried by a messenger to
be delivered to the owner. "But matter of excuse can be extended no
further with safety and a due regard to the integrity of the statute."3 3
The requisite guilty intent necessary for conviction was explained in
State v. Brozw3 6 as not the intent to use the concealed weapon, but the
intent to carry it concealed, the question being as to the manner of carry-
ing, and not to the purpose. Thus it was held in State v. Woodliff3 that
carrying a pistol concealed for the purpose of self-defense was the very
practice intended to be prohibited by the statute, and, instead of being
an element in mitigation, as contended by counsel for the defendant, was
in aggravation of the offense, since it tended to show an anticipation
of use.38
Aside from the question of intent, where is the line drawn as to
what is actually concealment and what is permissible under the statute?
Possession of a deadly weapon by a person off his own premises will
raise a presumption that the weapon is concealed, and the burden of
showing that the weapon was not actually concealed must be borne by
the accused. 3D However, a charge in the following terms, ".... and if you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a pistol concealed on his
person, or if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in possession
of a pistol on that occasion and find it beyond a reasonable doubt, then
it would be your duty to convict," would entitle a defendant to a new
trial, since the bare possession of a pistol by a person not on his own
premises does not necessarily constitute a breach of the statute.40 Sim-
ilarly, a showing that two pistols were worn by the defendant buckled
around him without scabbards and naked on a belt is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of concealment.4 1 Where a pistol was worn on
the person under an overcoat, and it was not shown whether the
overcoat was worn open or buttoned, but there was evidence that
the pistol could be seen, it was held that the jury should determine
whether the statutory presumption of concealment had been rebutted.
42
In State v. Reams43 a pistol ten or eleven inches long was placed in an
" Id. at 854, 19 S. E. at 365. -0125 N. C. 704, 34 S. E. 549 (1899).
172 N. C. 885, 90 S. E. 137 (1916).8 See also State v. Speller, 86 N. C. 697 (1882).
N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-269 (1953).
o State v. Vanderburg, 200 N. C. 713, 158 S. E. 248 (1931).
"State v. Roten, 86 N. C. 701 (1882).
"State v. Lilly, 116 N. C. 1049, 21 S. E. 563 (1895).
"121 N. C. 556, 27 S. E. 1004 (1897).
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upper outside coat pocket so that the handle and two inches of the
breech were exposed to view. The charge that if the jury believed from
the evidence that any part of the pistol was concealed they should find
the defendant guilty was disapproved. The supreme court stated that
if the weapon is partly exposed to public view, it would be difficult and
unreasonable to say, as a legal conclusion, that it is concealed.44 In
State v. Mangum,45 upon evidence tending to show that when arrested
the defendant had a pistol which protruded about an inch or so from
his pocket, a conviction was not disturbed, the question of concealment
being held a proper subject for the jury's determination.
The only North Carolina case found which deals with the corollary
question of how close the weapon must be to a person in order to be
"about the person" is State v. McManus.46 The defendant in this case
was in his wagon, and had a pistol in the dinner basket he was carrying,
on top of the cloth which covered his dinner, and the basket was carried
in his lap so that, he contended, it was clearly visible. The jury found
that the defendant had and carried concealed about his person a pistol,
off his own premises, as charged in the indictment. On appeal, it was
the argument of the defense that the pistol, if in the basket and con-
cealed, was not about the person of the defendant, though on his lap. In
disallowing this contention, weight was given to the fact that the pistol
was under the direct control of the defendant, within easy reach, so
that he could promptly have used it. "It makes no difference how it
is concealed, so it is on or near to and within the reach and control
of the person charged." 47 This ruling, placing emphasis upon the "con-
trol" element, raises the interesting and important question as to the
status of pistols carried in automobiles: are they concealed within the
meaning of the statute or not? Under the reasoning of the McManus
case it would seem to be clear that the statute would not be applicable
to a pistol carried in the trunk of an automobile, but what of a pistol
carried in the glove compartment of the dashboard; would a person have
sufficient control over the weapon so as to make it "about the person ?"4s
Aside from two amendments49 and the provision for licenses to deal
in pistols, 0 the remainder of the legislation regarding firearms in North
Carolina, G. S. 14-402 to -408,51 was passed in 1919. These statutes
I" Id. at 558, 27 S. E. at 1006.
It 187 N. C. 477, 121 S. E. 765 (1924).40 89 N. C. 555 (1883). 7 Id. at 559.
" See Elza v. Commonwealth, - Ky. -, 269 S. W. 2d 275 (1954), where a
conviction of carrying a concealed deadly weapon (pistol in glove compartment of
automobile) was reversed. Contra, Hudspeth v. State, - Tex. Crim. -, 254
S. W. 2d 130 (1954).
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-402 (1953) was amended by N. C. Public Laws 1923,
c. 106; N. C. Session Laws 1947, c. 781 (19).
o N. C. GEN. STAT. 105-80 (1950).
N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-402 to -408 (1953).
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control sales, 52 permits of sale and the description of their form issued
by the clerk of the superior court,5m conditions under and purposes for
which the permits are issued, 54 record of permits issued kept by the
clerk,55 record of sales kept by dealers,50 the listing of weapons for
taxes,57 and penalties. 8 From a study of these provisions, a general
perception of the intention of the legislature may be obtained, but a literal
interpretation of some of them proves confusing.
By G. S. 14-402 it is declared unlawful for any person, firm, or corpo-
ration to sell, give away, or dispose of, or to purchase or receive the
weapons enumerated, including pistols, without first obtaining a permit
from the clerk of the superior court of the county where the transaction
is to take place. The question arises: must one who holds a dealer's
license, authorizing him to sell pistols, obtain a permit to do so, and if
one were desirous of selling a pistol, must he likewise obtain a permit,
if the intended vendee were a dealer?59 Further, by the second para-
graph of the statute, which is the 1923 Amendment, it is declared unlaw-
ful to receive through the mails or by express the proscribed weapons,
including pistols, without exhibiting at the time of delivery and to the
person delivering the same, the permit from the clerk of the court. To
the writer's knowledge, the following situation arises: an owner of a
pistol sends it to the maker for repairs. Upon completion of the repairs
it is sent back to the owner by express, and at delivery, the owner must
show to the express agent a permit to "purchase" his own pistol.
The form of the permit to be issued by the clerk of the court for
the purchase of a pistol is set forth in G. S. 14-403, in which the clerk
certifies that the weapon is necessary for self-defense or the protection
of the home. G. S. 14-404 requires the clerk to first satisfy himself
as to the good moral character of the applicant, and that the possession
of the weapon is required for "protection of the home," excluding any
mention of self-defense. Assuming that this section, when considered
together with the one preceding it, will be construed to apply equally
to self-defense, should these two reasons be the only ones for which a
person will be permitted to purchase a pistol? ° Again using a literal
" N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-402 (1953). " N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-403 (1953).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-404 (1953). "N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-405 (1953).
"1 N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-406 (1953). ' N. C. GEN. STAT. 14-407 (1953).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. 14-408 (1953).
" Many of the uncertainties in this area are probably due to the fact that G. S.
105-80, relating to dealers in pistols, was originally enacted in 1939, N. C. Public
Laws 1939, c. 158, § 145, whereas G. S. 14-402 to -408, relating to purchases and
sales, were originally enacted in 1919, N. C. Public Laws 1919, c. 197, §§ 1-7.
"A number of jurisdictions have excepted antique pistols from their provisions
concerning purchase, possession, and sale if they are kept as ornaments or curios.
See MD. CoE ANN. art. 27 § 543 (1951). The Internal Revenue Code of 1954
excepts weapons not firing "fixed ammunition," i.e., metallic cartridges. INT.
Ray. CoDE OF 1954, § 5848.
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interpretation of the statutes, it would appear impossible for a citizen
to go to the clerk of the superior court and obtain a permit to purchase
a target pistol of .22 caliber.
It is suggested that the laws concerning firearms in North Carolina
should be re-examined and clarified, with an underlying policy designed
to resolve the conflict between the need for regulation and the prohibi-
tion of infringement of the right to keep and bear arms.
JOHN D. ELLER, JR.
Military Jurisdiction-Ex-Servicemen-Civilian Dependents
The United States Supreme Court in the greatly controverted
Quarles v. Toth case1 declared that ex-servicemen are not subject to
military jurisdiction for crimes committed in the service where charges
are not preferred prior to discharge.
In stating that Article 3(a) 2 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice,3 which provided for such jurisdiction was unconstitutional,
the Court held that Congress had no power to give military courts such
jurisdiction either under its powers "To raise and support Armies,' 4
"To declare War,"5 "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplin-
ing, the militia," or "To punish... (offenses) ... against the Law of
Nations" ;7 nor could such power be derived from the President's power
as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.
The Court further expressed its belief that "any expansion of court-
martial jurisdiction like that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on
the jurisdiction of the federal courts set up under Article III of the
Constitution .... '"8 (Emphasis added.)
Possibly the most dominant reason which led to the Toth decision
was the effect of Article 3(a) on the constitutional safeguard of trial
by jury. This appraisal is certainly apparent from justice Black's state-
ment, "We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of
military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article III
courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people [i.e., civilians]
I United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955). This case has
been the subject of many comments; see: 67 HAMv. L. R.wv. 479 (1954) ; 21 U.
CHI. L. REv. 426 (1954); 41 CORNELL L. Q. 498 (1956); 33 TEx. L. REV. 932
(1955).
2 "Subject to the provisions of Article 43, any person charged with having
committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this Code, an offense
against this Code, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which
the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or
Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from
amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status."
64 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U. S. C. § 553(a) (1952).
'Hereinafter: U. C. M. J. U. S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
'U. S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 11. 'U. S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
' U. S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. '350 U. S. 11, 15.
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charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, lib-
erty, or property."9  The Court seemed extremely hesitant to deprive
veterans of the protection afforded by jury trial and rejected the con-
tention that power to circumvent such protection could be inferred
through the "Necessary and Proper" clause.
Although the Toth Case apparently decided the question of military
jurisdiction over ex-servicemen, 10 it left unanswered the question of
whether the Toth decision would be extended to include other civilians
who had theretofore been subject to various other sections"' of the
U. C. M. J., i.e., civilian dependents and civilians working for and with
the armed forces overseas. The possibility of such an extention was ap-
parent from the Court's comment, "For given its natural meaning the
power granted Congress ... would seem to restrict court-marital juris-
diction to persons who are actually members or part of the armed
forces." (Emphasis added.)12
At the end of the 1956 Spring Term, the Supreme Court in Kinsella
v. Krueger'3 and Reid v. Covert'4 indicated that it was unwilling to
extend the Toth philosophy any further than was necessary. Both cases
involved dependent wives alleged to have murdered their husbands who
were on active duty outside the continental limits of the United States.
Trials by general court-martial were awarded each defendant, verdicts
of guilty were found, and sentences imposed. Habeas corpus proceed-
ings were instituted, and the two cases were reviewed before the
Supreme Court which upheld the convictions,1 declaring that Article
2(11):16 of the U. C. M. J. was constitutional.
Justice ClarklT who wrote the majority opinions in these two sub-
sequent cases, initially stated that Congress had the power to establish
legislative courts'8 and that citizens of the United States are not
Old. at 17.
"0 Prior to Quarles v. Toth there were conflicting views; see: United States
ex tel Flannery v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) and
Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F. 2d 128 (9th Gr. 1950).
" U. C. M. J. art. 2, §§ 5, 7, 8, 10, 12. "350 U. S. 11, 15.
"351 U. S. 470 (1956). 1"351 U. S. 487 (1956).
11 Military courts are legislative courts; neither their finding or decisions are
reviewable by any civil court, including the Supreme Court, except collaterally by
means of habeas corpus proceedings. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1954);
Collins v. McDonold, 258 U. S. 416 (1923); Torble's Case, 13 Wall. 397 (1871).
"0 Article 2 provides: "The following persons are subject to this code.... (11)
Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States
is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons
serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the con-
tinental limits of the United States and without the following territories; That
part of Alaska east of longitude one hundred and seventy-two degrees west, the
Canal Zone, the main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands." 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U. S. C. § 551 (1952).
17 yustice Clark was one of two justices who joined in all three majority
opinions of the principal cases.18351 U. S. 470, 475-476.
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guaranteed the right of trial by jury outside the continental limits of
the United States, District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii. 19
Upon these foregoing premises the Court concluded, "If it is
reasonable and consonant with due process for Congress to employ
the existing system of courts-martial for this purpose, the enactment
[Article 2(11)] must be sustained." 20
Attention should be focused on the fact that Articles 3 (a) and 2 (11)
of the U. C. M. J. are necessarily based upon the same constitutional
provisions, yet the Court labeled the former unconstitutional in the Toth
Case and the latter constitutional in the two more recent cases. Possibly
the sole explanation for the above can be found obscurely embedded
within footnote six2l of the Kinsella v. Krueger opinion, where the
Court narrowly construed the Toth ruling to a concise minimum: that
Article 3(a) was unconstitutional because it "necessarily encroached on
the jurisdiction of the federal courts set up under Article III of the
Constitution."
Having established this restriction, the Court went on to say that
there could be no such encroachment in the Krueger Case. However,
the Court did not specifically say exactly why there could be no encroach-
ment. Nevertheless, it could be assumed that the distinction was based
upon the fact that Congress had not acted in giving the federal courts
jurisdiction over the person or the crime. By so distinguishing the
Toth Case the Court stated that it would not be necessary to justify
the power of Congress with its [Congress's] constitutional limitations.
This latter statement of the Court raises two more questions which
have not as yet been answered by the Court. Was there actually an
encroachment in the Toth Case where the federal courts had in fact been
given no jurisdiction over such crimes by Congress ?22 And secondly,
if not: Was this encroachment the only justification for declaring
Article 3(a) unconstitutional?
There seems to be two plausible alternatives which arise from the
above analysis. Either the foundations of the Toth Case have been re-
moved by the Court, leaving a mere legal mirage to support the final con-
clusion that ex-servicemen are free from military jurisdiction, or the
Supreme Court has indirectly decided that it is not necessary for
Congress to actually give the federal courts jurisdiction over crimes
committed by ex-servicemen while they were in the service before
"o There is considerable authority to support this premise; see: In re Ross,
140 U. S. 453 (1891); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S, 145 (1879); In re
Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S. D. Ohio 1944) ; United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp.
708 (1944).
20 351 U. S. 470, 476.
21 Ibid.
22 This" query was raised in Justice Reed's dissent, U. S. ex rel Toth v. Quarles,
350 U. S. 11, 24-28 (1955) (dissent).
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a grant of such authority to a military court, in lieu thereof, will be
termed an encroachment on the federal court's jurisdiction.23
The present status of the law seems to be that ex-servicemen canuot
be tried by the military or civil courts for crimes committed while on
active duty overseas, unless charges are brought prior to discharge.24
In respect to civilian dependents and civilians working for and with the
armed forces, the military courts continue to exercise jurisdiction. It
also seems reasonable that the Supreme Court will extend the Toth
ruling to exempt civilians subject to the U. C. M. J., who return to the
United States before charges are preferred by the military authorities
for crimes committed overseas. 25
J. N. GoLDING
Taxation-Federal Income-Nonrestricted Stock Options-Proprie-
tary and Compensatory Options-Taxability of Options upon Receipt'
In a recent Supreme Court decision, a serious blow was dealt tax-
payers seeking to avoid income taxation arising out of certain employer-
employee stock option plans. In Commissioner v. LoBue2 the Court
decided against a distinction supported in the Tax Court s and Courts of
Appeals4 which, for income tax purposes, divided employee stock option
plans into two types.
The basic problem involved may be illustrated simply. TP, a key
employee of X Corporation, is given an option by the corporation to
21 It is likely that Congress will now give the federal courts jurisdiction over
ex-servicemen and ex-dependents; such would be constitutional. U. S. CONST.
art. III, § 2; Skiriotes v. Fldrida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941) ; United States v. Bowman,
260 U. S. 94 (1923) ; Jones i. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
2 Military jurisdiction is not retroactive in regard to crimes committed prior
to induction, although servicemen are presently on active duty; United States
v. Logan, C. M. 248867, 31 B. R. 363 (1944) ; nor can it be revived as to crimes
committed during the first enlistment, even though a second enlistment immedi-
ately follows; United States ex rel Herschberg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210 (1949).
However, military jurisdiction does not cease while a discharged serviceman is
serving his sentence; Kohn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1 (1921) ; and if charges are
brought before discharge, military jurisdiction continues after said discharge;
Carter v. McCloughry, 183 U. S. 365 (1902).
2u 351 U. S. 487, 490.
'In 1950 Congress enacted what is now INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 421, which
provides for capital gains treatment of certain "restricted stock options." If an
option complies with § 421 the employee has to report no income until he sells the
stock; and, then, any excess over the option price is taxed as a capital gain.
However, any stock option plan which does not come within the restrictions of
§ 421 will not receive the special capital gains treatment. The taxability of these
so-called nqnrestricted options is the subject of this note.
2 351 U. S. 243 (1956).
' Malcolm S. Clark, P-H 1950 T. C. Mem. Dec. f1 50210; Norman G. Nichol-
son, 13 T. C. 690 (1949) ; Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B. T. A. 258 (1938).
'Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955), re'd, 351 U. S. 243




buy a number of its shares of stock. On the date the option is given
the option price may be about the same as the fair market value of the
stock.5 Later when TP exercises the option the fair market value of
the stock has risen and TP purchases at a considerable saving. TP's
preference is to report no income upon receipt or exercise of the option
and, upon subsequent sale or exchange of the stock, to report any profit
as capital gains.
As early as 19236 the Commissioner urged that the spread or differ-
ence between the option price for the stock and the fair market value
of the stock is taxable income to the employee exercising the option.
The Board of Tax Appeals originally supported the Commissioner's
contention.7 Some Courts of Appeals, however, did not agree.8
The Board decided in 1938 that there were two types of employee
stock option plans.9 According to the Board's theory, one type of option
is compensatory in nature and in fact intended as compensation to the
employee.' 0 The second type is proprietary in nature and intended
only to give the employee a bargain purchase of the stock so that he
might acquire an ownership interest in the corporation."' Only where
the option is compensation to the employee would he be taxed on the
spread between the option price and the fair market value of the stock.
The Commissioner acquiesced 12 in this reasoning until 1945 when the
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Smith13 gave him new hope that
his original determination had been valid. In this decision the Supreme
Court reinstated a finding of the Tax Court that an option was com-
pensatory because of the intent of the parties, ignoring the proprietary
option theory on which the Court of Appeals had reversed.
Following the Smith case the Commissioner ruled in T. D. 5507 :4
The relationship of the option price to the market value of the stock on the
date the option is granted has been and will continue to be an important factor in
employee stock option cases. Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir.
1937) ; Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F. 2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935); Wanda
V. Van Dusen, 8 T. C. 388 (1947), aft'd, 166 F. 2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948); Albert
R. Erskine, 26 B. T. A. 147 (1932).
'T. D. 3435, 11-1 Cum. BULL. 50 (1923).
'Albert R. Erskine, 26 B. T. A. 147 (1932).
8 Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F. 2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935), reversing
29 B. T. A. 817 (1934) ; Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937),
reversing 31 B. T. A. 857 (1934).
'Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B. T. A. 253 (1938).
" Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 647 (9th Cir. 1938); Connelly's
Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F. 2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943); Edward J. Epsen, 44
B. T. A. 322 (1941).
"
1Malcolm S. Clark, P-H 1950 T. C. Mem. Dec. 1 50210; Norman G. Nichol-
son, 13 T. C. 690 (1949); James M. Lamond, P-H 1946 T. C. Mem. Dec. 1 46023.
1 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 13. The Commissioner also amended the regulations to
conform with the Board's holding. The difference between the option price and
the market price was to be taxable to the employee "to the extent that such
difference is in the nature of (1) compensation for services rendered or to be
rendered ... ." T. D. 4879, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 159.1- 324 U. S. 177 (1945). 1 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18.
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"If property is transferred by an employer to an employee
for an amount less than its fair market value, regardless of
whether the transfer is in the form of a sale or exchange, the
difference between the amount paid for the property and the
amount of its fair market value is in the nature of compensation
and shall be included in the gross income of the employee."
On the same day a statement amplifying and interpreting T. D. 5507
was issued:
"If an employee receives an option . . . to purchase stock
of the employer corporation, . . . and the employee exercises such
option, the employee realizes taxable income by way of compensa-
tion on the date upon which he receives the stock to the extent
of the difference between the fair market value of the stock when
it is received and the price paid therefor."' 5
The Commissioner thus, in effect, revived his 1923 ruling; again, all
options were taxable to the employee on the spread between the option
price and market value of the stock when the stock is received.1' The
Commissioner's determinations, however, did not end the idea of pro-
prietary stock options.'7
In Commissioner v. LoBue the stock option had been awarded
LoBue in recognition of his "contribution and efforts in making the
operation of the company successful."' 8  The Tax Court and Court of
Appeals had both held that the option was proprietary.19 In holding
that the distinction between proprietary and compensatory stock options
does not exist for income taxation purposes and that both should be
taxed alike, the Supreme Court said:
"... [T]here is not a word in section 22(a) which indicates
that its broad coverage should be narrowed because of an em-
ployer's intention to enlist more efficient service from his em-
ployees by making them part proprietors of his business. In our
view there is no statutory basis for the test established by the
courts below. . . . Section 22(a) taxes income derived from
compensation 'in whatever form paid.' And in another stock
--I. T. 3795, 1946-1 Cum. Bum. 15, 16.
"0 Usually the stock will be received at the same time the option is exercised.
However, when the stock is received at a date later than the exercise the Supreme
Court has held the spread to be taxable at the later time. Commissioner v. Smith,
324 U. S. 695, denying rehearing of 324 U. S. 177 (1945).
1 Phillip J. LoBue, 22 T. C. 440 (1954), aff'd 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955),
rev'd 351 U. S. 243 (1956) ; Robert A. Bowen, P-H 1954 T. C. Mem. Dec. g 54206,
as Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 244 (1956).
x' Philip J. LoBue, 22 T. C. 440 (1954), aff'd 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955),
ree'd 351 U. S. 243 (1956).
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option case we said that section 22(a) 'is broad enough to include
in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred
on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by
which it is effected.' "20
Thus the Court in LoBue has abolished a complicated tax doctrine
of eighteen years' standing2' by taking a more realistic view than had
the Courts below of the actual economic benefits derived by employees
receiving options. Now that the Court has ruled that all nonrestricted 22
stock options are compensatory, the question remains as to when and at
what valuation the gain should be reported.
TREATING THE RECEIPT OF THE OPTION ITSELF AS COMPENSATION
That the option itself may be the only intended compensation has
been recognized, at least in dicta, by the Supreme Court. In Com-
missioner v. Smith the option involved had no value when received by
the taxpayer. However, the Court stated: ". . . It of course does not
follow that in other circumstances not here present the option itself,
rather than the proceeds of its exercise, could not be found to be the
only intended compensation. '23 The Court had in the opinion previously
given an indication of what kind of option it might consider as com-
pensation to the employee:
". .. When the option price is less than the market price
of the property for the purchase of which the option is given, it
may have present value and may be found to be itself compensa-
tion for services rendered .... The option could operate to com-
pensate the taxpayer only as it might be the means of securing
the transfer of the shares of stock from the employer to the em-
ployee at a price less than their market value, or possibly, which
we do not decide, as the option might be sold when that disparity
in value existed .. "24
If an employee successfully contends that his option is compensa-
tion when received his tax saving might be substantial. He would
2 Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 247 (1956). The "another stock op-
tion case" was Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177, 181 (1945). Note that the
Court based its decision on INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(a), 52 STAT. 457 and
not T. D. 5507 or I. T. 3795. Section 22(a) defined gross income as including
"gains, profits, and income derived from ... compensation for personal service
...of whatever kind and in whatever form paid."
"For further discussion of the problems involved in determining whether
an option is compensatory or proprietary, see Dillavou, Employee Stock Options,
20 ACCOUNTING REV. 320 (1945); Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 706 (1947); Note,
11 TAX L. REv. 179 (1956).
2 See note 1 supra.




NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
report as ordinary income the value of the option the year received.
Any subsequent gain realized on sale of the option or stock would be
taxed under the lower capital gains rates.25
Aside from the dictum of the Supreme Court in the Smith case, the
taxpayer may find support from two recent Courts of Appeals cases.
In McNamara v. Commissioner26 the option was assignable and was
not conditioned on McNamara's continued employment with the corpora-
tion. A present value was indicated by the spread between option
price and market value when the option was granted .2 7 McNanara's
uncontroverted evidence showed the intent28 of the employer was that
the option itself would be compensation to him in 1945, the year of its
grant. For that year the corporation claimed a salary deduction in an
amount representing the value it placed on the option, and McNamara
reported the same amount as ordinary income.29 The Commissioner,
however, disallowed the employer's deduction and ruled that the trans-
action gave McNamara no income.
When McNamara exercised the option in subsequent years, the
Commissioner assessed deficiencies, stating that the spread between
option price and fair market value on the date the option was exer-
cised and stock paid for was taxable income.30 The Tax Court decided
in favor of the Commissioner.31
In reversing the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
felt that the facts of the case established a situation such as the Supreme
Court had described in the dictum of Commissioner v. Smith.3 2 The
2 Of course, the market price of the stock may decrease. This is the risk
that the employee takes in reporting the value of the option as ordinary income.
However, presumably the amount so reported would be reflected in the basis of the
option and, upon subsequent exercise, the basis of the stock.2'210 F. 2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
"The option granted a right to purchase a total of 12,500 shares during a two
year period. The option price was $16 per share. On the date the option was
granted the fair market value of the stock was $19 per share. The taxpayer and
the corporation valued the option at $16,375.
"
8A board of directors resolution had stated that the option was "in addition"
to the taxpayer's cash salary. In the yearly report to the Securities Exchange
Commission, the corporation reported that the option was granted to the taxpayer
for "services rendered or to be rendered."
29 If the taxpayer does not report the value of the option as income in the year
received, he may be estopped or deemed to have waived the right to claim the
amount as income in that year. See Bothwell v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 35 (10th
Cir. 1935).
"0 The difference between the option price and the market price of the stock
when the option was exercised was $78,125 in 1946 and $77,343.75 in 1947.
21 Harley V. McNamara, 19 T. C. 1001 (1953), re7Id 210 F. 2d 505 (7th Cir.
1954). The Tax Court said that the intended compensation was the profit to be
derived upon exercise of the option and not the option itself. "This is not a
case of the distribution of a stock option or warrant, which has a clearly ascer-
tainable market value or which the employee could readily sell. Although there
was no provision in the option forbidding assignment, it is nevertheless plain that
no assignment or sale was ever contemplated by either party." Id. at 1010.32324 U. S. at 181-82. The finding of the Tax Court that the compensation
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facts upon which the court relied were: (a) The taxpayer and the
employer intended the option as compensation when granted; (b) the
taxpayer and the employer both reported a valuation on the option itself
in 1945; (c) the option had value when granted; (d) the option was
assignable.
In Commissioner v. Stone's Estate33 the taxpayer, Stone, was allowed
to purchase one hundred warrants at a price of $10 per warrant. Each
warrant entitled him to buy one hundred shares of the employer's stock
at a certain price. On the date Stone obtained the warrants, the market
price of the stock was below the warrant price. However, he reported
$5000 compensation for that year as the total additional value of the
one hundred warrants.34 In the next year Stone sold eighty-nine of the
warrants for $82,680, returning the rest to the corporation at the pur-
chase price.
Stone sought to pay capital gain rates on the profit he realized from
the sale. The Commissioner determined that the gain was ordinary
income, falling within the scope of T. D. 5507 and I. T. 3795. He re-
lied specifically on a part of I. T. 3795:36
"If an employee transfers such option for consideration in an
arm's length transaction, the employee realizes taxable income by
way of compensation on the date he receives such consideration
to the extent of the value of such consideration."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court holding in favor of
the taxpayer, 36 both courts relying on the dictum in the Smith case.
The Court reasoned that the warrants had value when obtained by the
taxpayer. This was illustrated by the following facts: (a) Stone bought
the warrants and reported the amount by which his estimate of their
value exceeded the purchase price as income; (b) the warrants were
intended by the parties was not the value of the option itself but the spread between
fair market value of the stock on the day of exercise and the option price was
held "clearly erroneous" by the Circuit Court because not supported by substantial
evidence. "It seems clear to us, from the language of the parties found in the
written instruments they executed and from their actions, that they intended the
option itself to be the additional compensation by the parties for petitioner's
services." McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F. 2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1954).
"210 F. 2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954).
,The taxpayer's burden of proof on the value of the warrants was sustained
by two expert witnesses. The Tax Court said it was convinced from the evidence
that the 100 warrants were worth $6000 to Stone when he received them. How-
ever, exactly what data this valuation was based upon does not appear.
"1 1946-1 Cum. BULL. at 16.
"Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T. C. 872 (1953), aff'd 210 F. 2d 33 (3d Cir.
1954). The Tax Court reasoned that the warrants involved differed from the
usual options given to employees. On this ground it is difficult to reconcile this
decision with the Tax Court's decision in the McNamara case. However, in
McNamara the Tax Court had held that the option itself had no ascertainable
value; here, the warrants were held to have such a value. Accepting the court's
findings of fact the opposite holdings by the Tax Court are reconcilable.
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fully assignable by Stone; (c) the holder of the warrants was protected
from dilution of his right to purchase stock.
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. LoBue left the road open
for further taxpayer arguments that the receipt of the option is com-
pensation.
"It is of course possible for the recipient of a stock option to
realize an immediate taxable gain .... The option might have a
readily ascertainable market value and the recipient might be free
to sell his option .... ,,3
In future option cases the obstacle which employees will have to
overcome will be the proving of a "present value" of the option when
received, apparently required by the dictum in Commissioner v. Smith.8
The Court's dictum can be interpreted to mean that in order to have
present value the option price should be less than the market price of
the stock. In the LoBue case the Court referred to a "readily ascertain-
able market value" and the right to sell the option. It cited the Mc-
Namara case as an idea of what it had in mind.39  It may well be that
the Supreme Court intended to imply that proof of the existence of both
factors is essential for invocation of the McNamara rule.
As a summary, the following factors indicate a possibility that an
option will be taxed when received: (1) The option has value on the
date granted. Value means a present value and will usually be related
to the spread between the option price and the fair market value of the
stock. (2) The option is freely assignable by the employee. 40  (3) Cir-
cumstances surrounding the granting of the option indicate that the
parties intend the option as compensation. (4) The employee includes
the value of the option when granted in his tax return for that year.
Problems of valuation will not be too great for the employees of
larger corporations whose stock is readily available on the exchanges.
However, where a small corporation is involved, the value of the option
when received will usually be a matter of some conjecture. In some
tax matters the courts have been quite reluctant to evaluate property
where its value is a matter of much uncertainty.41 The Supreme Court
" Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 249 (1956).311324 U. S. at 181.
"' The Court made no reference to Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F. 2d
33 (3d Cir. 1954).
"'Where the option was not assignable it has been held not to be compensa-
tion to the employee at date of grant. Dean Babbitt, 23 T. C. No. 108 (Feb. 14,
1955) ; John C. Wahl, 19 T. C. 651 (1953). In John C. Wahl one half of the
option could not be obtained unless taxpayer was still employed by the corpora-
tion. Taxpayer could not assign the option except to other employees. Such re-
strictions were held to make determination of a value impossible.
41 In Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931), the Commiisioner attempted to
apportion amounts received and to be received by the taxpayer for sale of stock
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in the LoBue case seemed to be emphasizing this very point when it
referred to a "readily ascertainable market value." Rather than put a
highly conjectural valuation on the stock, the courts might prefer to
defer any taxable amount to the time the option is exercised. 42 In many
cases this rule might prevent the small corporation employee's use of
the lower tax rates as regards nonrestricted stock options.
CONCLUSION
Although Commissioner v. LoBue solved one problem of the Com-
missioner by eliminating proprietary stock options, it left him with
another when the Court passed up the opportunity to stifle its own
dictum in the Smith case. In the light of this new dictum in the LoBue
case and the Court's apparent approval of the McNamara decision, the
Commissioner may have to modify his position concerning the treat-
ment of the option as compensation. Although valuation problems
may prevent the treatment of the option as compensation by employees
of small corporations, there appears a good chance for such treatment
by employees of larger corporations.
DOUGLAS 0. TICE, JR.
Wills-Admission of Extrinsic Evidence to Explain Ambiguities in
Wills
In a recent case, Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Wolfe,' the testa-
trix left a will which read in part as follows: "To my sister, Camille
H. Wolfe, I leave my furniture, household effects and personal property
(emphasis added). The balance of my estate, I leave to the National
Red Cross Society of America." After payment of ascertained lia-
bilities and other bequests there remained $911.42 cash, and $20,915.78
in bonds and securities exclusive of furniture and household effects.
Both the Red Cross and Camille H. Wolfe claimed the cash, bonds,.
and securities under the will. The Red Cross contended that the words,
"personal property," in the bequest to Mrs. Wolfe was limited to
furniture, household effects, etc. and that they did not include stocks,
bonds, and cash which they claimed passed under the residuary clause
of the will. Mrs. Wolfe contended that the testatrix intended that the
stocks, bonds, and cash be included under the term, "personal property."
In trying to prove their contentions, both Mrs. Wolfe and the Red Cross
between return of capital and profit. The taxpayer argued that there was no ascer-
tainable present value of the profit. The Court decided in taxpayer's favor. There
would be no profit until taxpayer recovered her cost. See also Westover v.
Smith, 173 F. 2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949).
42 Burnet v. Logan, supra note 41.
1243 N. C. 469, 91 S. E. 2d 246 (1956).
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sought to introduce extrinsic evidence to aid in the construction of the
will, which evidence was refused by the lower court. On appeal, the
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that
there was a patent ambiguity and that evidence of the surrounding cir-
cumstances at the time of the testator's death should be admitted.
Thus, it is often the case that an otherwise valid will presents difficult
problems of construction because of ambiguities in the language em-
ployed. The question then presents itself: Under what circumstances
is it possible to introduce extrinsic evidence to aid in the construction of
the will?
The justification for admission of extrinsic evidence is the necessity
of the sitaution; that is, an ambiguity in the will itself, and unless an
ambguity exists, the testator's intention must be found only within
the "four corners of the will."2
The courts have classified ambiguities into two categories, "latent"
and "patent." A patent ambiguity arises when the will is ambiguous
on its face; i.e., from the very reading of the words of the will it is not
clear what they mean or what the testator intended.3 Thus, a will which
read: "I give to my four daughters the plantations on which I now live.
If any of my daughters die without issue, their portion is to be equally
divided among the three survivors & co.," 4 was held by our court to be
a. patent ambiguity because from the reading of the will the meaning
of the phrase, "& co.," was not clear. Also, if a testator leaves one
tract of land to two different people in the same will,5 the ambiguity is
apparent on the face of the instrument and is therefore patent.
The admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain or resolve a patent
ambiguity, has long been the subject of conflict among the courts. The
broad rule laid down in such cases is that extrinsic evidence is not ad-
missible in the case of a patent ambiguity, because the document was
void upon its face due to the uncertainty, and no interpretation could
be given to the words as there was nothing to interpret." This rule is
much too broad, however, when one considers the number of cases
'Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Green, 239 N. C. 612, 80 S. E. 2d 771
(1954) ; R. J. Reynolds v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 201 N. C. 267, 159 S. E.
416 (1931); Kidder v. Bailey, 187 N. C. 505, 122 S. E. 22 (1924); Wooten v.
Hobbs, 170 N. C. 211, 86 S. E. 811 (1915) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1627 (3rd ed. 1941).
Taylor v. Maris, 90 N. C. 619 (1884); Institute v. Norwood, 45 N. C. 65
(1853); 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1623 (3rd ed. 1941); 20 Am. JuR., Evidence § 1156
(1939).
'Taylor v. Maris, supra note 3.
'Bank of Manhatten v. Gray, 53 R. I. 377, 166 At]. 817 (1933) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS§ 1623 (3rd ed. 1941).
' Taylor v. Maris, 90 N. C. 619 (1884) ; Bailey v. Bailey, 52 N. C. 44 (1859);
Barnes v. Simms, 40 N. C. 392 (1848) ; Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N. C. 26 (1845)
Field v. Eaton, 16 N. C. 483 (1829).
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which admit some extrinsic evidence where the ambiguity was patent.7
The North Carolina Court has become more liberal in its attitude
toward allowing extrinsic evidence to aid in the construction of a
will where there is a patent ambiguity provided such extrinsic evi-
dence is limited to what it calls "circumstances attendant."8  Our court
on numerous occasions has said that in the construction of a wil the
cardinal purpose is to ascertian and give effect to the intention of the
testator as expressed in the words he has used, and, that to ascertain
such intention, all the provisions may be examined in the light of the
surrounding circumstances. These circumstances include the state of
the testator's family at his death, the condition and nature of his prop-
erty, and the relationship of the testator to his family and to beneficiaries
named in the will.2 For instance, in Wooten v. Hobbs0 the court
said, "The writing in which the will must be expressed, contains the
only testamentary intention that the law will effectuate. This in-
tention must be found within the instrument or nowhere. Hence, ex-
trinsic evidence is inadmissible to show an intent not contained in the
document itself. But when the will is such as to call for construction,
the court, with a view to securing a proper construction, puts itself, so
far as may be, in the position of the testator, that it may see things
from his view point. To this end, evidence regarding all relevant facts
and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of executing the
will is admissible." In other words, the court, in the case of a patent
ambiguity, can hear evidence concerning the "circumstances attendant"
to the making of a will so as nearly as possible to place itself in the
position of the testator at the time he wrote the will in order to ascertain
his intent. This evidence is to be considered by the court without the
use of a jury.1 The court may, however, in its discretion, submit ques-
tions of fact to a jury for determination.' 2 It should be noted, however,
that the evidence admitted is limited to the circumstances surrounding
the making of the will, and declarations by the testator of his intention
whether made before or after the execution of the will are inadmissible
to show his intent.18
7 Hubbard v. Wiggins, 240 N. C. 197, 81 S. E. 2d 174 (1954) ; In re Will of
Johnson, 233 N. C. 570, 65 S. E. 2d 12 (1951); Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N. C.
611, 36 S. E. 2d 17 (1945); Heyer v. Bullock, 210 N. C. 321, 186 S. E. 356(1936); Scales v. Barringer, 192 N. C. 94, 133 S. E. 410 (1926); Snow v.
Boylston, 185 N. C. 321, 117 S. E. 14 (1923); 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1624 (3rd ed.
1941) ; 57 Am. JuR., Wills § 1043 (1948).
8 Ibid. ' Ibid.10 170 N. C. 211, 86 S. E. 811 (1915).
"1 Cecil v. Cecil, 173 N. C. 410, 92 S. E. 158 (1917).
"In re Housing Authority, 235 N. C. 463, 70 S. E. 2d 500; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-172 (1953).
"' Holmes v. York, 203 N. C. 709, 166 S. E. 889 (1933) ; R. J. Reynolds v. Safe
Deposit and Trust Co., 201 N. C. 267, 159 S. E. 416 (1931) ; Raines v. Osborne,
184 N. C. 599, 114 S. E. 849 (1922).
1956]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The true rule seems to be that if the ambiguity is patent and the in-
tention of the testator cannot be discovered by a consideration of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of execu-
tion, then the devise must fail since other evidence may not be introduced
to show the testator's intention.14
The other type of ambiguity, which is designated as latent, does not
appear on the face of the instrument, but becomes apparent when other
evidence is introduced. The instrument seems unambiguous but it be-
comes ambiguous when an attempt is made to apply the words to exist-
ing facts. 15 It is generally stated that parol evidence can be admitted
to explain a latent ambiguity. 16 If there is a latent ambiguity, the
declarations of the testator as to his intentions, in contrast to the case
of patent ambiguities, will be admitted to prove the testator's intention
whether the declaration was made before or after the will.17
Latent ambiguities fall into three main groups: (1) Unambiguous
and certain description of a person, but two persons answer the descrip-
tion equally well: Thus, in Tilley v. Ellis,'8 where the testator devised
certain property to the "Methodist Episcopal Church" and the evidence
disclosed that there were two branches thereof under similar names, the
court said this was a latent ambiguity; or where the testator leaves cer-
tain property to Mary Jones and there is more than one Mary Jones, this
is a latent ambiguity and extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show the
intention of testator as to which Mary Jones was meant.' 9 (2) Unam-
biguous and certain description of property but two properties answer
the description equally well. So, when a testator devised what was
called the "Linebarger Plantation" and it could not be determined from
the will what specific piece of property was devised by this description,
the court held this to be a latent ambiguity and admitted extrinsic evi-
dence to explain it.20 (3) Unambiguous and certain description of
property or person, but the identity or location of the particular property
or person needs to be determined: Thus, where the testator was ac-
1" Ibid.
" Raines v. Osborne, supra note 13; 4 JONES, EVIDENCE § 1548 (2d ed.
1926) ; 4 PAGE, WMLS § 1623 (3rd ed. 1941).
"
8 Ladies Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928);
Raines v. Osborne, 184 N. C. 603, 114 S. E. 846 (1922); McLeod v. Jones, 159
N. C. 74, 74 S. E. 733 (1912); Institute v. Norwood 45 N. C. 65 (1853); 9
WIGORRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2470-2472 (3rd ed. 1940).
' In re Will of Southerland, 188 N. C. 325, 124 S. E. 632 (1924) ; 9 WIGa0RE,
EVMIENCE § 2472 (3rd ed. 1940).
s119 N. C. 233, 26 S. E. 29 (1896); See also: Ladies Benevolent Society v.Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928) ; Institute v. Norwood, 45 N. C. 65(1853).
" McDaniel v. King, 90 N. C. 597, 603 (1883) (dictum); 57 Amt. JUR.,
Wills § 1067 (1948).
20 Kincaid v. Lowe, 62 N.- C. 41 (1864); McDaniel v. King, supra note 19;
57 Amr. Ju., Wills § 1087 (1948).
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customed to call X by a nickname and the testator intended X to have
the property devised, even though the name used in the will was the
nickname, the court held this a latent ambiguity and extrinsic evidence
was admitted to show the intention of the testator.21
At first blush, it would seem that the Wolfe case,22 involved a latent
ambiguity, since a mere reading of the will indicates the personal prop-
erty is to go to Mrs. Wolfe, and the balance to the Red Cross. The
ambiguity becomes apparent only when it is discovered that the testator
possessed no real property and therefore, the "balance" to the Red Cross
could only be comprised of what is generally known as personal property.
Since this case does not fall into one of the three categories previously
mentioned in which a latent ambiguity must fall, the court was correct
in holding that there was no latent ambiguity. On the other hand, it
does not seem to be a true patent ambiguity since it is not apparent
on the face of the will that there is an ambiguity. However, in de-
termining that the will contained a patent ambiguity, the court evi-
dently reasoned that the phrase, "personal property," is in itself capable
of two meanings, 23 the broader including everything which is the sub-
ject of ownership except land and interest in land, while the more re-
stricted embraces only goods and chattels ;24 and thus, since it could not
be determined which was meant by the testatrix, there was a patent
ambiguity.
Although the North Carolina court's conclusions seem quite de-
fensible, the difficulty experienced by the trial court with the distinctions
between latent and patent ambiguities with the resulting questions of
admissibility of extrinsic evidence serves to emphasize the nicety of
the distinctions required.
It is the contention of the writer that our court should abandon
these old rules and follow the more practical appoach now being adopted
by many jurisdictions. This approach is to do away with the distinction
between latent and patent ambiguities. 25  Under this theory extrinsic
evidence may be admitted in cases involving patent ambiguities as in
those involving latent ambiguities to show the intent of the testator.
-1 Moseley v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S. W. 590 (1917).
2-243 N. C. 469, 91 S. E. 2d 246 (1956).
23 In holding that the phrase, "personal property," in this will is a patent am-
biguity, the court implies the phrase is ambiguous in itself. Quaere: If a testator
owns stocks, bonds, and real property and leaves the personal property to A and
the real property to B, does the will contain a patent abiguity?
"4 Blakeman v. Harwell, 198 Ga. 165, 31 S. E. 2d 50 (1944) ; Ward v. Curry,
297 Ky. 420, 180 S. W. 2d 305 (1944) ; 3 PAGE, WILLS § 964, 983 (3rd ed. 1941).
For a discussion of what passes under the words, personal property, in a will see
137 A. L. R. 212 (1942), an 162 A. L. R. 1134 (1946).25 In re Brodersen's Estate, 102 Cal. App. 2d 122, 229 P. 2d 38 (1951) ; Sater
v. Sater, 329 Mich. 706, 46 N. W. 2d 433 (1951) ; Moore v. Parrish, 38 Wash. 2d
642, 228 P. 2d 142 (1951); Fay v. Strader, 234 Minn. 444, 48 N. W. 2d 657
(1951) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1623 (3rd ed. 1941) ; 57 Am. JUR., Wills § 1043 (1948).
1956]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The court would only determine if there was an ambiguity; if so, ex-
trinsic evidence could be introduced allowing the jury to clear it up.
Such a rule would seem to permit greater freedom in determining the
testator's intent. In Armistead v. Armistead,26 the court stated: "The
distinction between latent and patent ambiguities, when examined, is
wholly unphilosophical, and founded upon a scholastic quibble of Lord
Bacon."
Another court has said: "The distinction between 'latent' and
'patent' ambiguities is now practically ignored and disregarded. The
courts without regard to the distinction, endeavor to arrive by the most
direct way at what the testator meant when he wrote the will."27
One of the chief arguments against changing to the new rule is that
it would encourage interested persons to perjure themselves.28  This
type of reasoning seems to rest on the assumption that more people will
be untruthful than will be truthful. While admitting that in a very few
cases a witness might perjure himself, it would seem that in the far
greater number of cases justice would be done by finding out the in-
tention of the testator so that the property could be disposed of as he
wished. The North Carolina Court has approached this position by
admitting the "circumstances attendant" in the case of a patent am-
biguity. It is submitted that the court should abandon altogether the
distinction between "latent" and "patent" ambiguities and, in all cases
where there is an ambiguity, admit the evidence necessary to establish
the intent of the testator.
EDWIN T. PULLEN
232 Ga. 597 (1861).
" Haupt v. Michaelis, Tex. Com. App., 231 S. W. 706 (1921).284 PAGE, WLLS § 1623 (3rd ed. 1941).
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